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  Summary 
i 
	  
Summary 
This thesis is an interdisciplinary exploration of the role of the jury in the criminal trial 
in which I draw together three areas: law - specifically jury research; education - 
specifically Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy; and interactive theatre arts – specifically 
Augusto Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed.  My vision is to develop a process which 
integrates the jury as meaningful participants in the trial and, to realise that, I have 
used the practical devices for communication in the work of Freire and Boal.  My work is 
conceptual and so the ideas put forward in the thesis are meant to be read as 
ideological visions rather than proposals which are based on empirical research. 
First, by mapping out the current research into juror understanding I make the claim 
that, as it currently stands, the jury do not participate in the criminal trial.  Second, by 
using Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy as a catalyst, I begin to assess the issues of 
communication through a critical pedagogical lens which results in my opinion that 
there is a real need to focus more on how we communicate rather than persistently 
focusing on what is being communicated in a criminal trial.  Finally, having developed 
heightened awareness of the need for being receptive to the methods of our 
communication I develop more practical solutions for integrated participation by looking 
to Augusto Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed in particular the use of his Joker as 
facilitator of communication. 
By the end of the thesis I have reimagined trial by jury, moving from a structure which 
has little or no room for jury participation to one which recognises the potential of the 
juror as an autonomous, thinking, human being, capable of his task, and which treats 
him,1 not as a subsidiary but rather as an integral part of the process.  In doing that I 
challenge the fundamental validating factor so often associated with trial by jury: the 
belief that jurors actually participate in the trial.  My research has dual benefits: first 
by using the methods developed by Freire and Boal I have expanded the boundaries in 
research techniques thus allowing us to come closer to the jury and, I argue, to 
understand them at a more genuinely nuanced level.  Second, my research offers real 
tools for jurors to use, tools for communication through participation which allow them 
to gain clarification, when they feel they require it, as the trial is in progress.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I have chosen at random to default to the male pronoun throughout the thesis however ‘he’ 
should be read as ‘he’ or ‘she’ equally. 
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Ultimately, as I communicate my arguments, I hope that the reader can appreciate the 
shift from presence to participation as I reimagine the role of the jury in the criminal 
trial. 
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Chapter one 
Introduction to the thesis 
1.1 Introduction to chapter one 
This is a conceptual thesis in which I present a reimagined picture of the role of the 
juror in the criminal trial.  In the course of the work I explore the scope of the role of 
the jury by offering alternative ways to address issues of their understanding within the 
trial framework.  In addition, I offer ideas which see the jurors as active participants in 
the trial process, able to voice their concerns when they do not understand certain 
terminology as it is presented within that process.  My work is based in a concern for 
humanity and empathy and so in that respect the exploration is ethical rather than 
political.  This is important to acknowledge early on as my reliance on the work of both 
Paulo Freire and Augusto Boal could be interpreted as meaning that my thesis is 
politically focused which is not the case.  As I have just said, I advance ideas which 
allow for the jurors to have a voice in the trial and through that voice I empower them 
in their role as juror.  Whilst these elements are obviously linked to politics, it is my 
personal belief that enabling a person to become empowered and to have a voice is 
deeply rooted in humanity, in empathy and in respect for another and it is on those 
elements that my thesis is built.  I should say however that whilst I develop ideas which 
see the jury empowered to interact in the trial process I do not suggest that this is at 
the expense of the accused’s right to a fair trial.  Therefore, I make the suggestions to 
integrate Freire and Boal’s theories into the trial process whilst simultaneously being 
mindful of the fact that the accused is, as he stands trial, in a vulnerable position and 
so to oppress him further by extending the trial for the sake of juror clarity should not 
be considered as a viable alternative to the current situation.   
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In attempting to integrate the theories from critical pedagogy and interactive theatre 
arts I am breaking away from the traditional norms seen in jury research methods and, 
whilst I acknowledge the place for social science research, I argue that unless we begin 
to diversify in our research methods in this area, we will be in danger of never really 
testing the boundaries both of the methods themselves, as well as the limits of juror 
capacity in a criminal trial.  
 
The essence of my work is conceptual and ideological in equal measure and to 
communicate my ideas I have turned to the work of Paulo Freire and Augusto Boal 
because it is in their work that I have found practical solutions when barriers to 
understanding and communication arise.  My research questions have developed to 
focus predominantly on juror communication and juror participation and my over-
arching aim in the thesis is to develop an understanding of both of these aspects as I 
attempt to enhance juror understanding in, and of, the trial.  Throughout my research I 
have questioned the way that we view the jury and so have challenged our perceptions 
of what jury participation is.  It is frequently argued that jury participation is important 
because it brings legitimacy to the criminal trial.  This may be true but it misses a 
crucial point because participation is frequently equated to physical presence which, 
when looked at in the broadest sense, is simply not the same thing.  Indeed, this 
perception is misleading both in terms of conveying a real picture of the part played by 
jurors, as well as reflecting a realistic position from which to develop future research.  
Therefore, we must be sure that we are clear about what juror participation within that 
parameter means and be careful not to equate their presence in the courtroom with 
their participation in the trial.  Thus, in this thesis I put forward suggestions to 
transform the situation as I believe it to be from one in which there is little or no room 
for the jury to participate to one which embraces it, makes space for it to be an equal 
part of the process, and treats it, not as a subsidiary, but rather as an integral part of 
the broader trial process.   
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Relatively early in my enquiry I was almost totally persuaded by the large body of 
existing research which indicates that the jury do sometimes struggle to understand for 
a variety of reasons. For example, they may find the legal language indecipherable or 
ambiguous, they may feel alienated in the process and as a result may default to relying 
on extra-legal influences, rather than focusing on the trial evidence when deciding their 
verdict, each element adding to the overall burden that they may find themselves 
under.1  There was no doubt in my mind that there were problems for the jury within 
the current framework and that those problems could be narrowed down to the fact 
that there seemed to be, in part, a breakdown in the communication process as well as 
barriers - both literal and symbolic - to communication between the legal professionals 
and the jury.  The other thing that caught my attention relatively early in the project 
was the language of the research and in particular the focus on participation.  I became 
aware of the frequent reference to juror participation and questioned whether there is 
a genuine belief amongst researchers that there is such a thing or whether through time 
this terminology used in relation to the actions of the jury has become either a 
presumption in the research or a misplaced norm in the language.  With the benefit of 
reflection I am inclined to suggest that it is a misplaced norm and so I challenge the 
fundamental assumption that the jury are participants in the trial as it is currently 
organised.  Indeed, I maintain throughout that the jury do not, as it stands currently, 
participate in any way except in the sense that they turn up and deliver a verdict and, 
whilst I accept the argument that presence alone can be regarded as a form of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For example, in respect of comprehension of legal language I began my exploration with the early 
studies carried out by Kalven and Zeisel as part of the Chicago study – Kalven, H. Jr. and 
Zeisel, H. (1966), The American Jury, Boston and Toronto, Little, Brown and Company.  In 
respect of the legal language I looked firstly to the research carried out by Charrow and 
Charrow - Charrow R. and Charrow V., (1979), ‘Making Legal Language Understandable:  A 
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions’ 79 Columbia Law Review, 1306 and when referring 
to extra-legal influences I looked inter alia at the effect of pre-trial publicity and the internal 
dynamics which may affect the jurors in such studies as Finch, E. and Munro, V.E. (1995), 
“Juror Stereotypes and Blame Attribution in Rape Cases Involving Intoxicants,” Brit. J. Criminol., 
45, 25-38 and Lloyd-Bostock, S. (2000), ‘The effect on Juries of Hearing About the Defendants 
Previous Record: a Simulation Study’, Crim.LR, 734.  These studies are discussed at greater 
length in chapter two. 
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participation in other situations, I do not equate juror presence with their participation 
in a trial.2   
As a result of my research I hope to have fostered renewed belief in a part of the legal 
system which continues to come under criticism, with those criticisms plain to see when 
we take a cursory glance at both the academic research and the populist opinions 
reported in the media.3  I have attempted to shape a template for trial by jury which 
challenges boundaries in terms of research methods as well as offering tools for the jury 
to use in live trials and in that way I am confident that my thesis contributes something 
new to the current scholarship.  Before discussing the journey that I took in researching 
my thesis I shall draw a brief outline of the emergence of the research questions. 
1.2 The emergence of the research questions and the distinct components 
of the exploration 
The primary aim at the start of my research was to deliver the elusive answer which 
would solve all of the questions in respect of juror understanding and thus bring to an 
end the constant analysis of the place, part and purpose of the jury within the criminal 
trial.  To do that I began to place my attention, as those before had done, on the legal 
and social science research into juries with the intention of finding this ‘solution.’  I was 
soon to discover however that my initial aim was both naïve and limiting and as a result 
of this early realisation I changed course, this time hoping to identify the specific 
language that the jury found problematic.  I felt at that stage that if I were able to 
identify the problematic language I could attempt to build a way around the problem(s) 
to enable the jury to better understand the trial with the idea that they would then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Chapter four is dedicated to the issues of participation and chapter five contextualises the 
concepts. 
3 See for example Darbyshire P. (1991), ‘The Lamp that Shows that Freedom Lives.  Is it worth the 
candle?’ Criminal Law Review, 749; Darbyshire, P., Maughan, A. and Stewart, A. (2001), ‘What 
Can the English Legal System Learn from Jury Research Published up to 2001?’ Commissioned 
Research for the Auld Report; most recently the media coverage of the collapse of the Vicky 
Pryce trial indicated a lack of confidence in the capacity of the jury and called for more research 
into how juries come to their decisions see 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9885066/Juries-could-be-open-to-more-scrutiny-two-top-
lawyers-say.html cf. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/feb/21/vicky-pryce-retrial-defence-jury-
system [live at 02/07/2013] 
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base their verdicts on firm knowledge rather than supposition.  Once more I realised 
that this perspective brought me back to what had already been researched thoroughly 
and contributing to the already large scholarship with an analysis of the minutiae of the 
existing research was not my aim.4  Finally, I came to the conclusion that my intended 
aim was to create the space in the trial framework for the jury to act and react to the 
best of their ability in as normal a way as possible.  By that I mean that I wanted to 
create a space where, if a juror did not understand a word or a phrase then that juror 
could, unapologetically, ask for clarification and thereafter the trial would move on.  
On understanding that I needed to enable a system where that type of normal 
communication could take place I turned to the work of Paulo Freire and Augusto Boal, 
neither of whom are commonly related to this field of research; however my choice was 
not without reason.  
My background, prior to working in law, was as a performance arts practitioner and 
teacher and I have had years of experience applying the theories developed by Freire 
and Boal in a practical sense.  I have seen first-hand how their work has the capacity to 
transform peoples’ lives, and as a result of that experience their work continues to have 
a great deal of influence in the way that I view the potential of people in all situations.  
Thus, the lens through which I view the jury, and so the lens through which I have 
written this thesis, is in part an academic legal one but is equally one guided by my 
practical experiences of Freire and Boal’s theories to act as catalysts for change and 
transformation, which have at their roots empowerment through communication and 
participation.  It was at that point that I realised that I was questioning the role of the 
jury in the trial and from that point I realised one of the core research questions of my 
thesis was not so much about finding a ‘solution’, rather it was about rethinking my 
image of the extent of the role of the jury - in terms of their capacity to contribute in 
the criminal trial – and then reimagining a role which would see them as fully 
integrated, active and meaningful participants in the trial.  Therefore, I began to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I discuss the existing research in chapter two. 
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question my own pre-framed image of their role, much of which was influenced by the 
role which is projected by the current research and the available literature as well as 
images amassed from popular culture.  Through that process I began to challenge some 
fundamental ideas commonly associated with the jury, specifically, the idea that they 
are participants in the trial and so, to move productively on from those challenges, in 
the course of the thesis I advance ideas which can result in tangible juror participation.   
I have written this thesis with the belief that my ideas could alter the way we think 
about the role for the jury not because I imagine that they may work in some ethereal 
way, but rather, as already noted, that I have practical experience of these ideas 
working in a variety of forums and I see no reason why they could not be as powerful in 
the criminal courtroom.  I accept that what I suggest in the chapters to follow may 
require some substantial shifts in perspective; however, I argue that if we do not at 
least embrace the arguments – even if that is only a transient sceptical embrace – we 
may miss a real opportunity to look afresh, and from a different perspective, at the 
issue of jury participation in the criminal trial and by extension we may miss the 
opportunity to understand their contributions as integrated participants in the criminal 
trial process.   
Against this backdrop I have aimed to develop awareness of the current trial 
communication and from there to expand the role for the jury to include their 
participation in that process.  I have also attempted to demonstrate how, with the 
integration of the theories of Paulo Freire and Augusto Boal, we can develop a trial 
format which has at its core a place where each of the trial players is able to 
communicate, with the result that this thesis is a conceptual work which shifts the 
emphasis from juror presence to juror participation in the criminal trial process.  
My starting point was to take the jury research which was specifically focused on juror 
understanding and to assess the findings in an attempt to understand better how juries 
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functioned.5  Thereafter I would assess the existing proposals for improving juror 
understanding and hopefully move beyond those solutions to develop my own answers to 
the problems.  One of the primary weaknesses in this early approach was that I kept 
losing sight of my primary aim which was to develop our awareness of the current trial 
communication before considering how the jury were able to function therein.  In short, 
I was missing my own point because the longer I placed the focus only on the jury, the 
further away I drifted from considering them within the broader trial structure.  This 
resulted in the research becoming mundane, repetitive and tired.  I therefore reverted 
back to my original aims, I re-engaged with what exactly it was that I wanted to say and 
I realised that I needed to breathe new life into how I was going to go about saying it in 
order to communicate my voice in a way that felt real for me and therefore would 
enable others to hear the spirit in my ideas.  I should say that the irony of consistently 
failing to communicate my ideas as clearly as possible did not escape me and it made it 
all the more acute and personal that I had to find a way to develop my voice, otherwise 
the thesis, in my opinion, would be futile.  It was that part of the journey that 
underpins my argument which is carried throughout the thesis that it was 
communication per se that we should be concerned with and it was at that point that I 
realised that I had the tools to tackle this with a fresh innovative approach.   
From that point I abandoned my search to identify the specific language which may 
have been problematic because I realised that it was not the substance of what was 
being said that was the problem, rather, it was the style of the communication of the 
information that was the biggest issue.  It was at that stage that I realised that I needed 
to make a very dramatic alteration to the trial framework in order to accommodate the 
jury and I therefore, quite literally, made space for them in the trial structure.  I should 
point out the obvious, i.e. that there is physical space in the trial for the jury, however 
it amounts to little more than an allocation of designed space both inside the courtroom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Which as I said earlier started in the US with Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury above n.1 
and in the UK with Baldwin, J. and McConville, M. (1979), Jury Trials, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
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and in the ante-room for deliberation but very little else can be regarded as space for 
the jury and certainly a space that is equipped for them to function, to communicate 
normally, to participate is simply not there.  My solution to this problem therefore is to 
integrate the theories and devices used by Freire in education and Boal in Forum 
Theatre, to create the space for participation in its myriad forms and to explore what 
positives could potentially arise from their integration into the current trial process.   
The second strand of my research invites the reader to regard as potentially valuable 
the work of Paulo Freire as a way to enhance communication in the criminal trial.  
Freire was a teacher who believed that traditional or conventional teaching was 
oppressive and so in his problem-posing education we see a system for communication 
which empowers through student-centred dialogue.  I use as my starting point of 
research his Pedagogy of the Oppressed.6  I should say at this early stage that I am, of 
course, well aware of the political aspect of both Freire and Boal’s work.  In Freire’s 
case his liberatory education was regarded as a way to ensure, or at least inspire, the 
idea in a person that freedom was possible.  I have specifically chosen however to 
remain a-political throughout the thesis partly because there is not sufficient space to 
explore all aspects of his work but mainly because I am more interested in exploring the 
practical aspects of the work and so the possibility of integrating the tools he developed 
in his problem-posing education as tools for use in a criminal trial.  Thus, I have 
integrated his problem-posing style of education which has at its core his use of 
codifications to inspire and instigate dialogue as a way to effect a change in the 
communication style of the courtroom and so to enhance understanding in the criminal 
trial.7  In chapter three therefore I have embedded images which I hope will show 
clearly how, if we use such codifications in conjunction with the problem-posing, we 
may be in a better position to understand the jury and, most importantly, the jury will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Freire, P. (1970), Pedagogy of the Oppressed, translated by Myra Bergman Ramos, London, 
New York, Penguin. 
7 Problem-posing is central to Freire’s critical pedagogy and I consider it in detail in chapters three 
and five. 
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be given the opportunity to engage with the trial in which they play a part.  From that 
engagement there will hopefully come empowerment and already we begin to gain a 
picture more positive than the picture of juries past.  
 
My third strand of research introduces Augusto Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed 
techniques with particular focus on the use of his Forum Theatre and Joker as a way to 
break the boundaries of understanding by way of communicative participation 
techniques.  Boal was a theatre practitioner best known for his Forum Theatre which 
was a small part of the broader Theatre of the Oppressed.  His theatre devices, which 
include the Joker and spect-actor, are devices used to empower and to generate 
communication through participation.  Through using Freire’s problem-posing pedagogy 
and Boal’s Joker as ways to re-ignite our perceptions of what communication and 
understanding are, I have quite literally reimagined the role of the jury in the criminal 
trial.  I have made space for it - something which I argue is lacking in the current 
framework - and I have enabled a system which sees the jury as actively involved, 
where communication is clear and where solutions to hurdles are facilitated by Boal’s 
Joker at the point at which they arise.  My work breaks new ground in that my 
reimagined trial regards the jury as an integral and equal part of the process situated in 
a conceptual framework which supports and enables dialogue between legal 
professionals and jurors during the trial.  Moreover, my ideas transcend the boundaries 
often associated with barriers to communication and participation by integrating Boal’s 
Joker.  First the Joker enables us to see beyond physical barriers which may come in the 
shape of the segmentation and segregation of the courtroom interior design, and which 
are commonly associated with power imbalance or hierarchical status symbols.  Second 
the Joker empowers us to overcome barriers to communication and reminds us that the 
ability to participate will always be available.  In the fourth chapter I have recreated a 
segment of a fictitious trial in which I engage the reader in a mini-forum to attempt to 
demonstrate the potential of integrating Boal’s theories.   
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Freire and Boal are considered both individually and together as people who can be 
linked because of their respective inspirations of each other.  Whilst for most of their 
individual careers they worked separately, it was their work together, created in the 
latter parts of both their lives, which has touched, influenced, and broken boundaries in 
a variety of areas which include education, performance arts, and legislation in Latin 
America.8  Indeed, part of the influence for Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed was his 
continued interest in, and exposure to, Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed.  Boal first 
met Freire in the 1960s when he was working at the Arena Theatre, however it was not 
until 1973, when he was working, as part of a much bigger team in a large-scale literacy 
project in Peru, that he began to use Freire’s ideas more explicitly.  The project, which 
was run by Alicia Saco, was known as the Operación Alfabetización Intergral or ALFIN 
project and its aim was to eradicate illiteracy in Peru.  The teams communicated 
through a range of ‘artistic languages’ such as photography, puppetry, journalism, 
music and theatre.  Boal organised the theatre arm of the project and although Freire 
was not actually a part of the project when Boal was working on it, his vision and 
insistence on the necessity of conscientizaçãon were ever present and had a huge 
impact.9  The primary aim of the ALFIN project was to enable communication in a range 
of languages, artistic as well as linguistic, so Boal worked with the participants and 
developed techniques from which they would be enabled to ‘speak’ theatre for 
themselves rather than continually being content only to watch performances which 
were already written and rehearsed.  Boal and Freire always assumed that the people 
involved in the projects were intelligent people who deserved to be respected and not 
patronised, thus they had the understanding that the students were not ignorant, rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For example as a result of the ALFIN project the face of illiteracy in Brazil changed within 85 days 
- this project was one in which both Freire and Boal played a part.  Additionally, in Boal’s 
Legislative Theatre we can see how he affected some laws in Brazil – Boal, A. (1998), 
Legislative Theatre: Using Performance to Make Politics, translated by Adrian Jackson, London 
and New York, Routledge. 
9 Conscientizaçãon is the process of developing a critical awareness of our social reality through 
praxis (action and reflection).  Action is the key because it is the process of changing reality.  
Freire argued that we acquire social myths and that those have a dominant effect on our 
understanding and so developing a critical awareness through learning will enable us to 
become aware of real problems and actual needs. http://www.freire.org/paulo-freire/concepts-
used-by-paulo-freire/ [live at 02/07/2013]. 
     
11 
 
they simply did not have the tools that they needed to read and write and the core of 
their education therefore was dialogue which stemmed from understandings of their 
worlds.  Their theories both in collaboration and individually have had huge impact on 
people around the world in projects where their theories are either at the forefront or 
they underpin the core teaching ethos in other spheres. 
 
The final strand of my research touches on how we may be influenced by allocated 
space in both the courtroom and the courthouse and so I nod towards where I imagine 
my research will go post-thesis.  I make a brief exploration of our subliminal deference 
to allocated space, to how the architecture of the courtroom and the courthouse has 
the ability to create illusions which could impact on those using the space.10  This may 
result in jurors’ normal senses being disrupted to suppress or confine their natural 
ability to participate thus calling into question the power of the architecture and 
interior design either to oppress or to liberate.  In his Forum Theatre Boal shows us why 
we do not need to rely on traditional theatre spaces to communicate his theatre and 
this has inspired me to consider more deeply how we react to or are influenced by 
space.  Thus, I draw in the visions of, among others, Peter Brook11 whose observations 
on the influence of theatre space inspired me to consider how I could encourage the 
participants in the trial to understand and own their space, thereby gaining a sense of 
empowerment through their understanding of the impact of that space.12   
 
To summarise, then, by introducing Freire’s pedagogy I challenge the current norms 
surrounding juror understanding through oral communication.  Rather than continuing to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In chapter five I take into consideration the work Claire Graham and Linda Mulcahy both of whom 
assess the impact of courthouse and courtroom architecture on those using the space.  
Graham, C. (2003), Ordering Law: The Architectural and Social History of the English Law 
Court to 1914, Aldershot and Vermont, Ashgate; Mulcahy, L. (2011), Legal Architecture, Justice, 
due process and the place of law, Oxon and New York, Routledge. 
11 Brook, P. (1972), The Empty Space, Middlesex, England and Victoria, Australia, Penguin. 
12 See for example Boal’s Games for Actors and Non-Actors where he guides the user through a 
series of techniques to enable this awareness – Boal, A. (1992), Games for Actors and Non-
Actors, translated by Adrian Jackson, London and New York, Routledge. 
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endorse the notion that jurors need to be taught I have shifted the focus to empower 
the jury to take ownership of their task through the integration of critical pedagogical 
techniques.  Moreover, by integrating the work of Boal I have enabled jurors to 
communicate by participating in a clear and normal way by being able to stop the trial 
at points where they do not understand.  Finally, by questioning the link that is often 
been made between criminal trials and theatricality and by demonstrating that the 
‘theatre’ or ‘theatricality’ is far more nuanced than proscenium arch theatres and 
conventional plays (which is so often the default point for departure in this 
comparison), I have broadened images of both a trial and theatricality in a trial, thus 
disrupting the norms for both actors and audiences alike.13   
 
1.2.1 Key concepts employed in the thesis 
The key concepts that I focus on in the thesis are the use of communication in the form 
of dialogue, and participation as ways to empower the jury in the trial with the aim of 
developing a style of communication which sees the jurors as engaged participants in 
that process.  I am unconvinced that there is participation by jurors in the trial as it is 
currently structured and so I question whether there is actually a belief amongst 
researchers that that is a practical reality for the jury.  Indeed, it seems to me that 
through reliance on the fact that the jury are present in the courtroom – a point that 
surely cannot be contested regardless of the perspective from which we are looking – 
there follows the implication that those present are participants and with that 
implication comes the idea that jurors are treated with the same dignity, are afforded 
the same flexibility, or are permitted to interact as they see fit, just as the other 
participants in the trial are.  Whilst I do accept that presence alone could amount to 
participation in certain circumstances, I stress that the presence of the jury – because it 
is an enforced presence – does not fall into that category.  This is a point that was 
raised by Duff et.al when they argued that it is essential, when thinking about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I discuss this in chapter four. 
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participation to define what exactly that means, drawing our attention to questions 
such as “Is it a requirement, for participation, that a person speaks; or is contributing 
through representation adequate; or is it even sufficient that the person is merely 
present?”14   
In their 2007 book Duff et.al explore issues of participation as a way to develop a 
normative theory of the criminal trial, “based on an account of its central 
communicative purpose as a process through which citizens are called to answer charges 
of wrongdoing.”15  When considering the question of what participation means in 
relation to the accused, the authors argue that at a very basic level there should be 
“recognition that the defendant at trial is not to be treated as a mere object of 
investigation, but rather as a citizen who is called to answer a charge and, if he is 
criminally responsible, to account for his conduct.”16  To do that, they make a very 
strong case for the defendant to be able to communicate all the time, regarding this 
communication as a form of participation in itself.  However, as they examine what this 
actually means for the accused they draw our attention to when the ideal of 
participation for an accused is undermined in the current trial framework.  For 
example, they highlight that the accused may be prevented from participating when he 
does not understand what is going on; when his counsel “exclude his voice…[or]…the 
language and atmosphere of the trial might be alienating or intimidating in ways that 
effectively undermine the defendant’s participation.”17  Thus, on the one hand the ideal 
of participation is relatively straightforward, however the reality may be far from that 
ideal and so in order to give scope to my interest in juror participation, as well as to 
gain a clearer definition of what we mean by participation in the trial context we need 
to acknowledge that, in general, it can come in a variety of different forms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Duff, A., Farmer. L., Marshall, S. and Tadros, V. (2007), The Trial on Trial: volume three, 
Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial, Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing 
at p.201 (subsequently referred to as Trial three). 
15 Duff et.al. (2007), Trial three above n.14, p.13. 
16 Duff et.al. (2007), Trial three above n.14, p.203 
17 Duff et.al. (2007), Trial three above n.14, p.153 
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Broadly, the different forms of participation could be categorised as proactive, 
reactive, active and passive – all of which feature in daily life and equally all feature in 
the criminal trial to varying degrees, depending on who the participant at a particular 
point is.  In general, proactive participation takes the form of, for example, the 
Olympic athlete choosing to take part for himself and / or his team in his particular 
sport.  These athletes participate in their sports with the aim of winning both for 
themselves and for their teams and so it would be fair to say that they are actively 
involved with the aim of achieving a positive end.  Reactive participation takes the form 
of taking part but only after instruction or permission from another, sometimes an 
authority figure, sometimes not.  Reactive participation is different from passive 
participation and I illustrate this with an example made by Duff et.al.  They make the 
point that it may not always be clear when people are participating, using as their 
example those people who are a part of an electoral system where voting is compulsory 
but who choose to abstain from casting their vote.  They are inactive or passive but 
nonetheless they are participants because their abstention still acts as a form of 
communication.18  This clearly marks the difference between passive forms of 
participation, opposed to reactive forms of participation: in the inactive or passive 
situation I have just described we can see that choices are still being made whereas in 
the reactive there may be no room for choice.  I should therefore stress here that the 
difference with the passive juror is that he has come to the point of being the passive 
observer through no choice of his own and so in this sense we could say that this does 
not amount to a form of passive participation as I shall later demonstrate.   
 
As we shall see in chapter four, Augusto Boal makes a similar observation when referring 
to the spectators in a Forum Theatre piece.  He makes the point that just because the 
spectator does not interact in the forum does not mean to suggest that he is not 
participating meaningfully for himself.  The act of attending the theatre (or space 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Duff et.al. (2007), Trial three above n.14, p.202. 
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where the piece is performed) is an indication of his proactive participation in itself.  
The same cannot be said of a jury who, whilst they are in the courtroom may look like 
they have a similar role as the theatre audience but with the crucial distinction that 
they did not choose to become a part of the trial by jury process thus calling to question 
the whole notion that they are participating at all. I suggest that it is useful to draw 
these distinctions because it allows us to reflect a little more on what we mean by 
participation generally and, when thinking about juror participation we may be inclined 
to consider more deeply what that means in the context of the trial.  
 
In their investigations, Duff et.al. defend a model of a criminal trial which “rests on the 
claim that the trial ought to seek knowledge through communicative participation.”19  
They highlight that the (guilty) verdict of the court should be an expression, not only of 
truth but also of knowledge gained throughout the process and that that knowledge 
would be based on a “proper participatory process.”20  This model is based in the 
normative concerns that arose in their investigation of the criminal trial in England and 
Wales “and in an investigation of the appropriate processes and claims that are central 
to the general practises whereby people hold each other responsible for their 
conduct.”21  Their observations, I would say, are not too dissimilar to those made by 
Boal in that his Joker wants problems or points of view to be investigated through the 
Forum performance rather than those points being assumed to be actual or real and 
therefore demonstrated as truth(s) in the performance and this is something that I look 
at in detail in chapter four however for the moment I shall pay particular attention to 
why participation – as a general concept – is important for the criminal trial.    
 
Participation, in a general sense, is important for the criminal trial because it brings 
with it the sense that justice is being seen to be done.  When considering why jury 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Duff et.al. (2007) Trial three above n.14, p.199 [emphasis original]. 
20 Duff et.al. (2007) Trial three above n.14, p.199. 
21 Duff et.al. (2007) Trial three above n.14, p.199. 
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participation is so important, we shall see in chapter two that one of the frequently 
cited explanations in their support, is that with their inclusion comes a legitimising of 
the trial process.22  By extension therefore beliefs such as the belief that their 
participation is a reliable way of determining guilt, or that through their participation in 
the process, justice is seen to be fair, equitable and democratic, begin to emerge.  
Indeed, there is strong evidence in such studies as the Arizona Project,23 the New 
Zealand Jury Project,24 Thomas’ Are Juries Fair,25 and Heuer and Penrod (1996)26 (all of 
whom have argued that the more active jurors were the better they understood the 
trial) to suggest that if the jury are participating in the trial they will encounter fewer 
obstacles in terms of their general understanding of it.   
 
I suggest therefore that there are two ways in which meaningful jury participation is 
important in a criminal trial. First, that participation may offer	  a way for the jury to 
improve their understanding by allowing scope for them to take part through asking 
questions and second, that through actual, practical, juror participation comes a 
reinforced sense of legitimacy in the trial process.  However, whilst there is a great 
deal of information which helps us to better understand participation in a trial in the 
general sense,27 when trying to establish that same sense of clarity from a juror’s 
perspective the scholarship is a little less rich.  Thus, given the research which indicates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See Thomas, C. (2007), Diversity and Fairness in the Jury System, Ministry of Justice Research 
series 02/07 (subsequently referred to as Thomas (2007)); Bar Council (2002), ‘Public backing 
for jury ‘rock solid’ new poll shows’, Bar Council Press Release, 30 January 2002; IMC 
Research (2007), State of the Nation 2006, Summary Results, www.icmresearch.co.uk  [live at 
03//07/2013]. 
23 Dann, B.M. and Logan III, G. (1996), ‘Jury reform: the Arizona Experience,’ 79 Judicature, 
Number 5, March-April, 280 (subsequently referred as Arizona Project). 
24 Young, W. Cameron, N. Tinsley, Y. (2001), Juries in Criminal Trials, Law Commission of New 
Zealand Preliminary Paper 37, Vol 2, Wellington, New Zealand (subsequently referred to in this 
chapter as the New Zealand Report 2001). 
25 Thomas, C. (2010), ‘Are Juries Fair,’ Ministry of Justice Research Series, 1/10, February 2010. 
26 Heuer, L. and Penrod, S. (1996), ‘Increasing Juror Participation in Trials through Note-Taking 
and Question Asking,’ 79, Judicature 256 and cf. with their earlier study Heuer, L. and Penrod, 
S. (1994), ‘Trial Complexity: a Field Investigation of its Meaning and its Effects,’ in Bull, R and 
Carson, D. (eds.), (1995) Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts, Chichester, Wiley in 
which they reported that when given the opportunity to take notes jurors preferred not to as they 
found it hampered their concentration. 
27 For example the Trial on Trial series. 
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that jurors may feel alienated by the system, I strongly suggest that it is crucial that the 
jury can see that they are being integrated into the trial system and in doing that we 
may make clear for them why their participation is so important.28  Indeed, if they can 
see and feel that they are a valuable part of the system, and that what they do whilst in 
their role as juror is taken as seriously by the rest of the trial participants as it is by 
them, then their feelings of, for example, alienation, may be set aside.  Indeed, I argue 
that developing an environment and process in which the jury really regard themselves 
as genuine participants in the trial, and that that feeling or sense is reciprocated, is a 
vital component and should not to be underestimated.   
 
My position therefore is that participation is crucial and the more that it can be 
facilitated the better to enhance understanding in the trial generally.  I acknowledge 
that my insistence that the jury participate as much as possible is open to a great deal 
of criticism not least because it could be construed as my inviting ad hoc interruptions 
from the jury and by extension, the fear that my suggestions could result in criminal 
trials becoming highly disruptive.  My concept however, is a situation in which jurors 
can participate in a meaningful way so that they have the opportunity to clarify their 
own understanding of aspects of the trial.  This would mean that the type of 
participation to which I refer is active: the juror will actively stop the process and will 
ask his question; this participation will be supported / facilitated / enabled by Boal’s 
Joker.29  Therefore I believe we will gain a sense of how important the chance to 
participate is when we are able to see the benefit (in terms of their enhanced 
understanding) that the jury gain from being actively included in the process.  
Moreover, I can see that that active involvement will bring with it tangible value for 
integrating participatory techniques to the criminal trial process.  This belief is based 
not only in my understanding and experience of the positive effect of Boal’s work, but 
also on what the established research indicates about juror attitudes to their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See for example Arizona above n.23 or NZ above n.24 
29 I demonstrate the practical application of the Joker in chapter five. 
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involvement in the trial.  In that regard I stress again why it is vital that we truly 
understanding why participation in the trial is so important because without such a 
nuanced understanding my fear is that we will never really know what actual jurors’ 
attitudes are towards their involvement in the trial.    
 
Therefore, if we accept - as I do - that participation is important as a factor which 
supports the integrity of the trial, the questions then arise of who is regarded as eligible 
for participation, to what extent do parties participate and, if we mean that 
participation by the jury in the criminal trial is something which can add value to the 
overall process, then it is time to examine what that means in practice.  I address all of 
these questions in chapters three, four and five of the thesis. 
 
1.3 What I do and what I do not do in the thesis 
I have said that my thesis is concerned with finding ways to enable jurors to be an 
integrated part of the trial process and through that integration they are able to 
communicate their concerns when they are faced with hurdles which may affect their 
understanding.  I have chosen to use the work of Freire and Boal because it is in their 
work that we can see how, when people are integrated and given the tools to take part, 
they become empowered to take ownership of their tasks.  Thus, I have used the 
practical elements of their work as a tool for discovery in my research into the jury and 
this is something that I hope could continue into future research in the field.  Moreover, 
the practical elements of their work can also act as tools for discovery for the jury as 
they attempt to understand in live trials.  In straightforward terms therefore I propose 
to develop a conceptual framework which makes space for the integration of problem-
posing or participation facilitated by the Joker with the aim of improving juror 
understanding as and when that is necessary as the trial is in progress.  Accordingly 
there are dual benefits in my research: first, by integrating the work of Freire and Boal I 
offer a way for us to improve juror understanding and participation in criminal trials by 
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providing alternative ways for the jury to seek clarity through heightened 
communication and participation devices; second, I might offer research insights which 
are currently lacking about where in the trial problems arise for the jury and what those 
problems amount to thus improving our understanding of how juries operate.  From that 
point we may be able to develop responses to poor juror understanding which are more 
specifically designed to respond to clearly identifiable problems.  Having set out what 
my thesis does do, I now make it clear what it does not, and was never intended to, do.   
First, it was not my aim in the thesis to undertake a comprehensive review of the 
existing empirical research into jury comprehension. Whilst I have highlighted the core 
pieces of empirical research into the jury and have used the lessons learned in those 
projects to inform my project, I have not reassessed the minutiae of those projects in 
an attempt to either bring a fresh perspective to their findings or to undermine their 
conclusions.  Moreover my analysis of the empirical research is not meant to be 
exhaustive and so I do not make reference to every aspect that has been covered to 
date.  I acknowledge that the field is vast and dense and so my attention is only spent 
on those core empirical studies which lend scope and understanding to the points that I 
raise about how the jury currently carry out their role in the trial process.  Second, my 
work is fundamentally conceptual therefore it is not linked to any one jurisdiction.  I am 
however aware of the distinctions between the different adversarial / common law trial 
processes in terms of their use of the jury in respect of size, verdicts available, voting 
systems and so on.30  Moreover, whilst in the thesis I am assuming a model of the trial 
that is adversarial, I am aware of the differences between different systems therefore 
many of the assumptions that I make about the trial procedure would not be true of an 
inquisitorial system.31  Third, it is not my intention to make an in-depth exploration of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See King, N.J. (1999, Spring), ‘The American Criminal Jury’, Law and Contemporary Problems, 
Vol.62, No.2, 41-68 for discussion on the distinctions and difficulties in the American systems; 
Kiss, L.W. (1999, Spring), ‘Reviving the criminal jury in Japan’, Law and Contemporary 
Problems, Vol.62, No.2, 261-284; Vidmar, N. (1999, Spring), ‘The Canadian Criminal Jury: 
searching for a middle ground’, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol.62, No.2, 141-172 
31 Jackson, J.D., Quinn, K. and O’Mally, T. (1999), ‘The Jury System in Contemporary Ireland,’ Law 
and Contemporary Problems, Vol.62, No.2, Spring, pp.203-232; Thaman, S.C. (1999), 
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the literature on the trial as theatre.  Whilst I am aware of this vast body of literature, 
it is not that the body of literature that I wish to contribute to as I am doing something 
rather different in that I am using Boal’s Forum Theatre techniques as a means to 
improving participation in the trial. 
	  
Fourth, I have already said that my thesis is at heart a conceptual one and when I 
started to write I presumed that my ideas should be reserved for theory alone however, 
I now believe that my ideas and arguments are valuable and if they are going to be 
tested in practice then perhaps my reimagining of the role of the jury will, in time, 
become a norm in the courtroom rather than just a vision for future trials.  However, 
whilst I believe that the ideas could have a practical application I do recognise that this 
would require both changes in mind-set as well as changes in the rules of criminal 
procedure.  Thus, because I am presenting a radical conceptual idea, not a detailed 
implementation plan, it was never my intention to engage with these practical details; 
however it is worth drawing a parallel to the work of Nils Christie who, in 1977, 
presented radical conceptual ideas about Restorative Justice and in so doing prompted 
people to question their assumptions about important issues in regard to models of 
justice.32  
Finally, it is impossible within the confines of the written thesis to communicate it 
practically and so I ask that the reader imagines the potential of integrating the 
theories that I advance throughout.  I hope to have demonstrated that in my work I can 
enable the shift from juror presence to juror participation and in that process I have 
offered a mode of communication, which will enable the jury to bring clarity in their 
own understanding in the trial to which they are a part.  Moreover, in developing a new 
research method I hope to have provided a basis onto which we may view the role of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘Europe’s New Jury Systems: The Cases of Spain and Russia’, Law and Contemporary 
Problems Vol.62, Spring, pp.233-260. 
32 Christie, N. (1977), Conflicts as Property, British Journal of Criminology, Vol.17, pp. 1-15. 
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the juror not as a passive receptacle into which we pour trial evidence but rather as an 
active, engaged and able participant in the criminal trial process.   
1.4 The overall arguments advanced in the thesis 
Given this fresh approach and the potentiality of integrating the work of Freire and 
Boal, the overall aim in this thesis is to transform the current conceptual framework of 
trial by jury from a structure which has little or no room for the jury to one which 
embraces the jury, makes space for it to be an equal part of the process and treats it, 
not as a subsidiary, but rather as an integral part of the system of justice.  I believe 
that this is possible and so I demonstrate how it may be achieved in the chapters to 
follow.  I argue that through integrating the theories of Freire and Boal we can enable 
empowered and self-informed jurors and from that point I argue that the formulation of 
the verdicts will be based on a firm understanding of the trial process, the language 
that is used throughout the trial and their part within that process.  Finally I argue that 
trial by jury is still a viable option for use in criminal trials; however I suggest that now 
is the time to reassess the way that people are enabled to communicate and participate 
in such trials. 
I now invite the reader to consider my journey which re-invents the conceptual 
framework of trial by jury and within that reimagines the role of the juror.  What I 
suggest some may find radical and others may not however I have not written the thesis 
in the hope that people will agree with it.  Rather I have written the thesis in the hope 
that at the very least the reader will engage with the ideas put forward and recognise 
that in order to see real changes in this area, major alterations in respect of the 
structure of the framework and perhaps most importantly, major changes in people’s 
mind-sets about the role of, and the ability of the jury within the framework need to 
take place. 
     
22 
 
The thesis proceeds as follows.  In chapter two I do two things: first I examine the 
values that the jury brings to the criminal trial and second I map out the territory of 
existing empirical research into the jury.  In chapter three I introduce the work of Paulo 
Freire and I consider in a theoretical sense how, through integration of his problem-
posing pedagogy, communication during the trial could be altered to create space for an 
integrated and active jury.  In chapter four I build on the ideas based on Freire’s work 
by adding the work of Augusto Boal.  I focus my attention, predominantly, on his 
Theatre of the Oppressed and I consider how, if we integrate his Joker, we may enable 
better juror understanding by allowing jurors to participate in the trial.  In chapter five 
I first draw attention to the areas where Freire and Boal’s work is used to effect 
positive change despite perceptions that there were barriers to participation.  
Thereafter I consider those barriers to participation in the courtroom when I focus my 
attention on the architectural and design elements of the trial.  To end the chapter I 
contextualise the theories discussed in chapters three and four to demonstrate, as far 
as possible, their effect in a live trial. 
The thesis concludes with chapter six in which I draw together the suggestions that I 
make in the preceding chapters and end by reflecting on the dual benefits of my 
suggestions: that they offer a way to improve understanding and participation by juries 
in criminal trials and, that they might offer some research insights into juries in that 
they may provide evidence that is currently lacking about where, during the existing 
trial format, problems might arise, thus potentially improving our understanding of how 
juries operate.  Therefore, by introducing participatory theories from both interactive 
theatre and critical pedagogy to legal discourse I now demonstrate interdisciplinary 
research in action. 
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Chapter two 
The jury in the criminal trial 
2.1 Introduction to chapter two 
In this chapter I aim first to use the existing research, both its substance and the 
language used to communicate its substance, to demonstrate that the idea that 
currently jurors participate in the trial is a misplaced assumption.  Second, I look 
closely at the research methods which are typically used in jury research, which as we 
shall see, are mostly indirect, and consider their merits as a method for future 
research.  By the end of the chapter I will have set out a picture of the existing 
research; identified the core reasons for continued use of the jury; and raised questions 
which challenge the fundamental presumption that the jury, as it is currently used, 
participates in the trial.  I make this exploration as a way to learn lessons from the 
diverse and rich field and to locate my own voice, thus giving me a root for the 
arguments that I advance both in the course of the chapter and the remainder of the 
thesis.  As I said in chapter one, I could not have written this thesis without learning 
from the research that is currently available on juries however, I maintain the opinion 
that, unless we diversify in our research methods, our capacity to understand the jury 
and how it functions within the criminal trial shall remain a little one dimensional.  I 
therefore consider not only the indications from the research but the actual methods of 
the investigation process.  Finally, I have written the chapter in two distinct, but 
related, strands.  First, I examine the discussions and commentary which are concerned 
with the value that juries bring to the trial process.  Second, I set out the territory of 
existing empirical research into the use of juries in criminal trials where I focus mainly, 
but not exclusively, on the studies which are concerned with juror decision-making and 
jury understanding of legal terminology. 
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As I have previously said, this is a dense field and as such I have chosen to focus on the 
larger studies which have shaped the field in a general sense.  I am thus going to focus 
on large foundational research projects such as Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury,1 
Baldwin and McConville’s Jury Trials,2 Cheryl Thomas’ Are Juries Fair3 and Young 
et.al’s. Juries in Criminal Trials4 as well as making reference to commissioned studies 
such as the Runciman Report (1993),5 which assessed the role of the jury in the criminal 
justice system; the Auld Report (2001),6 which re-examined the role of the jury with 
particular focus on the summoning and selection procedures; the Morris Committee 
Report (1965),7 which highlighted the problems which can arise from status imbalance 
amongst jurors; and the Roskill Studies (1986), which were the first empirical research 
into the use of juries in complex fraud and lengthy trials.8  It is not my intention to 
assess the minutiae of each project.  Rather my aim is to explore the different research 
methods utilised as well as to analyse the various responses to juror (mis)understanding 
in an attempt to better appreciate how we can move forward positively to enhance 
both juror understanding of the trial as well as our understanding of juror 
understanding.  Thus, whilst I am concerned with the research methods, my concern is 
with what these methods tell us about the assumptions the researchers make about 
juries rather than the methods as such.  Therefore, with clarity on these points, our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Kalven, H. and Zeisel, H. (1966), The American Jury. Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 
Toronto, (subsequently referred to in this chapter as Kalven and Zeisel (1966)).  The American Jury 
formed part of a Kalven and Zeisel’s larger project, which was known as the Chicago Project, in 
which other academics carried out subsidiary research which either informed The American Jury or 
were independently published articles based on the overall research carried out.   
2 Baldwin, J. and McConville, M. (1979), Jury Trials, Clarendon Press, Oxford, (subsequently 
referred to in this chapter as Baldwin and McConville (1979)). 
3 Thomas, C. (2010), ‘Are Juries Fair’, Ministry of Justice Research Series, 1/10, February, 
(subsequently referred to in this chapter as Thomas (2010)). 
4 Young, W., Cameron, N. and Tinsley, Y. (2001) New Zealand Law Commission, Report 69, 
‘Juries in Criminal Trials’, Wellington (also published as Parliamentary Paper E3169, 
(subsequently referred to in this chapter as NZ (2001)). 
5 Zander, M. and Henderson, P. (1993), Crown Court Study Commission on Criminal Justice 
Research Study No.19, Cmnd.2263, London, HMSO - the Runciman Report. 
6 Report of the Review of the Criminal Courts (2001) Chapter 5 - the Auld Review. 
7 The Report of the Morris Departmental Committee on Jury Service, Cmnd 2627, (1965). 
8 The Roskill Studies - ‘Fraud Trials Committee: Improving the Presentation of Information to Juries 
in Fraud Trials’  A Report of Four Research Studies by the MRC Applied Psychology Unit, 
Cambridge, (1986), London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
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responses to future hurdles can be specifically focused to deal with clearly identified 
needs.   
 
2.2 What values do juries bring to the trial process 
One of the most commonly cited explanations documented in the academic research in 
support of jury trial is that with the inclusion of a jury comes a legitimising of the 
criminal trial process.9  This is linked to a variety of beliefs, such as the belief that it is 
a reliable way of determining guilt or that the community should be involved in criminal 
justice.  In addition, there is the belief that, through the inclusion of a jury, the process 
of justice is seen to be fair, equitable and democratic.  This is clear to see when we 
look to the writing of Lord Devlin, who, whilst not referring specifically in the language 
he chose to democracy, was nonetheless a fervent admirer of the jury, who championed 
its ability to do justice “on the merits” and not merely in accordance to the law.10  
Depending on perspective, this statement may of course be interpreted as somewhat 
undermining the integrity of the jury at a fundamental level, however, I should make 
clear that Devlin was consistent in his support of the jury to act as reliable finders of 
fact in criminal trials.  Indeed, as Roberts and Zuckermann more recently have 
observed, by using ordinary citizens as jurors, confidence in criminal trials may be 
reinforced because of the tangible link between the fact-finder and the fact-finding.  
Thus, by including the public in the criminal trial, the trial process itself seems to be 
more legitimate, as Lord Devlin observed: 
“the jury is the means by which the people play a direct part in the application 
of the law […] Constitutionally it is an invaluable achievement that popular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Thomas, C. (2007), Diversity and Fairness in the Jury System, Ministry of Justice Research 
series 02/07 (subsequently referred to in this chapter as Thomas (2007)); Bar Council (2002), 
‘Public backing for jury ‘rock solid’ new poll shows’, Bar Council Press Release, 30 January 
2002; IMC Research (2007), State of the Nation 2006, Summary Results, 
www.icmresearch.co.uk  [live at 02//07/2013]. 
10 Devlin, Lord Patrick (1956), Trial by Jury, Stevens and Sons, London, pp.151-158. 
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consent should be at the root not only of the making but also of the application 
of the law.  It is one of the significant causes of our political stability.”11 
There is of course the obvious criticism of this description and that is, as Roberts and 
Zuckermann point out, that juries are not necessarily more suited to discovering the 
truth than their professional counterparts, they do not possess special qualities which 
make them any more (or less) suited to the part, and so to place them in an alternative 
category of more suitable fact-finder is, in my opinion (and in theirs), a little strange. 12  
Nonetheless, the jury have consistently been celebrated as a valuable part of the trial 
system.  When Devlin referred to them as a “little parliament” he was praising their 
role as, as Darbyshire describes it, “a symbol of participatory democracy,”13 and we can 
see that opinion being echoed in the later work of, for example, Bankowski and 
Mungham.14   
Public support for the jury is also evident in opinion polls which have shown strong 
support for jury trials.  For example, a MORI poll conducted in 2003 which was focused 
on the public’s opinion as to whether or not the jury trial was a fair system found that 
“both white and non-white members of the public had high levels of confidence in the 
jury system”15 and in 2007 the Lord Chief Justice “called for the legal system to have 
confidence in the common sense of the jury.”16  As we shall see these opinions are very 
closely linked to images of the jury as a bringer of legitimacy which is rooted in several 
different but nonetheless related elements, including the fact that the jury represent 
the community, that they bring with them a diversity of knowledge and experience and 
that such experiences - applied practically through their participation in the trial - 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Devlin, Lord Patrick (1981), The Judge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.127. 
12 Roberts, P. and Zuckermann, A. (2004), Criminal Evidence, Oxford, Oxford University Press p. 
63. 
13 Darbyshire, P. (1991), ‘The Lamp that Shows that Freedom Lives.  Is it worth the candle?’ 
Criminal Law Review, 749, p.745. 
14 Bankowski, Z. and Mungham, G., ‘The Jury as Process’ in Carlen, P. (ed.) (1976), The Sociology 
of Law, Sociological Review Monograph 23, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire. 
15 Survey conducted on behalf of the Jury Diversity Project by MORI in its Omnibus survey of April 
24-28, 2003 cited in Thomas, C. (2008), ‘Exposing the myths of Jury Service’ Criminal Law Review, 
Issue 6, pp.415-430, p.417, (subsequently referred to in this chapter as Thomas (2008)). 
16 Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, ‘Trusting the Jury,’ Criminal Bar Association Kalisher Lecture, 
October 23,2007 cited in Thomas (2008) above n.15 at p.417. 
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support this democratic ideal.  Therefore this idea that jury participation brings 
legitimacy to the criminal justice process is a widely held one, and that is evident when 
we look for example at the words of Zedner who describes the jury as the “beacon of 
participatory justice”.17  In this section I will first examine briefly the reasons why jury 
participation might be said to bring legitimacy to the criminal justice process, before 
questioning the very basis upon which these claims are made. 
Various reasons have been proposed as to why jury participation brings legitimacy to the 
criminal justice process. The first is that juries are better fact-finders than judges 
because through their combined knowledge they are better able to understand a range 
of situations.18  This combined knowledge is therefore considered to be more reliable 
than the knowledge of a judge sitting alone.  When viewed objectively there is 
definitely the argument that a panel of 12 or 15 people will have a broader range of 
experience simply because of its size – a point made by Saks and Marti19 or, as 
Redmayne points out, the social class of the jurors is likely to be different to that of the 
judge and so this may give them “better insight into the sort of situation which is the 
subject of the trial.”20  Indeed, in their 2001 study Young et.al. say, “the diversity of 
knowledge, perspectives and personal experiences of a representative jury enhances 
the collective competency of the jury as fact-finder, as well as its ability to bring 
common sense judgements to bear on the case.”21  Of course, what Young et.al are 
relying on here is that the jury are representative of the community, as well as relying 
on a situation which sees the jurors automatically bringing with them the levels of 
competency required to understand the evidence as it is presented throughout the trial.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Zedner, L. (2004), Criminal Justice, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press at p.16. 
18 See for example, Redmayne, M. (2006), ‘Theorising Jury Reform’ in Duff, et.al. (2006), The Trial 
on Trial, Volume 2, Judgement and Calling to Account, Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart 
Publishing, (subsequently referred to in this chapter as Duff et.al. Trial 2, (2006)) . 
19 Saks, M. and Marti, M.W. (1997), ‘A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size,’ 21, Law and 
Human Behavior, 451. 
20 Redmayne, above n.18, p.101. 
21 NZ (2001) above n.4, [133]. 
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Not everyone however accepts the arguments advanced in favour of the jury and it is 
often the subject of debate in legal and political literature.22  In her analysis of the jury 
Penny Darbyshire, for example, insists that for centuries the (English) legal system has 
relied on  
“no justification or spurious justification.  It has fed public complacency with 
the English legal system and distracted attention from its evils: a systematic lack 
of due process pre-trial and post-trial and certain deficiencies in the trial 
process itself.  It has distorted the truth.  The truth is that for most people who 
pass though the criminal justice system this palladium is simply not available and 
for those who can and do submit themselves to its verdict; it will not necessarily 
safeguard their civil liberties.”23   
 
Additionally, Darbyshire et.al later point out one of the most prominent situations 
where the jury nullified was in the trial of Clive Pointing whom the jury acquitted for 
“breaches of the Official Secrets Act despite the judge’s almost directing conviction” 
and this could be regarded as an example of ‘positive’ or ‘good’ jury nullification. 24 
 
A second reason why jury participation might bring legitimacy to the criminal trial is 
that, as Roberts and Zuckermann point out, they represent community standards, values 
and morality and can bring these to bear when deciding cases.25  As Lord Devlin said in 
1965 the “the juryman is in the eyes of the law the epitome of the reasonable man”26 
and this is particularly important given the legal tests that the jury is asked to apply.  
Moreover, he also highlights that “It is not a perverse acquittal that an innocent man is 
looking for when he asks for trial by jury, but a trial by men and women of his own 
sort.”27  Thus, as Roberts and Zuckermann make clear, the system of trial by jury seems 
to emit the sense that there is sensitivity, by the State, to “popular perceptions of right 
and wrong, and in this way criminal proceedings cultivate that public support which is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See for example Brooks and Doob (1975) “Justice and the Jury,” Journal of Social Issues, 31(3), 
pp.171-182 at p.172. 
23 Darbyshire (1991) above n.13. 
24 Darbyshire, P., Maughan, A. and Stewart, A. (2001), ‘What Can the English Legal System Learn 
from Jury Research Published up to 2001?’ Commissioned Research for the Auld Report, p.32. 
[subsequently referred to as Darbyshire et.al. (2001)] 
25 Roberts and Zuckermann above n.12, p.64. 
26 Devlin (1956) above n.10. 
27 Devlin (1981) above n.11 p.141-142. 
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essential to their effective operation.”28  The community standards argument can be 
questioned on at least two fronts.  First, that juries are not, in fact, representative of 
the community at all in terms of characteristics such as race or occupation. This is a 
point that has been made by for example Darbyshire et.al29 in the UK, Fukuri in the 
US,30 and Dunstan et.al in New Zealand who advised that unless geographical boundaries 
were extended there would be an increasing chance of unrepresentative juries across 
New Zealand.31  However, other researchers, for example Cheryl Thomas, have 
suggested that juries are actually representative, at least in terms of their ethnic 
background.32  Indeed, in her 2008 article - which is drawn from her 2007 empirical 
study - she concluded that the reports by others including Darbyshire, that argue that 
juries are unrepresentative of the community is a myth, and that the reality is that 
serving jurors closely reflect the diversity of their communities.33   
The participation of the jury can also be seen as a tool with which to guard against the 
possibility of state oppression, a point made by Mungham and Bankowski,34 Nicholas 
Blake35 and Paul Byrne,36 among others.  For example, the sense that the jury may act 
as a barrier to oppressive state sanctions is rooted in the idea that it can, if it wishes, 
vote to acquit or nullify in cases where it does not approve of the use of the law in a 
certain way by the state, thus exerting its power over what it regards as unfair 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Roberts and Zuckermann above n.12 p.64. 
29 Darbyshire et.al above n.33, appendix to the Auld Review who claimed that most people try to 
avoid jury service if summoned and that five-sixths of Londoners avoid or evade jury service. 
30 Fukurai, H. (1996), ‘Race, Social Class and Jury Participation: New Dimensions for Evaluating 
Discrimination In Jury Service and Jury Selection,’ Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol.24, p.77; 
Fukurai, H. (1999), ‘The Representative Cross Section Requirement: Jury Representativeness and 
Cross Sectional Participation from the Beginning to End of the Jury Selection Process,’ 
International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, Vol.23, No1, p.56. 
31 Dunstan, S., Paulin, J. and Atkinson, K. (1995), Trial by Peers? The Composition of New 
Zealand Juries, Department of Justice Policy and Research Division, Wellington, [6.4]. 
32 For example Thomas (2008) above n.15. 
33 Thomas, C. and Balmer, N. (2007), ‘Diversity and fairness in the jury system,’ Ministry of Justice 
Research Series, 2/07. 
34 Mungham, G. and Bankowski, Z. (1976), ‘The jury in the legal system,’ in Carlen, P above n.14, 
pp.202-225. 
35 Blake, N. ‘The Case for the Jury,’ in Findlay, M. and Duff, P. (eds.) (1988), The Jury Under 
Attack, London and Sydney, Butterworths pp.140-160. 
36 Byrne, P. (1988), ‘Jury Reform and the Future’ in Findlay and Duff above n.35 pp.190-208. 
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procedure.  Moreover, as Darbyshire points out, the jury can acquit in cases where it 
regards the law as unfair and so can demonstrate its sympathy with the accused in its 
verdict and in that way we can see that it has the capacity to act “as a democratic 
brake on the State.”37  Or, as in Abrahamson’s We, the Jury: the Jury System and the 
Ideal of Democracy,38 we see his defence of trial by jury in America as a system which is 
the epitome of democracy arguing that juries are not only the face of democracy but in 
many, if not all of its facets, it acts as democracy thus endorsing its place in the 
American criminal justice system.  We the Jury was written at a time in America, where 
there was growing cynicism over the impartiality of the verdict of the jury where crimes 
were racially motivated.  Abrahamson noted that, at a very basic level we could see 
that a jury could, if it wished, exert its power by nullifying or acquitting and in that 
regard we can see democracy in action – something which is unavailable, or at least not 
as overt, in trials without a jury.  Equally however, Abrahamson points out that juries 
generally do not depend on race alone and so to suggest that race alone is an accurate 
predictor of a jury’s verdict is to limit attitudes towards its capacity and integrity, 
ultimately urging the reader to see the positive aspects of continuing to use a jury, even 
where it first may seem that their verdict could be delivered contrary to the evidence.   
 
The legitimacy of jury nullification as a means by which juries can guard against state 
oppression has however, frequently been questioned.39  This however can be subject to 
criticism if we understand the rule of law as the legislature who make the laws and not 
the jury who make or adapt the law to suit themselves and to fit with their opinions and 
their moral or social standards.  Moreover, this practice can be criticised on the basis 
that it could lead to inconsistency in the application of the law more generally.  Finally, 
the point has also been made that even if it is accepted that the jury should be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Darbyshire (1991) above n.13. 
38 Abramson, J. (2000), We, The Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England, Harvard University Press. 
39 See for example, Winter, R.K. (1971) ‘The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion,’ Law and Society 
Review, p.335; Kalven and Zeisel above n.1, chapter 15.  
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permitted to refuse to convict where it views the law as unfair, juries might equally 
refuse to convict for less legitimate reasons, such as sympathy for or prejudice against 
the accused.40   
 
Others have highlighted that the notion or idea that the jury are participants in the trial 
may not transpire in the practical sense.  This was a point that Tatjiana Hörnle 
questioned when she observed that whilst lay participation is a central part of the 
organisation of criminal trials in the UK, the jury’s existence might be confined more to 
the theoretical than realised in a practical sense and that is to say that participation is 
frequently discussed but rarely are there practical ideas to support the theoretical 
analyses.  Indeed, she points out that if we are to continue to rely on the link between 
legitimacy and lay participation as some kind of validating factor for retaining the use 
of the jury, we must then have some evidence of co-operation between the legal 
professionals and the lay jurors.  Moreover, she speaks of the need to be sure that we 
know what we mean when referring to lay participation if we are relying on the “strong 
claim that lay participation is a necessary condition for a legitimate conviction (or a 
legitimate acquittal) in any democratic state.”41  She then goes on to highlight that if 
that is the case then “lay participation is crucial as the ‘democratic backbone’ of court 
proceedings in that it supports and authorises the outcome.”42  I agree with Hörnle that 
it is important that we understand what we are talking about when we constantly refer 
to lay participation, and this is especially important in respect of the jury who actually 
to have less of a participatory role than we may at first assume.43 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See for example Cornish, W.R. (1968), The Jury, Allen Lane, London for his in-depth inquiry into 
the willingness (or not) of the jury to nullify.  Also see Goff, R. (1988), ‘The Mental Element in 
the Crime of Murder’, Law Quarterly Review, Vol.104, p.30 for discussion of the juries refusal to 
convict despite evidence of intention to cause grievous bodily harm. 
41 Hörnle, T. (2006), ‘Democratic Accountability and Lay Participation in Criminal Trials’ chapter in 
Duff et.al. Trial 2 (2006) above n.18 
42 Hörnle above n.41, p.137. [italics in the original] 
43 http://www.justice.gov.uk/statistics/courts-and-sentencing/judicial-annual-2011 - in England and 
Wales the total number of trials heard was 1,734,579 of which 17,786 were trial by jury which is 
1.25% of the overall trials heard.  In Scotland the information suggests the figure was nearer 5% 
which reflects those proceeded against in the High Courts and Sheriff Court solemn 
proceedings http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/11/5336. 
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The points that I have just raised however can be questioned as there still seems to be a 
certain amount of disagreement amongst scholars.  Indeed, underlying that 
disagreement is a general position of support for the jury and where that support is 
perhaps waning there does appear to be the will to correct identifiable failings rather 
than a drive to eliminate the jury altogether.  On the fact-finding point, it has been 
questioned whether juries are better fact-finders at all44 and a considerable body of 
empirical research has suggested that, even if they are, juries are nonetheless too 
easily swayed by factors extraneous to the case.45   
It is not my intention here to enter into a lengthy discussion about the arguments for 
and against juries. This has been done elsewhere and it is not the main concern of my 
thesis.  My point is a different one, which is that those who argue that jury participation 
brings legitimacy to the criminal justice process - whether they do so on the basis of its 
superior fact-finding ability, community standards and so on - make a major 
assumption: that juries do, in fact, participate in the criminal trial.  From this 
perspective the value of the jury depends on its participation, thus in the absence of 
this the other arguments are worth little, hence the centrality of participation to my 
thesis.  In addition I will question this assumption and will argue that while juries are 
clearly present during the trial, this does not, in fact, equate to their participation.  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines participation as “the process or fact of sharing …; 
active involvement in a matter or event.” As later chapters of my thesis will 
demonstrate, the manner in which juries are presently used is far from “active 
involvement” and therefore the claims which are made about the legitimacy of the jury 
that rest on this assertion rest on a fragile foundation.   
 
In the following section I draw a broad map of the existing research which has been 
undertaken into juries in order to establish a clear picture of what that research can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Darbyshire (1991) above n.13. 
45 I assess this in section 2.3.4 below. 
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tell us about the jury.  I do this for two reasons.  First, I shall use the findings from the 
empirical research to inform my discussion in chapter three which is focused on juror 
understanding in the trial.  Second, I map the territory in order to make some overall 
observations about the nature of the actual research with specific focus on what the 
research tells us about the way that the jury is regarded by the legal researchers and 
social scientists on whose work much of our insights on the jury rely.  In this respect 
therefore I shall show that where researchers talk about jury participation what they 
are referring to is jury presence which, as I have previously argued, is not really 
participation at all. 
2.3 Empirical research into juries 
In the paragraphs to follow I map out the overall territory of existing empirical jury 
research in the broadest of terms.  The areas that I cover are jury decision-making, jury 
understanding of legal terminology which includes a section on complex trials, and the 
effect of extra-legal influences on a jury.  Having previously discussed the values that 
juries bring to the trial I am now interested in the assumptions about the nature of 
participation which underpin the research.  As I shall demonstrate, most of the 
interventions designed to assist the jury take the existing model of the jury and try to 
do things to it, they do not take a more holistic approach which could use as its starting 
point consultation with the jury, and most of the studies do not question the meaning of 
jury participation, with most appearing to assume that as a reality.  I now demonstrate 
these points by looking first at the research which is concerned with decision-making. 
2.3.1 Jury decision-making 
The first thing to say here is that it is very difficult to research jury decision-making 
because the law prevents actual observation of juries thus, unless actual jury decision-
making is made transparent, it is logically very difficult to measure.  Nonetheless, this 
is a major area where in the empirical research we see that evaluation of 
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‘performance.’  But what is regarded as good decision-making ‘performance’ within 
these parameters?  It is often taken to mean whether or not the judgments of the jury 
are legally correct, in the sense that they match up to some other assessment of the 
proper outcome.  In the empirical work this is commonly measured by comparing the 
jury’s verdict to that of the judge and this kind of approach can be seen in the seminal 
research which was carried out by Kalven and Zeisel.46  Although this was not the first 
research of its kind – see for example the earlier studies which were carried out by 
Hoffman and Brodley,47 Brand and Sieswerda48 and Broeder49 – Kalven and Zeisel’s 
research had a significant influence because of its scale and its impact on subsequent 
research.  Specifically, Kalven and Zeisel were concerned with the verdict of the jury 
based on juror comprehension of the trial and they addressed two issues: first they 
questioned whether the jurors understood the evidence and the judicial instructions50 
and second they considered whether, even if they did, did they base their verdicts on 
the evidence alone?51  Kalven and Zeisel’s research was the culmination of data 
collected from 3576 trials,52 which consisted of questionnaires completed by the 600 
judges who took part in trials with charges ranging from murder to forgery.  Their 
primary research objective was to discover how both the judge and the jury would have 
decided the case and when the judge’s hypothetical verdict accorded with the jury’s 
verdict they considered this agreement to indicate understanding on the part of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Kalven and Zeisel (1966) above n.1. 
47 Hoffman, H.M. and Brodley, J. (1952), ‘Jurors on Trial,’ Missouri Law Review, Vol.17, pp.235-51. 
48 Brand, G.W. and Sieswerda, R.E. (1947), ‘The Jury Looks at Trial by Jury,’ Journal of the 
American Judicature Society, Vol.31, pp.105-8. 
49 Broeder, D.W. (1965b), Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affecting Juror Behaviour: A 
Preliminary Look,’ New York University Law Review, vol.40, pp.1079-1100.  
50 Early research, for example, Hervey, J.C. (1947), ‘Jurors look at our judges,’ Oklahoma Bar 
Association Journal, 18, (October) 25: 1508-1513 indicated that about 40 of the jurors in their 
project had understood the judge’s instructions. 
51 Early studies showed that jurors had, at the very least, discussed extra-legal matters in the 
process of their decision-making see Wananmaker, L. (1937) ‘Trial by jury,’ University of 
Cincinnati Law Review,Vol.11 (March) 191-200. 
52 The first set of data was collected between 1954-1955 and the second in 1958.  The second lot 
of data was based on a different questionnaire given to the judges and this in itself has been the 
root of much criticism. 
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jury.53  Their method throughout was to compare the verdict of the jury with the 
verdict of the judge with the presumption that the verdict of the judge was the 
‘correct’ one. Their crucial focus therefore was not the relatively high agreement rate 
(78%) but the 22% of trials where there was disagreement between judge and jury.  Was 
this disagreement down to misunderstanding of the evidence, or the law, or both?  
Overall, the findings from Kalven and Zeisel’s research indicated that the disagreements 
were not down to juror incompetence or unwillingness to follow the law but, rather 
that there was confusion over the evidence or confusion over the law.54  This 
assumption however calls into question the purpose of the jury in the trial because if 
their verdict is only regarded as valid or ‘correct’ if it reflects that of a legal 
professional then the obvious question that that raises for me is why do we continue to 
have a jury in some criminal trials.   
With a similar focus as Kalven and Zeisel’s, the first major UK study into the ability of 
the jury to ‘perform’ well, i.e. to make a decision which reflected understanding of the 
trial, was carried out by Baldwin and McConville in 1979.55  Their study, conducted as 
part of the Institute of Judicial Administration, began in 1974 and was completed at the 
end of 1976.  It took into consideration 370 randomly selected cases from the Crown 
Courts in Birmingham and London and its primary objective was to try to evaluate jury 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 At a basic level the jury and the judge agreed in 78% of the cases and where there was judge / 
jury disagreement Kalven and Zeisel managed to find a “plausible explanation.” 
54 See also, inter alia, Hannaford-Agor, P.L., Hans, V.P. et.al. (2002), ‘Are Hung Juries a Problem,’ 
National Center for State Courts 
http://www.ncsonline/org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesPub.pdf; Garvey, S.P., 
Hannaford-Agor, P.L., et.al. (2004), ‘Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials,’ Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies, Vol.1, p.371; Hans, V.P. and Hannaford-Agor, P.L., et.al. (2003), ‘The Hung Jury: 
The American Jury’s Insights and Contemporary Understanding,’ 39 Crim.L.Bull., 33; 
Eisenberg, T., Hannaford-Agor, P.L et.al. (2005), ‘Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A 
Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury,’ 2 Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies, 171. 
55 Baldwin and McConville (1979) above n.2  Theirs was not the first study with earlier research 
carried out by inter alia, Sealy, A.P. and Cornish, W.R. (1973b), “Juries and the Rules of 
Evidence,” Crim.L.R., pp.208-23; McCabe, S. and Purves, R (1972), The Jury at Work, Oxford 
University Penal Research Unit, Blackwell;  McCabe, S. and Purves, R,  (1974), The Shadow 
Jury at Work, Oxford University Penal Research Unit, Blackwell; Sealy, A.P. (1975), “What can 
be Learned from the Analysis of Simulated Juries?” in Walker, N. (ed.), (1975), The British Jury 
System, Cambridge, pp.12-21. 
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performance in a series of criminal trials.56  Their method was to take the verdict of the 
jury and compare it with the hypothetical verdict of the other trial participants (who 
included the trial judge, the prosecuting and defence solicitors and the attending police 
officers) who had agreed to take part in the research by way of responding to the 
questionnaires designed for the project.  The questions that Baldwin and McConville 
posed included “Did the participants think, for instance, that the jury had returned a 
verdict in accordance with the weight of evidence?  What factors in their view 
influenced the jury in reaching its decision?  Did they themselves agree with the verdict 
of the jury?”57  Thus, as a result of posing such questions they had hoped to assess juror 
reasoning by comparing the verdict of the jury with the verdict - and the reasons for the 
verdict - which were delivered by the research participants.58  Whilst they found that, 
in general, juries were not swayed by “emotional or other legally irrelevant 
considerations”59 they nonetheless found that one of the things that had a negative 
impact on their decision-making was their problems understanding the legal 
terminology, which included the judicial instructions.   
Since then there have been numerous other studies of this nature and what links this 
research is the method by which the decision-making is assessed.60 This involves a 
comparison between the verdict of the jury and the verdict of the professional legal 
players, be that the judge or, as in Baldwin and McConville’s research, the solicitors and 
police who were also involved in the project.  One of the strengths of this approach is 
that it can instil in us a sense that the jury do in fact understand the substance of the 
trial and that in turn may lead us to have more confidence in its verdict.  Conversely 
however this style of research is fundamentally indirect and with indirect approaches 
we cannot really understand what the jury do and do not understand of the trial.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Baldwin and McConville (1979) above n.2, p.20. 
57 Baldwin and McConville (1979) above n.2, p.20. 
58 For a fuller discussion on this see Baldwin and McConville (1979) above n.2, pp.26-31. 
59 Baldwin and McConville (1979) above n.2, p.20. 
60 For example the impact of influences from sources such as the internet which I discuss in section 
2.3.4 below.  
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Moreover, there appears to be a subliminal message in this type of research which tells 
us that the ‘correct’ verdict is the one delivered by the professional player which then 
raises the question of the view taken of the jury by the researchers.  This constant need 
to measure the verdict of the jury against the verdict of the professional in the research 
seems to me to be a little odd given in reality the burden of accurate verdict 
responsibility lies squarely with the jury.  Thus, I can see that in the research the jury 
are often regarded as an object for the researchers to assess their capacity as decision-
makers rather than being regarded as equals and so learning with them about their 
capacity.  I understand the restrictions in place which prevent research with actual 
jurors in live trials,61 however, given that the majority of the research uses mock jurors 
in simulated trials, the benefits that could be gained by engaging with them on a face-
to-face level rather than providing them with extrinsic aides could prove to be very 
insightful for both the juror and the researcher because the actual information would 
be gained in real time through dialogue.   
2.3.2 Jury understanding of legal terminology 
Another strand of empirical research is that which assesses juror understanding of legal 
terminology and such studies date back to the 1950s in the US and the 1970s in the UK.  
Most of this research has been carried out using mock juries, as we can see in, for 
example, the work by Elwork, Sales and Alfini;62 some researchers have used jurors who 
have been cited but not selected, as we can see in, for example, Thomas 2010 which I 
discuss below and some have used real jurors as we can see in the New Zealand study, 
also discussed below.   
One relatively early example of research carried out using cited but not selected jurors 
was that carried out by Steele and Thornburg in 1988, who reported that jurors do find 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 s.8 Contempt of Court Act 1981 
62 Elwork A., Sales B.D. and Alfini J.J. (1977), ‘Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light 
of it?’ 1 Law and Human Behaviour, Vol.1, p.163. 
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it difficult to understand the trial language, especially the judicial instructions within 
the scope of the trial process and trial communication structure.63  This was one of the 
first studies which had assessed juror understanding of pattern instructions.64  The 
earlier studies with a similar focus had assessed juror understanding when the 
instructions guided the jury one step at a time65 others used ‘special issue’ instructions 
designed to guide only on individual points66 and others assessed juror competence with 
rewritten instructions.67  In their study Steele and Thornburg first examined the extent 
to which the jury understood the pattern instructions - with the presumption that if 
they understood the instruction they would understand more broadly how to apply it to 
their verdict - and second they surveyed actual jurors to determine to what extent they 
relied on the judicial instructions during the deliberation process.  The subjects in their 
trial were recruited from those who had been called but who had not yet served on a 
jury in Dallas, Texas.  Thus, they were keen to point out that the participants in their 
trial were actual and potential jurors, thereby distinguishing themselves from studies 
that had used paid volunteers.  They used five actual written instructions and a 
corresponding five rewritten instructions (which had been written by the researchers for 
the purposes of the project) to try to determine whether the latter had any impact on 
juror understanding of the terminology.  They used a testing method known as 
“paraphrase test,” in which they asked the respondent to explain what they thought the 
instruction meant in their own words.  They gave the instructions in oral (taped) form 
and when the rewritten instructions were given there was an overwhelming increase of 
91% in the overall understanding.68  Thus, only 12.85% had understood prior whereas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Steele, W.M. and Thornburg, E. (1988), ‘Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate,’ 
North Carolina Law Review, Vol.67, pp.77-115. 
64 Most states in the US employ pattern Instructions which are a set of model instructions designed 
to inform the jury of the charges against the accused. 
65 Strawn, D.U. and Buchanan, R.W. (1976), “Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice,” 59, Judicature, 
478; Strawn, D.U., Buchanan, R.W., Pryor, B. and Taylor, K.P. (1977), “Reaching and Verdict, 
Step by Step,” Judicature, 383, March. 
66 Strawn and Buchanan (1976) above n.65. 
67 Elwork, Sales, Alfini (1977) above n.62.  
68 Steele. and Thornburg (1988) above n.63. 
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24.59% understood afterwards.  They found that when the instructions were only given 
in oral form the jurors found them very problematic and this was attributed largely to 
the unfamiliar language as well as the unfamiliar sentence construction.69    
Another study which had a similar focus was Reifman, Guisick and Ellsworth’s research 
carried out in 1992.70  Their study consisted of recruiting participants from a pool of 558 
Michigan State citizens who were called to serve as jurors over a two month period in 
February and March of 1992.  Shortly after that time frame had elapsed they were sent 
a questionnaire which was designed to assess their comprehension of both the 
substantive and the procedural law.  Of the 558 sent, 244 were returned and, of those, 
144 of the respondents had served on actual trials within that time frame.  The 
questions were designed to elicit the jurors’ understanding of the judicial instructions 
as well as to establish in which form they had received the instructions, i.e. were they 
written or oral.  In addition there were a series of statements to which the respondents 
were to answer “yes”, “no” or “don’t know” and these statements were taken from the 
standardised instructions in use at the time in the State of Michigan.  They concluded 
from this research that whilst the jury may be perfectly competent at sorting out the 
facts in a trial they are less competent when it comes to understanding the law that 
they have been given by the judge.71  Their observations are in line with many before 
who have also suggested that the ability of the jury to understand the judicial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Steele and Thornburg (1988) above n.63 at p.90 For similar findings see Heuer, L. and Penrod, 
S. (1988), “Increasing jurors participation in trials,” Law and Human Behaviour, 12, 231-261; 
Heuer, L. and Penrod, S. (1988), ‘Increasing juror participation in trials: A field experiment with 
jury note taking and question asking’, 12 Law and Human Behavior, -430 (I discuss their work 
below); Sand, L.B. and Reiss, S.A. (1985), “A report on seven experiments conducted by district 
court judges in the second circuit,” New York University Law Review, 60, 423-497; Flango, V.E. 
(1980), “Would jurors do a better job if they could take notes?” Judicature, 63, 436-443. 
70 Reifman, A., Guisick, S.M. and Ellsworth, P. (1992), ‘Real jurors’ understanding of the law in real 
cases,’ Law and Human Behavior, Vol.16, No.5, pp.539-554. 
71 Reifman, Guisick, and Ellsworth (1992) above n.70, p.540. 
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instructions is, at times, little more than chance comparisons, with some research 
studies reporting jurors missing crucial distinctions in the legal language.72   
More recently Cheryl Thomas carried out a large scale project in the UK, which assessed 
juror understanding of judicial instructions as a way of gauging whether or not juror 
decision-making was fair.73 She used a multi-method research approach: case 
simulations with real juries in Nottingham, Winchester and Blackfriars Crown Courts 
which amounted to 797 juries on 68 different trials; analysis of all of the actual jury 
verdicts from 2006-2008 which amounted to 60,000 verdicts; and, post-verdict survey of 
668 jurors in 62 cases.  She was keen to point out that research of this nature - both its 
focus and its techniques - had never been carried out in the UK although there have 
been several projects along similar lines undertaken in the US.74  This was an insightful 
project, in which Thomas reported on a variety of areas with the result that we are able 
to gauge better how the jury copes with its task, as well as what the jury understands 
its task to be.  Indeed the jurors in her studies felt that they did not have difficulty 
understanding judicial instructions – something that was found in the earlier study 
conducted by Zander and Henderson;75 however when she looked more closely, she 
found that jurors are often more optimistic about their own understanding of the 
judicial instructions than is reflected in their actual understanding.76  Thus, in the 
simulated trials which involved 797 jurors at the three courts, over half of the jurors 
perceived the judge’s instructions to be “easy to understand.”  For example at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See for example, Elwork, Sales & Alfini, (1977), above n.62; Heuer & Penrod (1989) above n.69; 
Tanford, J. A. (1990), “The law and psychology of jury instructions,” Nebraska Law Review, 69, 71-
111; Tanford, J. A. (1991), “Law reform by courts, legislatures, and commissions following 
empirical research on jury instructions,” Law and Society Review, 25, 155-175. 
73 At the time she undertook the study the number of cases heard by juries was less that 1% in 
England and Wales. 
74 This is sometimes confused with her having used actual jurors in the study.  She did not.  She 
used the mock jurors in the simulated cases. Moreover, in relation to her claim that no previous 
research had been focused on whether jurors seldom convict in certain courts was misplaced 
given that Baldwin and McConville put high acquittal rates at the centre of their 1974 research.  
In regard to the first point made here – I discuss this in more detail in my critical reflection on 
research methods in section 2.3.5 below. 
75 The Runciman Report (1993) above n.5. 
76 Thomas (2010) above n.3 at vi.   
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Blackfriars and Winchester Crown Courts 69% and 68% respectively thought that they 
had understood the judge’s instructions and at Nottingham 51% felt they had 
understood.  Crucially, however, the responses from the questionnaires revealed that 
only 31% had actually understood correctly.77  The jurors who took part were asked to 
identify the two questions that the judge had specifically directed them to answer to 
determine if the defendant had acted in self-defence (did the defendant believe it was 
necessary to defend himself and did he use reasonable force?)  This research suggests 
therefore that uncertainty about juror understanding remains and despite some very 
carefully considered and innovative studies, there remain questions over how well the 
jury cope with understanding the legal terminology in the criminal trial.  To conclude, 
therefore, it seems that the research which is currently available points towards more 
use of written instructions as well as the rephrasing of instructions.  On the one hand 
this is positive for jurors because they would have access to information which may help 
them to overcome obstacles to their understanding in the course of the trial.  On the 
other hand however, providing written instructions alone may only lead to more juror 
confusion because, where such instructions are provided without scope for jurors to 
clarify points, we may find that they are no better informed than they were without 
them.  Finally, we should be careful not to equate the provision of written instructions 
with enhancing juror participation because however much we try, the one cannot lead 
to the other in a practical sense. 78  
I turn now to the research method which uses real jurors in real trials and one example 
of early work is the study carried out by psychologists Severance and Loftus in 1982.79   I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Thomas. (2010) above n.3 at p.36.  
78 There are some states in the US that have adopted the use of written judicial instructions -  for 
example, the Florida Supreme Court permit the use of written judicial instructions to be used at 
the deliberation stage of the process.  They are not permitted prior to that stage; therefore if the 
jury are confused during the trial their scope for clarification is slim. 
79 Severance, L.J. and Loftus, E.F. (1982), ‘Improving the ability of jurors to comprehend and apply 
criminal jury instructions,’ Law and Society, 17, 153.  They also found that the problems with 
juror understanding were magnified when there were no written instructions.  See also 
Severance, L.J., Greene, E. and Loftus, E.F. (1984), “Toward criminal jury instructions that 
jurors can understand,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol.75, 1, 198. 
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have chosen to focus on Severence and Loftus’ study because of its size, its influence on 
later work and because they were able to work with actual jurors.  In their study they 
assessed where, and in what instructions, the jurors had the most difficulty when it 
came to understanding the crucial points which were being conveyed.  Their study took 
place with actual jurors, permissible in certain states of the US.  They identified first 
that the convoluted linguistic construction of the judicial instruction led the jurors to 
become confused and this confusion was magnified with the inclusion of uncommon 
words that were used.  This therefore led to a situation whereby the jurors found it 
increasingly difficult to understand what was meant by the instruction and so, when 
faced with something that was designed to help, they found that they were hindered in 
their attempts to make sense of the law applicable in each case.  However, in the 
course of the research they found that when the instructions were reconstructed with 
the same information but using a more common linguistic structure (the syntax) i.e. one 
which sees the point that is crucial to overall understanding (the semantics) situated at 
the middle point of the sentence, the jurors found that their understanding was 
improved.  This is unsurprising given that the ordinary linguistic construction of a 
sentence has at the centre the point that is being conveyed.80  They also found that 
when the jurors were permitted to ask questions they had a far greater understanding 
of the instructions and so were able to follow them more easily.81  Ultimately, their 
findings led in increased confidence in the verdict of the jury.  
Another more recent major project which was focused on juror understanding of legal 
terminology and which used real jurors in their research was carried out in 2000 by 
Warren Young, Neil Cameron and Yvette Tinsley.82  This was part of the New Zealand 
Law Commission Study which was based on the earlier research which had been carried 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 See Severence and Loftus (1982), above n.79 and McIntyre, D and Busse, B. (2010), Language 
and Style: in honour of Mick Short, Basingstoke, Palgrave McMillan 
81 For similar findings see also Heuer and Penrod (1988) above n.69; Heuer and Penrod (1989) 
above n.69; Heuer, L. and Penrod, S. (1994a), “Juror note-taking and question asking during 
trials: A national field experiment,” Law and Human Behavior, 18, 121-150; Sand and Reiss 
(1985) above n.69.  
82 NZ (2001) above n.4. 
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out for two earlier unpublished papers83 and was a project in which the researchers 
assessed jury functioning in 48 trials.  Whilst the restrictions around jury secrecy 
normally make it difficult to have direct contact with jurors, in this study, the 
researchers were able to interview jurors directly after gaining permission from the 
Chief Justice, the Chief District Court Judge, and the trial judge in each case.  Moreover 
their research was subject to strict procedures to protect jury secrecy, which included 
close oversight by an ethical committee. The project provided insightful and valuable 
indications on jury research. However, by their own admission, “it is necessarily limited 
because just 48 cases were investigated – while that is enough to get a good indication 
of trends, it is far from comprehensive.”84  In their research they assessed the jurors’ 
understanding of the evidence as it was presented and, how they assessed it within the 
given framework that they work within by using simulated jury trials and mock jurors.  
First, unsurprisingly they discovered that jurors found the presentation of evidence 
difficult to understand because, on the whole, it was delivered orally and this difficulty 
was compounded by the fact that seldom were there audio-visual (or other) aids to 
understanding.85  Second, the jurors found that the evidence was delivered so slowly 
that, once again, understanding was hampered.86  Third, many of the jurors found that 
because there was no framework within which to place their decision, this added to the 
overall difficulty in their comprehension.  Finally, whilst the jurors were able to 
understand, and most diligently tried to follow the judge’s instructions, they had 
difficulty understanding various aspects of the law.  For example, they often did not 
understand fully phrases such as ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, ‘consent’ or ‘intent.’87  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Juries in Criminal Trials: Part One, (published in July 1998) (“Juries I”) and Juries in Criminal 
Trials: Part Two (published in November 1999) (“Juries II”). 
84 NZ (2001) above n.4, [451]. 
85 NZ (2001) above n.4, [18], [356] and [357]. 
86 NZ (2001) above n.4, [360]-[362] for similar results see Heuer, L. and Penrod, S. (1988) above   
n.69. 
87 For similar findings see Darbyshire et.al. (2001) above n.24, p.27; Reifman et.al above n.70 
especially at p.545 when they discuss the problems that the jurors faced when deciphering the 
pattern instruction for reasonable doubt. 
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Crucially some of the other research shows88 that much of the time the jurors were not 
aware that the “quantum of proof does not vary with the seriousness of the crime and 
so would wrongly acquit those charged with very serious offences or wrongly convict in 
the case of petty offences.”89  However, Young et.al. found that these hurdles did not 
have any significant impact on the verdict.  Indeed, they found that through the 
collective discussions, the problems with individual misunderstandings were usually 
teased out and their overall conclusion was that, whilst understanding was not 
necessarily unduly compromised it was never-the-less improved with the allowance of 
such discussions.  There is no doubt in my mind that the work carried out in New 
Zealand was invaluable in both its research methods and its findings.  Whilst the amount 
of trials was relatively small and so the amount of jurors assessed necessarily limited, 
nonetheless the lessons learned are important for furthering research in this area 
because we were able to get closer to the jury by being a party to their discussions thus 
beginning to actually hear where their understanding of the trial begins to become 
fragile or, conversely, where it is clear, concise and precise. 
 
Having drawn a broad picture of the research and the methods in this area, the first 
thing to point out is that, however ‘real’ the research seems to be, the reality is that it 
is one step removed from a real jury, functioning in real time, in a real case and that of 
course brings with it a certain synthetic understanding of how the jury cope in a live 
trial situation.  More importantly, as I noted in section 2.3.1 above, is that intertwined 
with the research method there appears to be a research mentality whereby a jury is 
regarded, overtly or subliminally, as an object which is only really able to function by 
responding to what has been provided for it, rather than being considered as able to 
contribute both positively and proactively in the process of the research.  For example, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 For example, Zander, M. (2000), ‘The Criminal Standard of Proof – how sure is sure?’ 150, 
N.L.J. 1517; Power, R.C. (1999), ‘Reasonable and other doubts: The problem of jury 
instructions,’ Tennessee Law Review,Vol.67, p.45; Saks, M.J. (1997), ‘What do jury 
experiments tell us about how juries (should) make decisions?’ 6, Southern California 
Interdisciplinary Law Journal, Vol.6, 1. 
89 Darbyshire et.al. above n.24, p.28. 
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in Thomas’ research she gauges jury understanding on the basis of their responses to her 
questionnaires.  At no point in this project does she seem to regard the jurors as a 
group of autonomous, thinking, capable people able to contribute throughout the 
research.  I do understand that the bulk of the research projects, whilst perhaps using 
multi-method approaches as Thomas does, are not interdisciplinary and so do not 
attempt to engage the jury as a central part of the research process.  I am also aware 
that I am looking through the eyes of someone who finds it quite normal to use 
interactive forms of communication and so perhaps my impatience with the methods we 
see here is rooted in frustration at the fact that I do not see active engagement styles in 
the currently available legal research or research carried out by social scientists.  
However, I do see that there is a massive benefit in engaging the jurors and so I argue 
that as a very basic starting point, a better way to understand a juror - from a research 
perspective - is first to shift perspective of the view of the jury and by extension shift 
research method to enter a dialogue with the juror as the primary point of the 
research.  From that point we could use the dialogue which emerges between the juror 
and the researcher to guide the research and that way we could see juror- led jury 
research rather than research-professional led jury research.  That, in my opinion could 
be very exciting because it would mean that by including the jury at the primary 
research point, we could quite literally begin to hear how they cope, we could begin to 
identify where they start to struggle and we could listen to their ideas for research in 
terms of what they would do to change things to affect their better overall 
understanding.  Whilst my suggestion may at first seem to be slightly risky in that it may 
appear to be fundamentally unstructured, it is actually very structured, as I shall 
demonstrate in chapters three and four.  Moreover, this type of approach certainly adds 
to the field in offering an alternative research method and perhaps most importantly, 
heightens the researchers’ awareness of how he views the subject matter of his project, 
again therefore broadening both the research method and what we can learn from the 
research. 
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2.3.3 Jury understanding of complex evidence 
Another major area of empirical research has been into juror understanding of complex 
evidence and one example of this are the studies carried out into complex fraud trials.90 
In the UK, the Fraud Trials Committee Studies - subsequently referred to as the Roskill 
Studies - looked at jurors’ ability to understand complex evidence and where difficulty 
was identified, to offer solutions in the form of external aids to understanding.  Albeit 
limited by the constraints of time and cost, this research was the most intensive study 
into juror understanding of complex evidence and, to date, has not been rivalled in the 
UK. 91  Its main objective was to see where improvements could be made in the 
presentation of information to jurors in complex fraud trials.  The research 
concentrated on “the effects of glossaries, the presentation of numerical information, 
the problem of concentration and the effects of summaries in improving 
comprehension.”92  Their method was a jury simulation which was focused solely on 
fraud trials and there were two simulations each using mock jurors.   
First the jurors listened to a recorded summing up, either in a continuous 1.5 hour 
session or for four periods of 20 minutes with 5–10 minute breaks.  They found that even 
although breaks were allowed for, this did not make much difference in juror recall of 
the information.  Second, the focus of the study was to compare the effectiveness of 
summing-up by either presenting all of the points made by the respective speakers (of 
which there were two) or by presenting all of the points made by the respective 
speakers, but rearranging the information around the crucial points which were being 
communicated to the jury.  In this experiment the first presentation style was found to 
be most effective in respect of juror recall and that was in line with other research, 
which suggests that if information is delivered in a chronological sequence it is easier to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Roskill Studies (1986), above n.8 
91 This study was the closest thing to a jury simulation experiment in relation to fraud trials.  It 
involved showing a mock jury an edited one and a half hour summing up in a fraud case and 
thereafter asking questions about it in order to test understanding and recall.   
92 Roskill above n.8, p.iii. 
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recall the information.93  Additionally, they found that the jurors’ understanding of the 
trial could be improved if they were provided with technical, financial or legal 
information prior to the trial but which was designed to help during the trial.  Thus 
their findings indicated that glossaries of key terms that were forecast as being a part 
of the trial vocabulary should be provided in everyday language.  Moreover, these 
glossaries should be given to the jurors before the trial began and that time should be 
allotted for the jurors to study the document.  Indeed, they recommended that 15 
minutes should be given for every 10 words on the list.  They also found that giving the 
glossary to the jurors at the start of the trial without time for familiarisation was 
unhelpful.94  However, when they were given graphs and diagrams their recall was 
increased by 20% and when the glossaries of terms were made available their recall 
improved by 55%.  Without such aides observers, who included Michael Levi noted that 
they were able to remember “comparatively little and they found difficulty in 
concentrating for even half an hour.”95   
 
Levi was amongst a number of observers who regarded the Roskill studies as unrealistic 
for several reasons, which included that the testimony recreated for the mock jurors 
was only oral, that the simulated transcripts were too short and were only from two 
perspectives, that the study did not take into account such things as the composition of 
the jury and, that there was very little done to recreate the solemnity of the task 
placed upon the mock jury in the simulated trials.96  He therefore maintained that the 
studies “eliminated from the outset what one might term the ‘contextualisation effects’ 
of improvements in understanding over the trial – whose existence is supported by the 
difference made by the use of glossaries in the simulation – as well as enhanced thought 
and recall due to the fact that one is actually charged with the responsibility of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 I discuss the narrative of the trial in chapter three. 
94 The Roskill Study above n.8, p.58. 
95 Levi, M. (1988), “The Role of the Jury in Complex Cases,” in Findlay and Duff (1988) above n.35, 
p.103. 
96 Levi, M. (1992), ‘The Investigation, Prosecution, and Trial of Serious Fraud,’ Royal Commission 
on Criminal Justice Research Study No.14, Draft Report, p.103. 
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determining someone else’s fate.”97  Moreover, in a subsequent report prepared for the 
Royal Commission, Levi stressed the importance of taking into consideration much more 
than simply juror recall and / or understanding of the trial evidence in lengthy fraud 
trials.  He maintained that if accuracy were to be given to the question over juror 
inclusion into such trials is to be found, then other factors which include the social class 
of those on the jury needs to be taken into consideration because only then could social 
inclusion begin to be assessed accurately .  Thus by extension, we need to look to the 
composition and representative nature of the jury in any given trial.  Indeed, he noted 
that in the Roskill Trials, the ‘working class’ jurors automatically assumed that middle-
class people did not commit crimes.98   
 
This point was echoed 10 years later in the study carried out by Honess in which he 
referred to the Roskill study as one that was “weak predominantly because it was an 
unrealistic simulation of the actual Maxwell Trial.”99  In light of this, Honess’ research, 
which was also a trial simulation using mock jurors, was designed to be more robust and 
realistic and as such his materials consisted of “verbatim transcripts of the charges read 
by the court clerk, the judge's initial briefing to the jury, and the opening statements of 
the prosecution and defence counsel in which they presented their main arguments and 
evidence across four days.”100  Additionally, he reconstructed documentary evidence by 
using “verbatim descriptions by counsel of material in the exhibits.  Specifically, there 
were seven sets of information, variously referred to by colour, number or type of file. 
These made up over 100 items and each item was referred to at some time during the 
opening statement from the prosecution.  The shorter defence opening statement used 
only a two-page document that summarised the key counter-arguments of the defence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Levi (1988) above n.95, p.104. 
98 Levi (1992) above n.96, p.121. 
99 Honess, T.M. (1998), ‘Juror competence in processing complex information: implications from a 
simulation of the Maxwell trial,’ Criminal Law Review, 763, p.765. 
100 Honess (1998) above n.99, p.765. 
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case.”101  The entire video lasted for more than six hours and was shown to the mock 
jurors over a period of several sessions.  The participants were paid volunteers who had 
been recruited through responding to notices which had been put up in colleges and job 
centres with the view that the resultant mock jury was a close representation of an 
actual jury in terms of “age, sex and economic status.”102 
 
The participants in Honess’ study identified a number of areas which could have 
improved their understanding of the trial.  First, they all suggested that the 
presentation of the evidence could have been improved and the most prominent 
suggestion for how to do this was to present it in a more “story-like” structure.  As we 
have just seen, this is a contrast to the work of Levi who found the opposite to be the 
case.103  In addition - and in concurrence with Levi and the Roskill studies - the 
participants in Honess’ study suggested that frequent summaries of the key points be 
given, that there be more visual aids104 and that the language be simplified.105  Whilst 
these studies do give us some indicators as to juror comprehension, because the 
research methods are set up to test specific assumptions about the role of the jury, 
they do not give a more holistic understanding of the jury due to their specific research 
focuses and methods designed for those focuses alone.  As I said at the beginning of the 
section, they were designed with the intention of testing juror understanding of fraud 
trials.  They were dominated by testing juror comprehension by measuring juror ability 
to recall information or interpret the complicated terminology when using glossaries 
designed to assist on those points alone.  At no point were the jury integrated to the 
trial and permitted to question as they began to become confused, indeed, the jury 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Honess (1998) above n.99, p.765. 
102 Honess (1998) above n.99, p.766. 
103 I shall discuss the trial narrative and storytelling in chapter three. 
104 And Honess highlighted the need for the visual aids to be introduced very early in the trial. 
105 For recent developments in aids for juries in US state and federal trials see Mize, G.E. and 
Hannaford-Agor, P. (2008), ‘Jury Trial Innovations Across America: How we are Teaching and 
Learning from Each Other,’ Journal of Court Innovation, Vol.1, p.189 at p.211 see the advances 
in permissibility of note taking and at p.214 the permissibility of jurors asking questions to 
witnesses (in written form), discussion of evidence during the trial p.215, pre-instructions for 
jurors on substantive law, improving pattern instructions p.222 and so on.  
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were treated as a live jury would be treated for the purposes of the experiments.  I 
understand that within the parameters of such experiments suggestions to integrate the 
jury would be irrelevant because the researchers were using as their point of departure 
the current institutional rules, however, it is the fact that they address the meaning of 
understanding within such narrow parameters that is most interesting for my research.  
Therefore, whilst the indications from their research may be positive in that one 
aspect, it could be outweighed because of their exclusive research focus.  Moreover, 
whilst they may tell us about the ability of the particular volunteers in the study to 
follow (or not) the instructions, they do not tell us much more than that and they 
certainly do not lend any insight into when the juror may become confused, or indeed, 
when he copes very well without any aides or assistance. 
 
To follow I turn to the research which has been concerned with the effect of extra-legal 
factors on the decision making of the jury.  I consider this to be relevant to the question 
of juror understanding because what we may find is that, in certain circumstances, 
jurors will defer to elements outside the scope of the trial because they cannot 
understand their part and their place in the process.  
 
2.3.4 The influence of extra-legal factors on jury decision-making 
I shall now turn to the findings from some of the research which suggests that when 
jurors become confused or disengaged, they may resort to basing their verdict on extra-
legal information rather than on the trial evidence.  I consider this to be relevant for 
the purposes of my thesis because, as we shall see, there is research to suggest that 
when jurors become confused, frustrated or disinterested they will be more likely to 
default to relying on stereotypes, extra-legal information or defer to the stronger 
characters or opinions in the jury room.  Whilst I acknowledge that there are countless 
elements which could be regarded as an extra-legal influence, for the purposes of this 
section I have chosen to include juror selection of the foreman; the knowledge of 
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previous convictions; pre-trial publicity and the effect of general media attention in 
certain cases.  I acknowledge there is a wealth of information but I have confined my 
selection to those studies which have attempted to assess the functioning of the jury as 
the trial is in progress rather than those which are focused on the communication 
between the jurors at the deliberation stage, with the exception of looking briefly to 
research carried out on jury foreman selection because it is in that research that we 
can see that jurors will sometimes defer to what they regard, in the foreman, as a 
higher intelligence.106  Essentially, I have confined my search to these areas, and not to 
the discussions in the jury room, because I believe that assessing what the jury do and 
do not understand at that point in the trial is way too late to respond meaningfully to 
any misunderstandings which they may have had and which accordingly could have been 
crucial for their understanding.  I fully acknowledge however that even if my concepts 
were to be integrated as a part of the trial process, they could not possibly prevent 
extra-legal issues being a possible facet of the deliberations which take place in the 
jury room itself.  With that said however I do believe that continuing to focus on their 
deliberations at the end of a trial is beyond the point where dedicated support could 
assist them.  
 
One of the earliest pieces of research in this area was carried out by Bevan et.al. in 
which they recreated a trial and in the simulation actors took on the parts of various 
foremen.107  The aim of the project was to determine whether or not the social status 
or the character of the foreman would influence the rest of the jury.  Some of the 
actors were directed to be autocratic whereas others were to be democratic and the 
results showed that, generally the jurors were swayed by the character and nature of 
the foreman.  In their small study, which was conducted as part of the Law and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See for example Dann, B.M. and Logan III, G. (1996), ‘Jury reform: the Arizona Experience’, 79 
Judicature, Number 5, March-April, 280 [subsequently referred to as Arizona 1996]; Thomas 
(2007) above n.33; Thomas (2010) above n.3; Darbyshire et.al (2001) above n.24. 
107 Bevan, W. et.al. (1958), “Jury Behaviour as a Function of the Prestige of the Foreman and the 
Nature of his Leadership,” Journal of Public Law, Vol.7, pp.419-449. 
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Behavioral Science Project at the University of Chicago, Strodtbeck, James and Hawkins 
reported a similar result when they assessed how the social status of the foreman 
affected the rest of the jury.108  The source of their data was through assessing mock 
jury deliberations in which the participants were drawn from jury pools in courts in 
Chicago and St. Louis.  The mock jurors listened to a recorded real trial in conditions 
set up to replicate a real courtroom.  Their deliberations were then recorded and fully 
transcribed and “scored in terms of interaction process categories” which means that 
they were concerned with the nature of the interaction rather than the content of the 
interaction.  It was found that generally jurors are swayed by the characteristics of the 
foreman with a tendency to agree with his opinions or decisions.109  Baldwin and 
McConville carried out a similar study, in which they used the same research methods, 
into the impact of the foreman in 1980 and they found that the jurors in their 
simulation tended to agree with the foreman if he was perceived as being of a higher 
status than the rest.  They also reported that men who seemed to be better educated 
were selected by the others to be the foreman and from that they noted that the other 
members of the jury tended to defer to the perceived intelligence of that person rather 
than asserting their own understandings of the process.110  Thus, in this we can see that 
it is very difficult to assess whether or not the jury actually understand because their 
comprehension is being hidden behind their deference to a perception of a higher 
intelligence in the foreman.  
In 1994, Ogloff and Vidmar compared the impact of, and reliance on, different types of 
publicity (in their study they compared television with printed media) on the Mount 
Cashel Orphanage Cases where members of the Congregation of Christian Brothers of 
Ireland were charged with physically and sexually abusing young boys at the Mount 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Strodtbeck, F. L. and Mann, R. D. (1957), ‘Social Status in Jury Deliberations’ American 
Sociological Review, Vol.22, December, pp.713-719 
109 Strodtbeck and Mann (1957) above n.108, p. 714. 
110 Baldwin, J. and McConville, M. (1980), “Juries, Foreman and Verdicts,” British Journal of 
Criminology, Vol.20, No.1, January, pp.35-44 
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Cashel Orphanage in St. John’s, Newfoundland, Canada.111  The primary focus of their 
study was the potential impact of the visual effects of television reporting on juror 
attitudes, perceptions and beliefs whilst continually reflecting on the ability of the 
juror to remain impartial in the face of, sometimes, harrowing imagery coupled with 
the hype generated through chat shows such as Oprah.  They chose specifically explicit 
television excerpts in the control group to test whether the jury were affected and - 
unsurprisingly - found that they were.112  Their study consisted of 121 participants (63 
female, 58 male) who were students and staff at the Simon Fraser University in British 
Columbia.  They deliberately did not select participants from the St. John’s area 
because it was thought that those people would have been “contaminated by multiple 
sources of exposure” with their opinion that their experiments would have been 
compromised as a result.113  Once selected, the participants were shown media stimuli 
with some of the most graphic sexual abuse testimony given by former Mount Cashel 
residents.  The point of the study was to measure the relative impact of the types of 
media stimuli used (print v. video).  Whilst the forum of presentation was different, 
Ogloff and Vidmar were at pains to stress that the content of the articles/VTs were 
almost identical.  Overall their findings were unsurprising in that the participants were 
regarded as more biased when the testimony had been presented in televised form as 
opposed to written form and this was put down largely to the emotional involvement in 
engaging with the former.114 
Another area of concern is the knowledge of an accused’s previous convictions and this 
was something that was the focus of Sally Lloyd Bostock’s study carried out in 2000.115  
In this study she was interested in the effect on the jury when they were aware of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Ogloff, J.R.P. and Vidmar, N. (1994), ‘The impact of pretrial publicity on jurors: A study to 
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Human Behavior, 18, 507-525 at 508. 
112 For examples of the content of the excerpts see Ogloff and Vidmar above n.111 at pp.509-511. 
113 Ogloff and Vidmar (1994) above n.111, p.513. 
114 For a detailed account see Ogloff and Vidmar above n.111, pp.513-521. 
115 Lloyd-Bostock, S. (2000), ‘The effect on Juries of Hearing About the Defendants Previous 
Record: a Simulation Study,’ Crim.LR, 734. 
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accused’s previous conviction and in particular she was interested in seeing whether the 
jury would be more likely to convict if the previous conviction was similar to, or recent 
in time to, the current one.116  Additionally, her study looked at the impact on the jury 
of introducing a previous conviction for indecently assaulting a child.  The research 
method was “a controlled experiment in which simulated, or ‘mock’ jurors viewed 
videos of a condensed, reconstructed trial.”117  The subject matter of the reconstructed 
trials were typical of those predicted to be coming before the court in regard to the 
crimes charged.  There were three: 1.) handling stolen goods; 2.) indecent assault on a 
woman and; 3.) a deliberate stabbing.  In total 24 variations on the videos was shown to 
a group of 12 mock jurors who were all members of the public and all eligible for jury 
duty.  Each of the videos introduced some, none or all of the previous convictions.  
Lloyd Bostock’s study indicated that where a previous conviction was both recent and 
similar in nature to the current charges the jury would be more likely to place weight 
on the previous conviction and so the likelihood of a guilty verdict was high.  If however 
the previous conviction was dissimilar and was an old offence, the likelihood of a guilty 
verdict where the previous conviction was relied upon was considerably weaker.  These 
results were in direct contrast to the earlier studies carried out by Wissler and Saks118 
and Cornish and Sealy,119 both of whose studies indicated that dissimilar previous 
convictions were more likely to be relied upon for the current charges.  It is noted 
however that in both of their studies the dissimilar previous convictions were for rape 
and murder which calls into question the relevance of the severity of the previous 
convictions.  It is clear that there is certainly evidence to suggest that the knowledge of 
previous convictions – especially of a same or similar nature – will impact on the jury 
with the result that they will be more likely to convict in such situations or, as Lloyd 
Bostock says, the knowledge of prior convictions evokes in the jury stereotypes of a-
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typical criminality, and “that caution over revealing a defendant’s criminal record is 
well justified.”120  In Lloyd-Bostock’s study we can see that the jurors were more likely 
to convict the defendants (regardless of the current charge) where the defendant had a 
previous conviction for indecent assault.  I accept that previous convictions can be a 
relevant factor when determining guilt, indeed, if we have a person who has been 
convicted previously of a very similar offence perhaps using identical methods then this 
is evidence that suggests that he is guilty of the charge at hand.  However, my point is 
not so much that juries are more likely to convict where there are previous convictions 
as such, but rather that juries place too much weight on previous convictions.  Thus, 
what Lloyd-Bostock’s study tells us is that, in regard to juror reasoning, there is a higher 
chance that a juror will rely on previous convictions, (which could be extra-legal 
information) thus rendering their verdict more open to question. 
In 2010 Cheryl Thomas published research which was focused on the influence of the 
media on the jury.  This research took place in three different courts and it included 62 
cases and 668 jurors.  Her sample covered a spectrum of different cases which included 
long, high profile and standard cases, with the latter lasting under two weeks with little 
or no media attention.121  She reported that jurors who were sitting on cases which had 
been subject to high profile media coverage during the trial were 70% more likely to 
recall the media coverage of the trial than jurors sitting on less newsworthy cases who 
recalled only 11% of the media coverage.122  She stressed that this finding was linked 
only to the media publicity which was communicated as the trial was in progress and 
that the jurors did not recall the pre-trial publicity.  In this respect she argued that her 
study was the “first empirical evidence in this country of the ‘fade factor’ in jury trials 
(the further away media reports are from a trial the more likely they are to fade from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Lloyd-Bostock (2000) above n.115, 734. 
121 Thomas (2010) above n.3, p.v. 
122 Thomas (2010) above n.3, p.vii and pp.40-44. 
  
56 
 
jurors’ memories).”123  However, she went on to say that 35% of jurors on high profile 
cases did recall pre-trial media coverage from a variety of forums which included 
television (66%) and national newspapers (53%).  Additionally, the jurors who recalled 
this coverage did not recall it being persuasive in any one direction, however, to clarify, 
she did report that, in high profile trials those jurors who did recall which slant the 
media coverage took (20%), recalled it as indicating that the accused was guilty with 
that figure falling to 15% in standard cases.124 Thus, there is evidence to suggest that 
jurors do sometimes look at information other than that provided to them during the 
trial process and this is worrying.  Moreover, if we are concerned (as Lloyd-Bostock was) 
that jurors are too influenced by previous convictions then media attention pre and 
during trials is one way that they could find out about them and so, I suggest, we are 
right to be concerned.  
In her 2010 report, Thomas also took into account jurors’ proactive use of the internet 
and the indications from her research raised a number of slightly concerning questions.  
She first asked whether jurors knew that they were not supposed to make independent 
internet searches.  Second she assessed how the jurors used the internet – for example, 
did they do general searches for information on the defendant or were their searches 
more focused on the law, i.e. were they using the internet to expand their knowledge 
of the evidence presented or did they make inquiries about the other trial participants 
such as the Judge, the legal counsel or the witnesses.  Finally, did they use forums such 
as Facebook or Twitter to discuss the case and so were they in danger of being in 
contempt of court?  In high profile cases Thomas reported that 26% of the jurors saw 
information about their case on the internet and 15% actively looked for something.  In 
standard cases she reported 13% and 5% respectively.125  Finally, she reported that those 
making internet searches were all over the age of 30.  The implications from this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Thomas (2010) above n.3, p.vii. 
124 Thomas (2010) above n.3, p.43, fig.3.22. 
125 Thomas (2010) above n.3, p.43 figure 3.23. 
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research suggests that whilst jurors are likely to recall media reporting of their trials 
and the more high profile the case the more likely the recall of the reporting, it does 
not give clear indications on whether this impacts adversely on the verdicts in such 
trials.  All the more reason therefore to consider using methods which actively engage 
jurors because through their being able to interact in the trial process we, as 
researchers, will come to gain a more accurate picture of what they rely on and what 
they do not.   
Another area of research explored relatively recently has been the effect of extra-legal 
influences on jurors in rape trials, where the complainant has been intoxicated and the 
primary researchers identified in my exploration are Emily Finch and Vanessa Munro.  In 
1995 they carried out a pilot study to test the impact of such factors on the jury and 
they reported that jurors considered a “number of extra-legal factors when reaching a 
decision: rape myths, misconceptions about the impact of intoxicants and factors such 
as the motivation of the defendant in administering an intoxicant” were all a feature of 
the process.126  In their pilot study they used two focus groups and single trial 
simulations to try to establish what the jury did and did not rely on in rape trials 
involving intoxicated complainants.  Their aim was two-fold: first they wanted to assess 
the parameters that jurors place on drug assisted rape and second (and most important 
for our purposes), “what factors (extra-legal or otherwise) influence the attribution of 
blame and responsibility in sexual encounters involving intoxicants?”127  The facts in the 
scenario remained constant throughout but different variants were introduced: the 
nature of the intoxicant; the means of administration and the level of intoxication.  The 
simulation was enacted in real time and portrayed by trained barristers in the roles of 
legal counsel with volunteer student actors in the roles of witnesses.  The mock jurors 
were volunteers and their deliberations were audio recorded and analysed.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Finch, V. and Munro, V.E. (1995), ‘Juror stereotypes and Blame Attribution in Rape Cases 
Involving Intoxicants,’ British Journal of Criminology, Vol.45, pp.25-38, p.25. [referred to 
subsequently as Finch and Munro (1995)] 
127 Finch and Munro (1995) above n.126, p.30. 
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indications from the pilot study were that jurors did rely on extra-legal information with 
four main areas identified: “the victim’s responsibility; the defendant’s intentions; the 
parity of the parties’ intoxication; and the impact of intoxication upon the victim.”128  
The findings from this study formed the basis of a larger scale ESRC-funded study which 
examined juror attitudes to intoxicated rape complainants which Finch and Munro 
undertook between 2004 and 2005.129 
The research was carried out in two stages.  First they assessed the decisions of focus 
groups and then they compared those findings with decisions in trial simulations.130  Like 
their earlier project they used simulated trials although the number was increased to 
seven in the current study.  Unlike most other studies of this sort however, this one was 
not designed “to test the efficacy of any particular hypothesis or theory, but rather to 
replicate as closely as possible, given the prohibitions on involving jurors in real cases, 
the environment in which jurors evaluate events and make determinations about 
liability.”131  In this case they analysed the juror deliberations and, taking everything 
into consideration, (the recreated environment: the modes of trial delivery and the 
insertion of extra pieces of information such as differentiations in the drugs ingested) 
they were able to report that jurors do work backwards from what they already know 
(an extra-legal element) and then use their knowledge in their formation of a verdict 
which uses the trial information.  Thus, Finch and Munro used this research as fairly 
compelling evidence of jurors’ tendency to rely on extra-legal information (whatever 
that may be) in their decision-making process.  My initial reaction is to agree that this 
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References RES 000-22-0328 and the research culminated in the production of Finch, E. and 
Munro, V.E. (2008), ‘Lifting the Veil: The Use of Focus Groups and Trial Simulations in Legal 
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Responsibility Attribution in Rape Trials Involving Intoxication,’ Social and Legal Studies, 15, 591 
[subsequently referred to as Demon Drink, 2007]. 
130 Finch and Munro (2007) (Demon Drink) above n.129, p.597. 
131 Finch and Munro (2007) (Demon Drink) above n.129, p.597. 
  
59 
 
model seems to allow for a fair understanding of how the jury get to their verdict and 
to identify which (extra-legal) elements they rely on along the way.  However, on 
reflection I would say that their optimism over both their research method, as well as 
their findings is slightly misplaced.  Not only do they seem to automatically view the 
jury as participants in their simulation - which I suggest is a misplaced presumption in 
itself because the jurors in their study are not actually participating - they also attempt 
to better understand the jury through comparisons alone.132  Thus what they have done 
is they have taken the typical or existing model of the jury and assessed it in isolation 
through comparison methods as others before them had done.  Whilst I accept that this 
would be a normal course of action in policy oriented research I argue that until such 
time as we are able to come closer to the jury by using research methods designed with 
interaction at their core, we may be in danger of learning very little more about them 
than we do currently.  
2.3.5 Critical reflections on the research methods and the limitations of 
those techniques 
I have previously suggested in this chapter that whether they use mock jurors, cited 
jurors or real jurors, there has tended to be a researcher mentality which has driven the 
majority of the projects.  That mentality, I suggest, is one that places the jury in a 
passive or slightly disconnected stance (just as we see them in a live trial) in order to 
observe, in particular, how it (as an inanimate body or a receptacle into which evidence 
is poured) copes with the various aids given to it as part of the research project.  I 
should clarify my position by saying that I am yet to see a research method which 
includes the jury right from the start, and so I argue without their inclusion they have 
been placed in a passive, disconnected (because the researchers have negated to 
connect with them) position.  Regarding the jury as passive and disconnected however 
is perfectly understandable given that this is how they are understood by the trial 
system and so it should not be so surprising that this stance is adopted in the research.  
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There are of course problems associated with suggesting, as I do, that there may be 
consultation with (mock) jurors prior to the commencement of the research with the 
most obvious being the financial burden which this would place on the projects 
themselves. However, I argue that unless we challenge the idea of the juror as passive, 
thereby perhaps stretching researchers out of their tried and tested comfort zones, we 
will not even begin to develop a more nuanced understanding of how the jury operates 
and which includes what it does and does not understand. Moreover, I accept that some 
may regard consultation with the jurors as naïve or pointless but I suggest that 
discussion with (mock) jurors could be invaluable because it is only through this early 
consultation that we have the chance of seeing the project through their eyes, hearing 
what their expectations of themselves are and dispelling, at the very earliest of stages, 
any myths on pre-framed notions that they may have of the criminal trial process and 
their part therein.  
Another problem, as I see it, in the research methods themselves is that the majority 
have focused specifically on the language that the jurors hear rather than on the 
process of the communication of the language itself.  For example, we saw in the 
Roskill trials that where the researchers foresaw jurors having difficulty understanding 
what they regarded as difficult language, we saw them pre-empting that problem with a 
glossary of terms and definitions.  They did not actually confirm with the jury whether 
or not the area specific language had in reality been problematic in the first instance.  
What this also indicates is that in the large proportion of the studies the jury is, as I 
observed earlier, regarded as a unit as opposed to autonomous thinking individuals, and 
so the understanding, and then decision-making, seems from a research perspective to 
mean “how juries combine their sundry, individual perspectives into a single verdict.”133  
Indeed, this attitude towards jurors is fairly evident when we look to studies such as 
those carried out by Hastie, Penrod and Pennington or Kassin and Wrightsman where we 
see their reference to the jurors as a reference to a group rather than to individuals and 
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so their individuality, in terms of their understanding is definitely a secondary concern 
to these researchers.134   
Indeed, what most of these solutions have in common is first, that their primary focus 
tends to be trying to identify what language the jury find most problematic and second, 
giving things to the jury as a way to respond to the problems that they have identified.  
As we have seen from the research discussed thus far, the things ‘given’ to the jury 
include the option to note-take, glossaries of terms, computer animations, re-worded 
judicial instructions, re-timed judicial instructions, copies of written judicial 
instructions and the option to ask questions of the judge.  All of these ideas have been 
regarded by researchers as beneficial for the jurors to enhance their understanding of 
the legal language, however most have been decided without any input from 
prospective, actual, mock or shadow jurors.  The trouble with this approach is that it 
reduces the jury to a kind of inanimate object which can only really function if it is 
given things to help it, thus, from my perspective, undermining it greatly.  Indeed, I 
would say that by continuing to view the jury as a body which is only capable of 
reacting or understanding when given things we are in danger of losing sight of the fact 
that jurors are ordinary human beings who have the capacity to think clearly for 
themselves in their private lives and so I fail to see why this is not factored into the 
research as it currently stands.135   
Thus, in order to understand better how the jury operate we must develop a forum that 
accepts that the jury are a part of the trial and so communication with them and by 
them should be as natural as possible.  As part of the transition towards that we also 
need to develop a research technique which treats the jury as thinking individuals and, 
where appropriate, allows them to lead in the process of the research as I have already 
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Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England; Kassin, S.M. and Wrightsman, L.S. (1988), 
The American Jury on Trial: Psychological Perspectives, New York, Hemisphere Publishing. 
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discussed earlier in this chapter.  Indeed, naïve as it may at first sound, if the jury 
simply indicated what they found problematic, and the researchers listened to that and 
worked with it, then perhaps some of the mystery around what they do and do not 
understand of the trial language would finally be laid to rest.  I accept that this 
suggestion may at first appear to be simplistic especially when we consider the findings 
in Thomas’ 2010 study where jurors did not accurately assess their own understanding, 
often thinking they had understood when in actual fact they had not.  However, if we 
shift our mind-sets to accept that at the very least the jury are autonomous, thinking, 
capable people and from there to allow those people to be proactive in the process of 
the research, perhaps what has appeared to be so unfathomable would finally become 
clear.  Thus, to be clear, when referring to the unfathomable, I am referring to the 
debate over which language, or what aspect of the trial process a juror finds 
problematic and so, rather than continuing to surmise what that could be I suggest we 
simply encourage the jury to indicate at which points their understanding becomes 
confused.  In turn therefore, I suggest that in time if the same or similar barriers to 
understanding arose in mock or simulated trials, future research of a similar nature 
could be designed which clarified these points.	  
I have highlighted what are considered to be the most important research projects in 
this area, however I should acknowledge that there have been very many different 
studies which, when looked at collectively, cover just about every perspective and 
angle of the trial process, its timing and its content.  Moreover the studies on the trial 
process are equally important in their discussions and indications.  For example, as we 
have seen, some suggested that the order in which the evidence is presented affects 
the outcome of the verdict136 and others maintained that the order in which the 
witnesses gave evidence was another factor which affected the verdict of the jury.137  
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Others have questioned the ability of the juror to maintain and recall large amounts of 
evidence138 with little or no support139 and still more explored how discussions between 
the jurors in their decision-making process helped, or hindered, in understanding and 
recalling these masses of information.140  Studies then began to emerge into the 
representative nature of the jury141, the effect on the verdict of the composition of jury 
venires (or panels as they are more commonly referred in the UK)142 and the impact of 
the status of the jurors on the panel.143  Suffice it to say there have been myriad 
research projects viewing the jury from different angles but with the same primary 
question in mind, how well do juries make decisions and what factors are at play to 
disrupt or distort their decision-making process.  The majority of the research places 
the focus firmly on the jury in isolation and considers the different ways in which its 
role could be made easier by providing for it a variety of solutions. 
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Jury and the Defense of Insanity, Boston, Little, Brown at pp.116-119. 
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My review until now was not intended to be a comprehensive survey of jury research.  
My concern was primarily with research methods as the relevant substantive findings of 
the research will be discussed in more detail in chapter three.  For the remainder of 
this chapter I am interested in reflecting on the research methods themselves and as I 
consider whether they in themselves may be limited, I raise questions over whether 
those methodological limitations - as I regard them to be - may contribute to what 
could be considered as limited responses to juror understanding.  The main types of 
research methods considered here are: jury verdict comparisons with legal professionals 
which use either simulated trials and which are re-creations of actual trials; simulated 
trials using video re-enactments all of which use mock jurors who have either responded 
to advertisements, have volunteered, both of the aforementioned, some paid and some 
unpaid.  Additionally, I assess the value of using shadow juries. 
Thus, we can see a variety of different methods used in both the early and the 
contemporary jury research.  For example, there are simulated trials which recreate an 
actual trial using documentation designed to replicate what was used in the actual 
trial.144  There are simulated trials which use video re-enactments which have actors 
taking on the various roles in reimagined trials and there are simulated trials which use 
real trial transcripts which are portrayed by a variety of actors and legal 
professionals.145  In such simulations mock juries are used and these juries come in a 
variety of shapes.  For example, there are mock jurors who have been chosen from 
actual jury pools,146 others are volunteers selected from responses to adverts,147 some 
involve payment of the volunteers and some do not.148  Moreover, there are shadow 
jurors who follow the jury in an actual trial but who at the decision-making stage retire 
alone to consider their verdict.  Despite these different types there is a common aim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 For example the Roskill Trials above n.8. 
145 I make reference to particular studies in the course of this section. 
146 as was the case in Cheryl Thomas’ 2010 research above n.3. 
147 For example the Roskill Trials above n.8. 
148 Dann and Logan (1996), the Arizona Project above n.106 cf. NZ (2001) above n.4. 
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and that is to create a simulation which is both credible and provides an accurate basis 
upon which we can assess the jury.  I mentioned earlier that Browning suggested in 1973 
that the unique value in simulated trials lay in “their ability to reproduce observed 
behaviour, even of complex systems, with a high degree of precision.”149  The jury 
simulation paradigm has, however, been extensively criticised. Two of the most 
prominent critics have been Weiten and Diamond who, in a seminal paper, considered 
the issue of whether the jury simulation paradigm provides “an accurate basis for 
drawing conclusions about real jury functioning.”150  They selected as their criterion for 
a simulation, any study where the subjects had been asked to “act as jurors” in their 
research spanned 1969-1978 and they noted that, apart from the Chicago Study, there 
had been very few documented simulation studies prior to 1969.   
Their opinion about the simulation studies was fairly damning as they identified a 
number of areas where questions about their validity could be raised.  For example, 
they questioned those authors’ whose work was based on the view that the simulation 
paradigm was a convenient way to test theory, asserting that if the results were never 
to have a practical application in the courtroom then the point of the study must surely 
be called to question.151  Additionally, they identified a number of inadequacies in such 
areas as the sampling and the value of role-playing as well as scrutinizing the decision, 
in some studies, not to include group deliberation processes.  Moreover, they 
questioned the value of the simulations where the authors included caveats that their 
results were “merely suggestive regarding the practicalities of jury functioning.”  Thus, 
in their questioning of the simulation model itself they highlighted that if progress were 
to be made to enable better understanding of how the jury functions in the trial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Browning, R.P. (1973), “Simulation: attempts and possibilities” in Knutson, J.N. (ed.), Handbook 
of Political Psychology, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass at p.348. 
150 Weiten, W. and Diamond, S.S. (1979), ‘A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The 
Case of Defendant Characteristics,’ Law and Human Behavior, Vol.3, No1. 
151 See for example Boor, M. (1975), ‘Effects of victim competence and defendant opportunism on 
the decisions of simulated jurors,’ Journal of Social Psychology, 6, 301-2 who used the 
simulation method as a way to test theories about juror competence; Cornish and Sealy (1973) 
above n.55. 
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situation, then steps needed to be taken to design a research method which went 
beyond only assessing certain parts of its functioning.  Therefore, they acknowledged 
the merit in making determinations about specific facets of the part of the juror – for 
example whether or not they would be swayed by defendant characteristics – but they 
concluded that the method of research must go beyond those specifics if it were to be 
deemed credible.152   
Overall Weiten and Diamond concluded that the jury simulation paradigm fell short of 
its expectations as a vehicle to assess the jury.  They were clear in their opinion that 
the external validity of the research method needed to be robust because it was on 
such methods that reliance was placed and future research developed.  They noted that 
the simulation process had been used to assess a great many different aspects of the 
jury from its ability to remain impartial in its decision making and from there the 
variables which may affect it in this endeavour.  In addition to questioning the method 
itself, they also questioned some of the actual simulations, first making clear that “one 
cannot carry out a jury simulation without some form of trial simulation.”153  In this 
respect they criticised much of the research for its brevity, in the sense that the 
simulations were cut down both in terms of their length and in their detail,154 
highlighting (as Finch and Munro most recently also did155) that lack of complexity in a 
simulation affects the jurors in that they will begin to fill in the gaps in information 
with their own irrelevant fillers.156  For example, Weiten and Diamond expressed 
concern when the content of the simulation was pared down to exclude any extra-legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 For the defendant characteristics simulations see Mitchell, H.E., & Byrne, D. (1973), ‘The 
defendant's dilemma: Effects of juror attitudes and authoritarianism on judicial decisions,’ 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.25, 1, pp.23-129; Griffitt, W., and Jackson, T. 
(1973), ‘Simulated jury decisions: The influence of jury-defendant attitude similarity and 
dissimilarity, ‘Social Behavior and Personality, 1, 1-7. 
153 Weiten, W. and Diamond, S.S. (1979) above n.150, p.77. 
154 for example in Landy and Aronson’s 1969 research they note that the case summaries are only 
400 words long, much shorter than the average case summary in an actual trial - Landy, D., & 
Aronson, E. (1969), ‘The influence of the character of the criminal and his victim on the decision of 
simulated jurors,’ Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol.5, pp.141-152. 
155 Finch and Munro (2008), Lifting the Veil above n.129, 30-51 
156 See Bermant, G., McGuire, M., McKinley, W., & Salo, C. (1974), ‘The logic of simulation in jury 
research,’ Criminal Justice and Behavior, Vol.1, pp.224-233. 
  
67 
 
stimuli as this may have led to the jury relying on stereotypes to fill in the gaps and 
therefore leading to questions over the validity of the model itself.  I should note 
however that this opinion is not universal.  Indeed, Krammer and Kerr have suggested 
that trial complexity (or simplicity) in a simulation does not necessarily undermine the 
verdict delivered by the mock jury because “even highly artificial simulations are not 
inherently distorting and may actually inform us on relationships of real significance for 
law and human behaviour.”157   
This was a point that was raised and assessed in detail in Finch and Munro’s 2008 study 
“Lifting the Veil”158 in which they considered the findings of such simulations as those 
carried out by Weiten and Diamond.  In their study, Finch and Munro reported that in 
their focus groups the discussants tended to default to stereotypes when the trial 
information had been pared down, but this was contrasted with the mock jurors in the 
simulated trials who, when faced with more complicated (but realistic and reflective of 
a real trial) information, found it much more difficult to separate out issues of “morally 
condemnable demeanour and guilt.”159  Linked to this is the issue of role playing in 
simulated trials.  Finch and Munro’s research seemed to indicate that when people are 
taking on the role of the juror in a simulated trial they are more likely to take seriously 
– or look forward to the consequences of their decisions – than they would in discussion 
groups.  In that respect we can see the merit in this type of research.  To counter the 
concerns over the use of undergraduate students, the participants in their trial were 
selected from the local population just as a real jury would be selected.  Moreover, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Krammer, G.P. and Kerr, N.L. (1989), ‘Laboratory Simulation and Bias in the Study of Jury 
Behavior,’ 13, Law and Human Behavior, 89-99 at p.99 [emphasis original]. For similar research 
see Bray, R.M. and Kerr, N.L. (1979), ‘Use of the simulation method in the Study of Jury 
Behavior,’ Law and Human Behavior, Vol.3, 107-19.  
158 Finch and Munro, (2008), Lifting the Veil above n.129.  
159 Finch and Munro, (2008) Lifting the Veil above n.129, p.46. 
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they addressed the problems of minimal or abstract stimuli in the simulation by using 
“detailed, real-time and scripted mini-trial reconstructions.”160  
Finch and Munro concluded that there is a great deal of untapped potential in the jury 
simulation model as a way in which to assess juror understanding generally or 
specifically, in their case, when “assessing juror attitudes in rape cases involving an 
intoxicated complainant.”161  They were keen to stress that not all of the jurors in their 
study appeared to be engaged, indeed one spoke only four words throughout the entire 
process, however, they did not say that this “virtual silence” should equate to lack of 
interest or lack of understanding.162  Therefore, they suggested that ‘social loafing’163 
may be a feature of both simulated and actual trials but their point was that in their 
model for juror participation, participation itself could be assessed and addressed 
better than in group discussions where the facilitator prompted engagement.  Finally, 
they acknowledged and accepted the limitations in the model.  Whilst they did not 
agree with Vidmar that such models are reflective of “legal naivety” they did agree that 
there is cause for concern in the way that the model has been used in the current 
research.  Therefore in their study they endeavoured to create a situation which was as 
reflective of an actual trial as possible, with the hope that the research design could 
yield insights into the functioning of the jury like none before, as well as being regarded 
as a valid model for future research.  Thus, it is apparent that the simulation model, 
whilst a popular model for assessing the jury, does have problems of its own.  Despite 
that, and leaving aside its synthetic nature for now, it is clear that it is considered by 
researchers in the field to be the best way in which to conduct research into the jury 
not least because some say that there is a “dearth of alternatives” available.164     
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163 Karau and Williams (1995), “Social Loafing: Research findings, Implications and Future 
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Another area of concern about the simulated trial and one which was identified by 
Weiten and Diamond was the lack of attention paid to the collective decisions of the 
jury, with much of the research seeming to focus on the verdicts from individual jurors.  
Whilst they acknowledged that some of the studies had factored in time to assess the 
group discussions, that time was often very limited and rarely exceeded 15 minutes of 
the entire research process.165  They accepted that whilst there was obvious merit in 
assessing individual elements of how the jury functions and their individual decisions, 
overall they were of the opinion that if progress were to be made to understand the 
jury as a group then more time should be spent assessing the group deliberations which 
came after realistically developed trial simulations.  This leads me to the final related 
point, which concerns the use of filmed or videoed trial enactments.  There is a worry 
that using such a style of enactments only serves to enhance the idea of fiction with the 
possibility of diverting the jurors’ attention away from the seriousness of the trial.  
Indeed, as Devine et.al. pointed out, if simulations are going to be used then they must 
be as realistic as possible;166 however by using films or video-tapes this realism is 
diluted and constantly therefore “reiterates the fiction of the situation to mock 
jurors.”167 
One of the alternatives to simulated trials that has been used is the use of shadow 
juries.  Just as the name suggests, shadow juries are those who are chosen to shadow 
actual juries, who listen to an actual trial and who retire to consider their own ‘verdict’ 
in tandem with the actual jury.168  Indeed, this was a technique that Cheryl Thomas 
used in her 2010 research and whilst the findings in her study are fairly compelling, and 
I admit that the shadow jurors in her study very closely mimicked those of an actual 
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pp.271-279. 
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juror in an actual trial, there is no getting away from the problems with using indirect 
means of assessment.  For example, one of the criticisms that has been made is that 
they are not realistic enough because the shadow juries know that they are not deciding 
on a real case or in simulated trials the mock juries, similarly, know that the trial is 
synthetic and so they may always have this subliminally acting as a barrier to their 
seriousness when contemplating their verdict.  Added to that, if volunteers are being 
paid for their time then this too may act either as an incentive or a disincentive (if they 
feel retrospectively that they are not being paid enough for example) and so may 
impact on their seriousness or focus and as a result may influence their verdict.  Thus, 
where such methods are used, the reports from the studies shall always remain just 
indications.  However, we should not be too quick to dismiss them because the studies 
that use shadow jurors as the focus, and where the point of the study is judge/jury 
agreement/disagreement, tend to show high levels of correspondence between the 
verdict of the actual jury and the verdict of the shadow jury which would suggest that 
the shadow jury takes on its task seriously and that at least some weight should be 
placed on the findings of the studies.  This was a point raised in McCabe and Purves’ 
1974 study in which they assessed the verdicts delivered in 30 cases.  The shadow juries 
worked alongside actual juries169 and in all but one of the cases, they reported that the 
shadow jury took its task very seriously and “there was little evidence of perversity in 
the final decisions of these thirty groups.”170  Sealy and Cornish’s171 earlier study showed 
similar results as those reported by McCabe and Purves and in 1991 Michael McConville 
reported on a televised study of five criminal trials which were heard by a shadow jury 
and he found that “overall, the quality and power of the argument within the shadow 
jury room, and the high level of correspondence between the verdicts of the real and 
shadow juries, suggests that confidence in the jury is well placed.”172  This finding was 
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in contrast to his 1974 Jury Trials where he and John Baldwin were very clear that 
trying to assess the jury’s performance through indirect means was an extremely 
difficult undertaking with the result that the indications from the studies should be 
viewed with caution. 
Shadow jury research is less common than mock jury research and this is due in large 
part to the logistical complications of such projects.  As Koski highlights, often such 
trials are problematic because several factors need to be taken into consideration and 
these include that “shadow juries require extensive cooperation from one or more 
courts, tend to involve small samples as a result, and the interpretation of their findings 
is often plagued by confounding variables.”173  Thus, what we can see happening is that 
on the one hand we have many simulated trials each utilising mock jurors who take part 
in a series of specifically designed tests, and on the other hand, the shadow jury who 
must take part in an actual trial and as MacCoun points out “this at best reverses the 
dynamic of simulation studies by purchasing external validity at the cost of internal 
validity.”174  To be clear therefore, more weight was placed on how the research 
project looked to the government funder than was placed on the efficacy of the results 
from the actual projects themselves.  Moreover, these types of study rely on the shadow 
jury role-playing at the decision-making stage and so when there is a guilty verdict we 
actually have no idea about the reasons that led to it – was it based on the same 
considerations and information or was just a coincidence?  This leads me to consider 
what defines the ‘correct’ verdict in jury simulations or shadow jury trials.  
The way in which jury understanding is often assessed is by testing the verdict of the 
mock or shadow jury against the verdict of the judge.  I have suggested what this does 
is to create a distorted image of the actual situation because there is the tendency to 
assume, as was seen in Kalven and Zeisel’s study, that where the jury and the judge are 
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in agreement the verdict of the jury must have been correct.  A similar situation was 
seen in Jury Trials where Baldwin and McConville’s study indicated that the verdict of 
the jury was accurate because it was in the majority of cases the same as what the 
legal professionals in the trial would have delivered.  Thus the primary problem with 
this sort of comparison is that the verdict of the judge or the legal professional is 
deemed to be the correct verdict and the concurrent verdict from the jury assumed 
correct if it accords with that of the legal professionals.  Until such time as the method 
for research is significantly altered however, I can see limits in how to test the verdict 
of the jury without there always being doubt cast for one reason or another.  I develop 
my opinion with concrete suggestions in chapters three and four. 
I have identified a number of projects which have been focused on juror understanding. 
Working on the assumption that jurors bring with them a sense of legitimacy to the trial 
that it would not otherwise have, I have focused my attention on the research as a way 
to both clarify this perception for myself as well as seeking evidence in the research 
which support this claim.  Of those projects that I have explored, the majority use as 
their research method mock juries in simulated trials or shadow juries in actual trials.  
Thus, the research carried out to date has been predominantly, but not exclusively, 
indirect.  I argue that this is a problem with the current research methods but I shall 
argue later that it need not remain the case for future research by setting out my own 
ideas for development in chapters three and four. 
Before concluding, I should note again that there has been limited research which has 
engaged with real juries who have served in real trials.  As we have seen, that was the 
case in, for example, the New Zealand studies,175 the study conducted by Reifman, 
Guisick and Ellsworth discussed in section 2.3.2 above176 and in Severance and Loftus’ 
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study which was undertaken in 1982.177  Indeed, in the New Zealand study we saw the 
researchers engaged in assessing a number of issues which potentially could impact on 
the jury and which included such procedural issues as note-taking, question asking or 
selection of the foreman.  They did this first by selecting the jurors from forty-eight 
different trials to complete a pre-trial questionnaire and then interviewing them after 
the trial.  Their results indicated that despite the jurors being conscientious there were 
nonetheless problems with their understanding of the legal terminology used in the 
course of the trial.  In Reifman et.al’s research a similar method was used, however 
their questionnaire was only sent after the trial and was sent to actual and potential 
jurors.  Whilst I can see merit in this sort of assessment to gain a very broad 
understanding of how the jury operates in the trial, I suggest that ultimately it is 
lacking because the engagement with the jury that we see is more often than not after 
the fact.  Therefore I can see that this could turn out to be problematic for a variety of 
reasons which include that those people who had served on the jury may well have a 
distorted recollection of their time in court.  They may not remember parts of the trial 
or they may remember incorrectly thus calling to question the validity of this method.  
Moreover, once again this method demonstrates a researcher-led approach, which asks 
the juror only to respond to what he has been asked to do rather than encouraging 
proactive engagement on the part of the juror or even to regard the juror as a 
participant in the trial.  
The research to date appears to tell us, first, that there may be problems with juror 
understanding of legal terminology which I shall return to in detail in chapter three and 
second, that there are assumptions which social science researchers make about jurors 
which include that they appear to regard the jury as a passive ‘object’ to have legal 
information poured into, be experimented on and then surveyed rather than as a true 
participant in the trial.  In response I argue that by developing a method which is both 
interactive and integrated we will come to understand the jury better because we will, 
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quite literally, be closer to them, and in dialogue with them.  I suggest that there is a 
great deal more to be learned in this field and in the chapter to follow I develop ways in 
which we could understand both the jury and the research into the jury more clearly 
through integrating devices thus far untried in this field.178   
2.4 Conclusion to chapter two 
Having reflected on the current research, some common themes emerge.  First, there is 
a presumption that the jury are participants in the trial therefore, many of the 
supposed advantages of the jury stem from the notion that its participation in the trial 
brings the sense of legitimacy to the trial process.  But, as I demonstrated earlier, this 
is based on the assumption that the jury does, in fact, participate as opposed to simply 
being present.  I have raised concerns about whether this can be properly characterised 
as participation – or at least that it is necessary to examine what is meant by 
participation in this context.  I suggest that now is the time to re-think both of these 
assumptions.  Indeed, I shall argue in the rest of the thesis – particularly in chapter four 
- that we should assume as our starting point that the jury are not participants in the 
trial as it is currently organised in common law adversarial systems.  Second, the 
research methods that have been used to date are limited in that they have been 
assessing the jury indirectly through mock and shadow methods.  Such methods have 
dominated the field predominantly because it has been said that there are very few 
other methods open to researchers.179  Third, and possibly most important, is that the 
research into juror understanding largely assumes the passivity of the jury and this is 
something that I challenge because I do not regard this as the best framework within 
which to address issues of understanding.  Thus, I ask the reader to embrace my ideas 
for change and to assume that there are other ways to assess a jury which involve 
direct, real-time, interactive methods.  In the remainder of the thesis I demonstrate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 For discussions of the publicity aspect of jurors giving reasons for their decisions, see chapter 9 
of Duff, et.al. Trial 2, (2006) above n.18. 
179 Finch and Munro, (2008), Lifting the Veil, above n.129. 
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these ideas with the aim of developing new research techniques which will bridge the 
gap between the juror and the researcher and which may in turn narrow the gaps in 
understanding for all of those concerned in the trial.   
I now propose that it is time to broaden both our understanding of the jury as well as 
our aims for the jury, by introducing, and then integrating the work of critical educator 
Paulo Freire and Theatre of the Oppressed founder and director Augusto Boal into the 
current trial by jury framework.  In the remainder of my thesis I open up the scope for 
juror participation and communication through using techniques which are new to this 
field.  I hope to demonstrate that we can begin to understand the jury more clearly 
simply by including them in the actual trial communication.  Moreover, I shall 
demonstrate how to create a forum which will support the jury to be active participants 
in the trial. 
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Chapter three 
Communication in the trial: 
Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
3.1 Introduction to chapter three 
As we have seen in chapter two, much of the existing research is content with equating 
juror presence with juror participation.  I have not however highlighted this as a 
criticism of the research or the researchers but rather as a crucial point of departure 
from which to develop the field by examining things from a different perspective.  In 
this chapter I am going to develop this argument by introducing the educational theories 
of Paulo Freire as a way to help us alter our perspective on how we view issues of juror 
understanding.  It seems that because there are so many concerns over juror 
comprehension, and that many of the solutions to date have as a central feature giving 
things to the jury, often referred to as juror education, then at the very least we should 
look to some education theory to help guide our perceptions in this regard.  I have 
chosen to elucidate my work by using Freire’s critical pedagogy because it is in his work 
that I see so many practical tools to aid or enhance understanding.  The primary benefit 
of using Freire’s theories is that he sees education as a participatory process and so 
through integrating his ideas we can begin to see the jury at work within the current 
framework.  Therefore, as I stress the importance of taking juror participation seriously 
(in the practical sense) and, in chapter five develop actual ways to achieve this, I hold 
the jury up to the standards that its defenders claim on its behalf.  Thus, through using 
his codifications and problem-posing we can engage, in real time, with the jury as they 
take their part in the trial and so, with the use of Freire’s problem-posing pedagogy, we 
can begin to see how it may be possible to create an environment in which true 
communication and participation is possible.  I should be clear however that I have not 
chosen to use Freire’s theories as an alternative means to ‘teaching’ the jury; rather I 
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am using it as a way for us to open our perceptions and awareness of the lines for 
communication and understanding in the trial. 
 
The crux of Freire’s theory is that education is not about knowledge per se but it is 
about ideas, it is about engaging in dialogue to generate thought, explanations and 
understanding.  He argues for “critical and liberating dialogue” between the teacher 
and the student but he rejects the status of the teacher as ‘expert,’ instead arguing 
that an exchange of ideas in which both parties benefit and develop is much more 
positive and productive. 1  Necessarily, therefore, the responsibility for ensuring 
understanding is placed on both the student and the teacher in equal measure.  This 
immediately shifts the emphasis in terms of the student’s sense of self in his own 
learning and so he is elevated to understand and be empowered in his own learning and 
this is fully acknowledged, encouraged and facilitated by the teacher in this situation.  
By attempting to integrate Freire’s theories into the trial this shifts the emphasis for 
ensuring understanding on to all of the trial players and this in turn means placing more 
emphasis on how the information is communicated rather than, as is currently the 
norm, on just what is being communicated.  Therefore I call for reconsideration and a 
radical transformation of the way that information is communicated in a trial and this 
requires that we reimagine the role of the jury within that process. 
 
I am not suggesting alternative ways to teach a jury.  Indeed, I do not consider that 
teaching the jury is the key to overcoming either the area specific hurdles or the more 
general issues which affect understanding and, even if I did, I do not think that legal 
professionals are best placed to take on the role of teacher.  I do want to suggest 
however, that if Freire’s theories were integrated as part of the trial communication 
then we would be in a better position to assess the jury’s overall understanding of both 
the legal terminology and their part within the trial.  I argue that, until we begin to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Freire, P. (1970), Pedagogy of the Oppressed, translated by Myra Bergman Ramos, London, 
New York, Penguin (subsequently referred to in this chapter as Freire (1970). 
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integrate the actual jury and so gauge its understanding within the trial through 
practical means and not simply through observation methods where they are the 
primary focus for research attention, we will neither really know where the hurdles to 
their understanding arise nor the true extent of their comprehension.  Indeed, I 
demonstrated in chapter two how a large proportion of the empirical research is not 
only indirect but that it often assesses the understanding of the jury in isolation, either 
through the use of questionnaires or through consultation with them after the trial.  
This tendency to wait until the end of the trial and then to assess juror ‘performance’ 
is, in my opinion, too late to make any dedicated attempts to hone responses to 
problems because the point at which they arise has long passed.  The jury therefore 
needs to be acknowledged as a working part which is integrated into the bigger whole 
and I suggest that only then can we begin to gauge its capacity as decision-maker in 
criminal trials.   
 
In this chapter I introduce Paulo Freire’s problem-posing education in order to 
encourage the development of engaged, proactive and critically aware jurors.  I discuss 
the integration of his theories to demonstrate how we can move closer to more 
effective, participatory and, perhaps even a more legitimate institution of the jury and 
in chapter five I contextualise these theories by integrating them in a ‘mock up’ trial 
situation.  As we shall see, Freire argued that a person cannot transform a situation by 
understanding it alone, instead he stressed that he must be an active part of the 
situation and in that regard he considered dialogue as the key. In this chapter I am 
particularly interested in seeing how, if we use Freire’s techniques for learning, we can 
transform communication in the criminal trial.  To be clear, however, I am not 
suggesting that future jurors will change the course of a trial but rather, by being aware 
of Freire’s emphasis on dialogue as a way to understand, I explore the relevancy of his 
pedagogy in the criminal trial process both as a tool for, and an entry point to, 
enhanced participation. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows.  First I examine Freire’s theory of education - the 
dominant themes which make it a more adaptable and all-encompassing method for 
teaching and learning when compared with the more commonly used technocratic 
systems which are standard in most Western teaching.  Second I look more closely at his 
pedagogy and how feasible it would be to integrate it into the courtroom trial by 
revisiting the elements of the trial process that I identified to be the most problematic 
for jurors - I include at that stage a more substantive discussion of the solutions which 
have been advanced to date to see whether Freire’s work could be a valid solution in 
part or in whole.  I conclude the chapter with an exploration of the trial as narrative as 
a way to demonstrate the difficulty with juror understanding if the form of 
communication is, as I argue, on-way.  Thereafter I towards contextualising these 
theories in chapter five where I demonstrate how Freire’s pedagogy could be integrated 
into the trial, highlighting the benefits as well as pre-empting some possible criticisms. 
 
3.2 The life and work of Paulo Freire 
“If the dichotomy between teaching and learning results in the refusal of the one 
who teaches to learn from the one being taught, it grows out of an ideology of 
domination.”2 
 
Paulo Freire (1921-1997) was a “pioneer of education for social change” and one of the 
most influential educational thinkers of the late twentieth century. 3  He believed that 
education was a life-long process of growth and development, which was an intrinsic 
element in individual and social realisation.4  Freire insisted that human beings act not 
only from habit, intelligence or creativity, but that they exist meaningfully in and with 
the world of history and culture, created before them but that they were empowered to 
continue to create and transform.  He argued that if we failed to acknowledge the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Araújo, A. M. and Macedo, D. (eds.), (1998), The Paulo Freire Reader, New York, Continuum. 
3 Bell, B., Gaventa, J. and Peters, J. (eds.) (1990), We Make the Road by Walking.  Conversations 
on Education and Social Change.  Myles Horton and Paulo Freire, Philadelphia, Temple 
University Press p.xv. 
4 Freire (1970) above n.1 and Freire, P. (1974), Education for Critical Consciousness, London, 
Sheed and Ward (subsequently referred to as Freire (1974) Critical Consciousness). 
   
80 
 
historical, cultural and linguistic praxis which sets humans apart from the rest of the 
organic world, then we would be unable to transform our society towards a vision of 
justice and democracy.5  Freire believed that conventional teaching was oppressive and 
so to nurture a democratic society the key was in a teaching method based on 
empowerment and communication through dialogue.6  This belief was rooted in his early 
experiences of facing physical, mental, and emotional deprivation as a result of his 
social class, and was something that he continued to develop until his death.   
 
Freire began his career by teaching Portuguese grammar in secondary schools.  In 1946 
he moved into adult education and became the Director of the Pernambuco Department 
of Education and Culture - the Social Service of Industry (subsequently referred to as 
SESI).7  Here, he taught illiterate families, through what were then considered non-
orthodox forms, how to read and write.8  He worked at the SESI for ten years and in the 
Pedagogía da esperança9 (Pedagogy of Hope) he notes how that experience formed the 
basis for his doctoral thesis.10 
 
In 1961 Freire was appointed the Director of Cultural Extension at Recife University and 
here he applied his theories for problem-posing more practically in his work with farm-
workers.  In 1962 he utilised his problem-posing methodology when teaching 300 
sugarcane workers how to read and write in only 45 days. This work involved forming 
culture circles, using coded pictures (subsequently referred to as a codification) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This view is criticised in Bowers, C.A. (1983), “Linguistic roots of cultural invasion in Paulo 
Freire’s pedagogy,” Teachers College Record, 84(4), 935-953. 
6 Freire (1970) above n.1 especially chapter one. 
7 Gadotti, M. (1994), Reading Paulo Freire: His life and work, Albany, SUNY Press pp.5-6. 
8 The non-orthodox form was considered the Liberation Theology which is thought to have 
stemmed from the Roman Catholic church, in Latin America during the 1950s-1960s.  It was 
known as the Liberation Theology because at the time only literate people were permitted to 
vote in the presidential elections in Latin America.  
9 Freire, P. (1998), Pedagogy of Hope: reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed, (translated by Robert 
R. Barr), New York, Continuum Press (Subsequently referred to in this chapter as Freire (1998) 
Hope). 
10 His completed PhD thesis entitled ‘Present Day Education in Brazil’ (1959) formed the basis of 
his first book, Education for Critical Consciousness. above n.4. 
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using problem-posing to great success, with the result that the Literacy Programme was 
developed with the full backing of the Brazilian government in 1963, which saw 
thousands of culture circles for problem-posing teaching being created around the 
country.11  To clarify, a culture circle was made up of a group of adult learners in which 
the focus of the learning was the world in which the learner lived.  Therefore, the 
learning was developed on real experiences for the participants rather than pre-
organised theoretical situations made up by the teachers.  Learning based on dialogue 
was fundamental in the culture circles and formed the basis on which the skills in 
literacy, both oral and written, would be developed.  Those taking art in the culture 
circles were people living in the community – often those communities were favelas or 
slums and the scope for inclusion was open to all.  The culture circles were so called 
(rather than simply being referred to as groups) because the subject of the learning, as I 
have previously said, was developed from the culture of the person learning. 
 
In 1964, following President João Goulart being overthrown by the Brazilian military, 
Freire was imprisoned as a traitor12 for 70 days and after a brief exile in Bolivia he 
travelled to Chile where he lived in exile for five years.  It was during this period that 
he wrote Educacão como pratica da liberdade (Education, the practise of freedom),13 
Cultural Action for Freedom14 and his most widely known book Pedagogia do Oprimido 
(Pedagogy of the Oppressed).15  Pedagogy of the Oppressed has been applied on every 
continent in different contexts.  These have ranged from basic literacy programmes in 
kindergartens and schools (where Freire attempted to engage the students and parents 
in discussions about educational and societal matters) to national educational policies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Freire, P. and Macedo, D. (1987), Reading the word and the world, London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, chapter 4. 
12 He was considered to be a traitor for what was considered to be a dangerous and subversive 
literacy approach. 
13 Freire, P. (1976), Education, the practise of freedom, London, Writers and Readers Publishing 
Cooperative (subsequently referred to in this chapter as Freire (1976) Freedom). 
14 Freire, P. (1972), Cultural Action for Freedom, New York, Penguin (subsequently referred to as 
Freire (1972) Cultural Action). 
15 Freire (1970) above n.1. 
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which re-moulded attitudes to education.16  In 1969 Freire moved to the US where he 
spent time as a visiting Professor at Harvard University before moving to Switzerland 
where he was the special education adviser to the World Council of Churches in 
Geneva.17  Over the next ten years, he travelled extensively helping underdeveloped 
countries implement popular education and literacy programmes and as a result his 
work has had a huge impact in a variety of countries.18   
 
In 1979 Freire was permitted to return to Brazil and from then on he worked tirelessly 
at improving the literacy of the oppressed.  He often reflected on his formative years, 
the poverty of his youth and his surroundings and he never ceased in his search to 
“address the disenfranchisement of poor people.”19 He produced several books, many of 
which started out as spoken dialogues and thereafter were committed to the written 
word, he won the UNESCO Prize for Education for Peace (1986), and he received an 
Honorary Doctorate from the University of Nebraska at Omaha in 1996 along with 
Augusto Boal, whilst they were in residency at the Second Pedagogy and The Theatre of 
the Oppressed conference in Omaha. 20  Paulo Freire died on May 2nd 1997 but his 
“theory about the relationship between liberation and education has inspired and 
informed countless efforts to make life more humane for those oppressed by economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Gerhardt, Peter-Heinz (1993), ‘Paulo Freire’, Prospects: the quarterly review of comparative 
education (Paris, UNESCO: International Bureau of Education), vol.XXIII, no.3/4, p.439-458.  
These policies included: The National Plan of Literacy Training (1963); the national literacy 
programme in the African State of São Tomé, where the result of the programme was that 55% 
of the students enrolled in schools were no longer illiterate and of those who had already 
graduated school, 72% benefited by transforming their illiteracy to literacy. 
17 http://www.pedagogyoftheoppressed.com/author/ [live at 03/07/2013] 
18 See for example Armstrong, George A.W. ‘After 25 Years: Paulo Freire in New Zealand, 1974’, 
in Roberts, P. (ed.), (1999), Paulo Freire, Politics and Pedagogy: Reflections from Aotearoa-
New Zealand, New Zealand, Dunmore Press, pp.23-33 and Freire, P. (1978), Pedagogy in 
Process: The Letters to Guinea-Bissau, New York, Published in collaboration with the World 
Council of Churches by The Seabury Press (translated by Hunter, Carman St. John) 
(subsequently referred to as Freire (1978) Process). 
19 Williams, A.D. (2009), ‘The Critical Cultural Cypher: Remaking Paulo Freire’s Culture Circles 
Using Hip Hop Culture,’ International Journal of Critical Pedagogy, Vol.2 (1), pp.1-29 p.2. 
20 I use Theatre of the Oppressed to support my arguments in chapter four. 
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and ideological structures that denied them their dignity, rights and self-
determination.”21   
It was in the Pedagogy of the Oppressed that he introduced his problem-posing theory 
for education and it is to that theory which I now turn.  In the next section I set out the 
key concepts of his theory which demonstrate the importance of understanding the 
environment in which we learn and the impact of dialogue as an enabler of critical 
understanding and analysis. In so doing I am laying the foundations for my argument of 
integrating those concepts as a way to reimagine both, how we communicate in the 
trial, and our image of the role of the jury in that communication.  In that exploration I 
hope to alter existing perspectives on the depth and capacity for communication in a 
criminal trial.   
3.3  Key concepts of Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy 
When Freire said that “the more people become themselves, the better the 
democracy”22 he was referring specifically to the way that education can subvert or 
compromise a person’s learning because of the way that it is communicated.  He said 
that “Education always implies program, content, method, objectives and so on” when 
making specific reference to the obviously oppressive facets of technocratic styles of 
teaching. 23  Whilst Freire was not opposed to set objectives or course content per se he 
was opposed to those points being dictated to the learner with little or no regard for 
their ability to understand, stressing that when this was / is the case the teaching falls 
into an undemocratic method for control rather than a situation whereby both the 
learner and the teacher are on a par, each respectful and respecting of the other.  This 
formed the core inspiration for his critical pedagogy where we see him move the 
illiterate people of Northeast Brazil from, as Gadotti says, “a culture of silence” 
because, as a result of their illiteracy they did not have a voice, to a place where, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Glass, R.D. (2001), ‘On Paulo Freire’s Philosophy of Praxis and the Foundations of Liberation 
Education’, Educational Researcher, Vol.30, No.2, pp.15-25. 
22 Bell et.al., above n.3, p.145. 
23 Bell et.al., above n.3, p.145. 
   
84 
 
through the power of a new found literacy they could be responsible for their own 
destiny.24  Thus, Freire’s problem-posing education gave them words and through those 
words they were able to move and to participate in their own lives and so contribute to 
the development of Brazil at that time.  I now look in more detail at these key 
concepts. 
3.3.1 “Banking” and problem-posing concepts of education 
Where “banking” education treats students as vessels in which to deposit information, 
problem-posing encourages critical thinkers.  Where “banking” inhibits creativity and 
domesticates25 - although as Freire was quick to point out, it cannot completely destroy 
- problem-posing bases itself on creativity and stimulates true reflection and action 
upon reality.26  In order to fully understand Freire’s problem-posing approach it is 
necessary first to consider in more detail what exactly is meant by “banking.”  
 
“Banking” education is focused on depositing information into passive and inactive 
students.  Freire regarded this way of teaching as an instrument of oppression, saying  
 
“in the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who 
consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider know 
nothing.  Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the 
ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of 
inquiry.”27   
 
If we agree with Freire, that libertarian education begins with the solution of the 
teacher-student contradiction and therefore we need to reconcile the “poles of the 
contradiction so that both are simultaneously teachers and students,”28 we must look to 
“banking” with the necessary caution.  Indeed, as Freire says, if the teacher regards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Gadotti above n.7, p.15 
25 Here he used the word domesticates because he saw, through illiteracy the inability for people to 
develop, to move and to grow. 
26 Freire (1970) above n.1, p.65. 
27 Freire (1970) above n.1, p.53. 
28 Freire (1970) above n.1, p.53. 
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himself as the opposite to the student and regards the students as ignorant, thus 
presenting himself as absolutely necessary for their learning, not only does he justify his 
own existence but he could also oppress or dictate to them thus stifling their will to 
learn. 
Indeed, in Freire’s terms “banking” was a reflection of an oppressive society and the 
“banking” approach, particularly in adult education, would never propose that the 
students critically consider reality.  This leads to the question of the role of the teacher 
in the “banking” method.  Essentially, this person teaches, he knows everything, he 
thinks, he talks, he disciplines, he chooses, he acts, he confuses the authority of 
knowledge with his own professional authority, he is the Subject of the teaching.  Thus 
the role of the teacher in the “banking” method is to regulate the way that the world is 
introduced to, and enters into the student.  The core of the “banking” method 
therefore sees a dichotomy between the human beings and their world.  As Freire 
highlights, these students look at the world rather than being actively engaged in and 
with their world: “the individual is spectator and not re-creator.”29  Therefore the 
student is not consciously thinking and being encouraged to ask questions as he is 
learning, rather he is the possessor of a consciousness and so is regarded as able only to 
be ‘filled’ or ‘deposited in’ as he sits passively.  “Banking” resists dialogue preferring to 
treat the students as objects, inhibiting creativity along the way and Freire stressed 
that “banking” domesticates “the intentionality of consciousness by isolating 
consciousness from the world…”30   
 
What transpires is that through “banking” there is little room to develop a critical 
consciousness.  Indeed, the more the students “accept the passive role imposed on 
them, the more they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented 
view of reality deposited on them.”31  In this respect what we can see occurring is that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Freire (1970) above n.1, p.56. 
30 Freire (1970) above n.1 pp.64-65. 
31 Freire (1970) above n.1 p.54. 
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where students experience difficulty with a subject, rather than alleviating the problem 
immediately through dialogue, their problems are exacerbated by the model for 
communication.  In this regard Freire said that “A careful analysis of the teacher-
student relationship at any level, inside or outside the school, reveals its fundamentally 
narrative character.”32  This relationship is usually based on two things, the “narrating 
Subject (the teacher) and patient, listening objects (the students)” and so what we can 
see is that through this narrative process of education the information or contents of 
the course become one dimensional and static. 33  Freire suggested that education in 
this form suffered from narration sickness34 something which, if not addressed, leads to 
a variety of emotions or opinions from those learning, including complete disinterest, 
confusion, detachment and apathy.35 
 
The most prominent feature of this style of teaching is that the teacher “fills” the 
student with his narrative and often the narrative is completely alien to the students, 
with the result that, although prima facie “filled”, actual understanding for the student 
is very likely to be lacking.  This however is not a failing on the part of the student but 
rather is symptomatic of the “banking” system.  Freire highlights that the outstanding 
feature of this narrative education “is the sonority of the words, not their 
transformative power.”36  Thus, the teacher who only narrates “leads the students to 
memorize mechanically the narrated content.”37  The teacher therefore is the depositor 
and the student the depository.  The teacher does not communicate but rather “issues 
communiqués and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Freire (1970) above n.1, p.52. 
33 Freire (1970) above n.1, p.52. 
34 i.e. that the information becomes lifeless and petrified. 
35 Freire (1970) above n.1, p.52. 
36 Freire (1970) above n.1, p.52. 
37 Freire (1970) above n.1, pp.52-3. 
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repeat.  This is the “banking concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed 
to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits.”38   
 
Problem-posing education has its roots in the work of both Jean Piaget and John Dewey 
who encouraged “active, inquiring education, through which students constructed 
meaning in successive phases and developed scientific habits of mind.”39  Dialogue is 
essential in problem-posing, indeed it was regarded by Freire as “indispensable to the 
act of cognition which unveils reality”40 and in Freire’s pedagogy problem-posing is 
discussed in direct contrast to a “banking” style of learning.   
 
Problem-posing involves all subject matter being questioned rather than accepted as a 
wisdom and so the problem-posing teacher should use the students’ thought and speech 
as the basis for developing critical understanding.  In this way, the teacher does not 
expect the students to “bank” information which is considered to be official 
knowledge.41  So, for example, in a law course where murder was the subject of the 
lesson the teacher may put up a picture which shows a person lying in a pool of blood 
with a discarded dagger and in the background a person running away into the distance 
with blood dripping from his fingers.  The question for the class would be “what do you 
see in the picture?” from which a dialogue between the students and the teacher could 
take place.  In my own classes I would move around with the students, I would ask to 
take part in their dialogues and as a group we would come to the understanding of the 
subject.  In doing this parity is achievable because the gap (both physical and 
metaphorical) begins to close.  I as the teacher literally come close to the students and 
often I will invite them to take a direct part in their class by, for example, encouraging 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Freire (1970) above n.1, p.53. 
39 Shor, I. (1992), Empowering Education: Critical Teaching for Social Change, Chicago, London, 
University of Chicago Press referring to Piaget, J. (1979) (originally published 1969), Science of 
education and the psychology of the child, New York, Penguin and Dewey, J. (1963) (originally 
published 1938), Experience and Education New York, Collier. 
40 Freire (1970) above n.1, p.64. 
41 Shor, above n.39, pp.32-33. 
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them to provide diagrams, (either with prior notice for the next class) or on the spot 
drawing as the class is in progress.  Personally, I am perfectly happy to adapt my 
teaching style to suit the needs of the group being taught and I am unafraid of 
abandoning any pre-planned style to pick up on what I sense would be a better 
communication style for the students.  This was the essence of Freire’s problem-posing 
and is a style which I consider to be a very effective way to communicate information in 
any learning environment.  
 
To be clear however, problem-posing is not suggesting that the students have nothing to 
learn from established knowledge, nor that those who have already acquired that 
knowledge are not worthy to share it, but rather that that knowledge should be 
reconstructed by the people learning.  What then transpires is that the teacher and the 
students focus on the underlying assumptions of a course or a discipline and through 
questions and dialogue the knowledge is contextualised.  Therefore, the students in 
problem-posing education are not reinventing their subjects but rather they are 
studying in a critical context with the teacher who, by listening to the discussion, 
should guide the learning using a subtle democratic authority.  For example in any 
classroom, the student may ask why the standard textbooks and syllabus are organised 
in a certain way and the teachers should be willing to consider these not only to be 
valid questions, but also valuable questions for their own reflection on the way they 
have constructed their own courses.  In the broader scheme this style of education, 
whilst it may be bound within a broader curriculum, is nonetheless fluid, it is free and, 
in my opinion, it is exciting because both the teacher and the students are concurrently 
guiding the learning.  One of the keys to the success of the problem-posing method is 
the ability to find a language which is effective for the whole group, thus in each 
situation the teacher needs to be prepared to adapt, sometimes very quickly, to the 
given situation.  In this respect the style is organic and evolves with the learners in real 
time  
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Thus, Freire’s problem-posing education looks first of all for a shared language and from 
there a dialogue can emerge in which each person has the chance to contribute from his 
own point of understanding.  In his early work, shared language was vital as a means to 
communicate because his literacy programmes were designed, as I discuss below, for 
illiterate peasants of North East Brazil.  In those programmes the teachers did not pre-
prepare material which they thought might apply.  They did not impose reading books 
on the student, nor did they introduce standard texts.42  Instead these projects 
developed curricula from student culture by researching local issues and language in the 
students’ communities and so selected generative words43 and phrases emerged.44 
 
Thus, when problem-posing places itself in the language and perception of the students 
it allows for their understanding, their culture and their perception of situations to be 
built into the study process.  From there the idea is that it is easier for the students to 
understand because they are able to contextualise the subject of their study using their 
own experience and culture.  Whilst these methods may seem to be nothing out of the 
ordinary, they are certainly less ordinary in contemporary Western education where the 
emphasis is, as I have said on “banking” within a technocratic framework – very similar 
indeed to the system of communication that we see in the criminal trial.   
From Freire’s perspective, it is important to be sensitive to how different people 
perceive the complex processes of learning and teaching, because that is what both 
shapes and feeds our work as people who teach and communicate.  Giroux said:  
“Critical pedagogy […] signals how questions of audience, voice, power, 
and evaluation actively work to construct particular relations between 
teachers and students, institutions and society, and classrooms and 
communities […] Pedagogy in the critical sense illuminates the 
relationship among knowledge, authority, and power.”45   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Whilst developments have been dramatic and currently reading books are produced to develop 
such things as phonemic awareness, fluency, comprehension, text and decoding they were not 
nearly as developed in the 1970s. 
43 The generative words used when working with the preliterate students in Brazil included slum, 
land, food, work, salary, vote, profession, government, brick, sugar, mill and wealth. 
44 Shor above n.39 p.46. 
45 Giroux, H.A. (1994), Disturbing pleasures: Learning popular culture, New York, Routledge. 
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There are three assumptions which serve as organising principles in critical pedagogy 
and they are: (1) Education is not neutral; (2) Society can be transformed by the 
engagement of critically conscious persons; and (3) Praxis connects liberatory education 
with social transformation.  These things Freire regarded as crucial in his attempts to 
tackle the massive problem that Brazil had at the time and it was on principles similar 
to those that he built his culture circles.  Through persistence in these beliefs we shall 
see how changes can emerge when we look at the transformations from illiterate to 
literate students that Freire made.   
 
It was as a result of his experiences as the Coordinator of the Adult Education Project of 
the Movement of Popular Culture in Recife (Movimento de Cultura Popular) that Freire 
came to understand that education techniques needed to be accessible by the people 
who were using them.  The culture circles were therefore created with the objective of 
offering a new perspective on learning.  The relevant topics for debate were group-led 
and the information was presented at the culture circles with visual aids and the 
learning was through dialogue, which Freire maintained is a horizontal dialogue or 
relationship between the teacher and the learner and is the opposite to the anti-
dialogue which sees a vertical situation - one in which party A is dominated by party B.  
The role of the Freire teacher therefore is to enter into the dialogue with the 
[illiterate] person about concrete situations and to offer him the “instruments with 
which he can teach himself to read and write.”46  The success of these culture circles 
was largely down to consistently returning to the basic tenet of raising critical 
consciousness and empowerment through dialogue.  
 
In order to facilitate this learning Freire needed to transport the learner from the point 
of being the object (the adaptable malleable vessel) in the learning to the subject who 
was able to take ownership in his learning through a critical transmission of ideas and 
the way that he saw to do that was as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Freire (1974) (Critical Consciousness) above n.4 p.48. 
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a) in an active, dialogical, critical and criticism-stimulating method; 
b) in changing the program content of education; 
c) in the use of techniques like thematic “breakdown” and “codification”47 
Whilst I acknowledge that “codification” and “breakdown” are two central elements in 
student-centred problem-posing education, it is with the codification element that I am 
most interested for the purpose of enhancing juror understanding in the trial.  
For clarity however “Breakdown”	  is the splitting of the themes into their fundamental 
nuclei and “Codification” is the representation of the theme in the form of an existing 
situation usually through the use of pictures.  
 
Stage one of the literacy program was researching the vocabulary of the groups to 
reveal the commonly used words and phrases and in turn, those words and phrases were 
used as the basis of this stage of the program.  Here we therefore see the words have 
meaning in the learner’s world and this is conveyed in the codifications.  
 
The codified situation would be projected together with the first generic word.  The 
oral perception is thus reflected graphically / visually and this is followed by debate 
around the picture.  After the situation has been decoded the facilitator encourages the 
participants to visualise the word and once this has occurred the semantic link between 
the word and the object to which it is linked is established.  This is followed by a 
picture of the word but without a picture of the object that it is naming and the visuals 
would be showing the phonetic breakdown of the word.  Given that my work is not 
concerned with teaching people how to read, write and spell, I have chosen to omit 
phonetic breakdowns that traditionally follow in Freire’s work because they serve no 
purpose for our exploration. 
 
Reading the word in the world was the essence of understanding as far as Freire was 
concerned, thus he put it at the centre of the students’ learning environment.  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Freire, (Critical Consciousness) above n.4 p.45.  [emphases in original]. 
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however would challenge the teacher to adapt his communication style accordingly, 
something that I suggest is vital and so we would do well to give it due consideration 
when later we consider its application in a criminal trial.  Indeed, it is one thing to 
enter a learning environment and say, for example, this is not working so we must 
change it, but it is another to be sensitive to those working, very often tirelessly in the 
field, and to embrace their needs, views, visions and experience.  Freire was indeed 
sensitive to those already working in education.  He was however unrelenting in his 
insistence that those teaching must engage with his ideas because, he argued, only 
through that integrated thinking could the student move towards a critical 
consciousness and it was through a mutually understandable communication that that 
could be achieved.  On reflection I see that it is in the ‘mutually understandable 
communication’ that we can make progress with the jury. 
 
In the Pedagogy of the Oppressed Freire reminds us that people are not supposed to live 
and grow in silence, but rather they move forward by using words as their 
communication platform: through words they can act and reflect and through that 
praxis48 comes a critical awareness and consciousness.49  Therefore by encouraging a 
critical consciousness a person is moved from passive to active and this is achievable 
through dialogue, where there is a shared respect and where the language is mutually 
understandable and understood.  He taught that the essence of dialogue itself was 
through the word but that the words are meaningless unless accompanied with critical 
consciousness.  This dialogue, Freire said, could not be reduced to the act of one person 
“depositing” ideas in another, nor could it become a simple exchange of ideas to be 
“consumed” by the discussants. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The characteristics of which are: self-determination (cf. coercion); intentionality (cf. reaction); 
creativity (cf. homogeneity); rationality (cf. chance). 
49 Freire (1970) above n.1, p.69. 
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Stage two of the programme saw the selection of the words which have phonemic 
richness,50 phonetic difficulty51 and pragmatic tone52 and stage three saw the 
codification of these words.  This meant that the words would become the 
representations of typical situations for the group.  Thereafter these representations 
would function as challenges, “as coded situation-problems containing elements to be 
decoded by the groups with the collaboration of the coordinator.”53   Stage four of the 
program was the elaboration of the agendas and stage five was the breakdown, onto 
cards, of the phonemic families which corresponded to the generic words, as I 
demonstrate in chapter five when I contextualise the work discussed in this chapter.  
What should transpire from understanding the core principles of the five stages of the 
literacy programmes is the emphasis on the group led learning.  The nuances of the 
production of sound and the ability to then write down that sound as a word is not 
nearly as important as understanding the key inspiration which was empowering people 
to learn through dialogue which stemmed from their lives and their experiences in their 
world.  I shall now demonstrate how the codifications work in practice.   
 
The “codification” in picture 1, entitled “Man in the World and with the World.  Nature 
and Culture” was one theme which emerged from the early culture circles.  From this 
picture the participants in the culture circle made the distinction between nature and 
culture.  The questions that were asked in this situation included, “Who made the 
well?”, “Why did he do it?”, “How did he do it?” and “When did he do it?”  From there 
the same questions were asked in relation to different elements in the picture and 
through that dialogue two basic concepts emerged – “that of necessity and that of work; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Phonemic richness refers to the variants or modifications made to a sound when it is influenced 
by its neighbouring sounds.  Colson, G. (1973), Voice Production and Speech, third edition, 
London, Pitman. 
51 In phonetics the focus is with the individual sounds, whereas in phonemics the focus is with the 
systems of sounds.   
52 Pragmatic tone defines a particular standpoint, for example, hostility, tentativeness, happiness or 
sadness. 
53 Freire (1974) (Critical Consciousness) above n.4, p.51. 
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and culture becomes explicit on a primary level, that of subsistence.”54  Therefore the 
generative words begin to emerge.  The man made the well because he needed water, 
the word ‘water’ therefore could be broken down phonetically, (“breakdown” stage) 
and through that codification (of the picture) and “breakdown” (of the word) we can 
begin to see how an illiterate person can, in the first instance become empowered to 
learn and take ownership of that learning.  Additionally as the person moves from 
passive to participatory we can see the transition from illiterate to literate and able 
therefore to understand that through working the man made the ‘house’, he made the 
‘clothes’, he made the ‘tools’ to make the ‘house’ and the ‘clothes’. Each of these 
words (that I have put in inverted commas) can be broken down but, crucially for the 
illiterate participant, they have meaning because they have emerged through the 
dialogue which has at its centre the world of that participant. 
Picture 1 
“The codification functions as the knowable object mediating between the knowing 
subjects - the educator and the learners - in the act of knowing they achieve in 
dialogue.”55  It is in the culture circle that the codification is used in order to generate 
dialogue and it is the peer group that provides the “theoretical context for reflection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Freire (1974) (Critical Consciousness)  above n.4, p.63. [emphasis in original] 
55 Freire (1972) (Cultural Action) above n.14, p.85. 
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and for transforming interpretations of reality from mere opinion to a more critical 
knowledge.”56  In the culture circles, the reasons for the situations that are depicted in 
the codifications are discussed.  As a result, context is given to the word and the deeper 
the dialogue, the more reality is revealed.  What transpires therefore is a gradual 
dissipating of the myths which may surround the situation in the image, enabling 
perceptions to be transformed from pre-conceived notions to critical knowledge of 
subject.  
In 1987 Elsa Auerbach and Nina Wallerstein adapted Freire’s use of codifications about 
daily life in order to develop language skills and critical thinking for work in English as a 
second language classes in the US.57  The essence of their work is critical literacy 
however it offers clear insights into the benefits of student-centred problem-posing.  
They suggested three basic steps: listening to the students (here their goal is to learn 
about key issues in their community), dialoguing on these themes (here the goal is to 
include all of the students, hear all of their views, problems and so on), and thereafter 
working out ways to act on these problems.  Thus we can begin to see how, by posing 
problems right at the start, the process of participation begins. It is important to 
highlight that it is the problem posing that is crucial, because in the posing of the 
problem we get to the key social and personal issues and not problem solving because 
problem solving does not necessarily invite a critical mind and, as Ira Shor says, “if 
problems are posed they are often met with resistance and boredom.” 58  
 
Similarly, when Freire began to teach the illiterate children and adults in Brazil, what 
he saw was that a “banking” style of teaching as the default and dominant mode for 
education.  Thus, in order to carry out the teaching, Freire needed to find teachers who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Heaney, T., ‘Issues in Freirean Pedagogy’/Thresholds in Education/ ‘Freire Issues’ section, 
http://nlu.nl.edu./ace/Resources/Documents/FreireIssues.html.html.08/29/96 and 12/28/99. [live 
at 03/07/2013] 
57 Auerbach, E. and Wallerstein, N. (1987), ESL for action: Problem-posing at work, Reading 
Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley 
58 Shor above n.39 p.43 
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were able to deliver the courses using the problem-posing system for communicating 
the information and so the teachers needed to reassess their image of the role of the 
student from passive object to active participant of the learning.  From that point the 
courses would be run by encouraging and respecting dialogue.  I now put the work of 
Paulo Freire into the context of the courtroom as I explore its applicability as a means 
to overcoming barriers to understanding within the current framework.   
 
3.4 The problems identified with juror understanding 
In chapter two I argued that while there are good reasons for retaining the jury as 
decision-makers in criminal trials, researchers have pointed to problems over whether 
they truly understand the legal terminology and/or the judicial instructions.  In this 
section I explore communication in the trial more closely by breaking down the areas 
where I consider that things begin to become problematic for the jury.  I explore the 
different ways in which Freire’s problem-posing could be integrated and will 
demonstrate how, through integration of his methods, we could see a trial which has at 
its core liberating communication which gives potential for each person involved to 
understand by participating in the process.  At the simplest of levels I suggest that if a 
dialogue which includes, or at least has scope to include, the jury were one of the main 
communication devices in the trial process this would make us more aware of what 
jurors do and do not understand as the trial is in progress.  Indeed, I argue that unless 
there is a departure from the traditional norms of research, as well as a change in our 
understanding of the role of the jury, which is followed by innovations in future 
research methods and responses, we will never really break boundaries in this area.  If 
my ideas are embraced that would enable us to engage all of the trial participants and 
through that mutual engagement we would be able to see and hear at which points in 
the trial communication problems for the jury really do arise, as opposed to surmising 
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where they might arise and then, as is the case currently, deciding how to respond well 
after the point where the problem first arose.   
 
As we have seen, there is a large body of research focused on juror understanding of 
legal terminology as well as significant numbers of projects focused on the impact that 
extra-legal influences may have on a jury.59  What I shall later demonstrate is that what 
we have tended to see is that in the majority of the studies, once the problems have 
been identified, the response has generally been to implement some sort of method for 
teaching jurors to better understand the trial with suggestions tending to be centred on 
giving things to the jury in the form of glossaries, aides memoire or explanatory 
pamphlets.  Whilst I accept that this is important, equally I suggest that this focus on 
the actual or perceived problems may result in diverting attention away from how the 
information in the court is communicated between the legal professionals and the jury.  
Therefore, it may be an idea for the future to adapt the research methods in order to 
ensure that when the problems are being identified, not only do they include the jury as 
a part of the equation, but that they respond meaningfully to the clearly identified 
needs with those responses being direct and immediate and not, as is currently the 
case, retrospective and often one step removed from the initially identified problem.   
 
To test Freire’s methods for enhancing understanding, I will first revisit those 
approaches which have looked at jury understanding of certain concepts or language in 
isolation, and then assess the measures that have been proposed or adopted in 
response.  Second, I will move to look at a different approach to juror understanding 
which looks at how it is linked to narrative structure.  This raises different sorts of 
issues in that it demands an exploration of the trial as narrative which then raises issues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 As was discussed in for example, the rape trials studies carried out by Finch and Munro - Finch, 
E. and Munro, V.E. (2006), ‘Breaking boundaries?  Sexual consent in the jury room,’ Legal Studies, 
Vol.26, No.3, pp.303-320; Finch, E. and Munro, V.E. (2008), ‘Lifting the Veil: The Use of Focus 
Groups and Trial Simulations in Legal Research,’ Journal of Law and Society, Vol.35, pp.30-51; 
Finch, E. and Munro, V.E (1995), ’Juror stereotypes and blame attribution in rape cases involving 
intoxicants,’ British Journal of Criminology, Vol.45, pp.25-38 and for the influence of a defendants 
past convictions see Lloyd Bostock (2000), ‘The effect on juries of hearing about the defendants 
previous record: a simulation study,’ Criminal Law Review, Sept., pp.734-755. 
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of the problems which may arise with the delivery of competing narratives.  I address 
this in section 3.6 below when I consider some of the early research carried out by 
Bennett and Feldman60 and Hastie, Penrod and Pennington61 as well as some more 
recent analysis by scholars such as Peter Tiersma or Brooks and Gerwitz.62   
 
My primary aim in this part of the chapter is to assess the possibility of integrating 
Freire’s pedagogy as a valuable response to the issues of understanding which the jury 
may face.  In addition I am interested in testing Freire’s problem-posing and his 
insistence on dialogue when we explore, in section 3.6.1, the story telling theories and 
the reliance on narrative in the trial more generally.  Therefore, I am keen to test 
Freire’s problem-posing to see whether the dialogic element or, as Tiersma put it, the 
“turn-taking” element of a conversation, can affect the overall understanding.63   
 
I have already acknowledged many of the studies which have been focused on, and 
attempted to solve, issues of juror understanding.  However, I want now to argue that 
the central issue is less that of understanding than it is of communication.  For 
example, Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury assessed both the content and the 
timing of the judicial instructions by comparing the verdict of the jury with the verdict 
of the judge and measuring the jury’s performance against that of “the judge as a 
baseline.” 64  What we saw was that, in Kalven and Zeislel’s study, judge/juror 
disagreements were not down to “juror incompetence or unwillingness to follow the 
law” but rather were due to confusion about the law and the evidence delivered in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Bennett, W.L. and Feldman, M.S. (1981), Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and 
Judgement in American Culture, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press. 
61 Hastie, R., Penrod, S.D. and Pennington, N. (1983), Inside the Jury, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England; Hastie, R., Penrod, S.D. and Pennington, N. 
(2002), Inside the Juror, New Jersey, The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 
62 Tiersma, P.M. (2000), Legal Language, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London; 
Brooks, P. and Gewirtz (1996), Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, Yale University 
Press, New Haven and London. 
63 Tiersma (2000) above n.62 chapter 9. 
64 Kalven, H. and Zeisel, H. (1966), The American Jury, Boston , Toronto, Little, Brown and 
Company, p.9. 
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trial. 65  This is a key point to consider but one that is easily overlooked when we 
consider the current responses to the problems in many of the projects highlighted.  
Moreover, it demonstrates my point that if we were to shift our focus to the means of 
communication of the information rather than the minutiae of the words used we may 
be better placed to gauge juror participation overall.  Before going on to explore how 
shifting the focus to the mode of communication can alter our perspective and our 
understanding of the jury, I shall look back briefly to the key themes of the research 
discussed in chapter two which demonstrate the core areas where there may be 
legitimate cause for concern.   
 
One of the core themes discussed was jury understanding of judicial instructions and a 
key finding in many of the studies was that jurors do find this area problematic.  I 
demonstrated this with reference to a number of studies which included the early work 
of Steele and Thornburg who found through comparison with other mock juries that 
jurors did struggle to understand the pattern judicial instructions.66  I also looked to the 
New Zealand study which was focused on concerns over juror understanding of legal 
terminology, in which the focus was on developing as many ways as possible to aid the 
jury given the concern over their understanding of the legal terminology during the trial 
process.  Their key recommendation was that when the jurors were perceived to have 
misunderstood complicated evidence, or when they could not recall large amounts of 
evidence, that the focus should not be placed on the content of the information, nor 
should the “blame” be placed on the jury, but rather they suggested that more focus 
should be placed on the judge or legal counsel to see if there were improvements which 
could be made in respect of their modes of communication.67  Additionally I looked to 
Thomas’ 2010 study where we saw, again, that the jurors do interpret the instructions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Vidmar, N. and Hans, V. (2007), American Juries: the Verdict, Amherst, New York, Prometheus 
Books, p.149. 
66 cf. Strawn, D.U. and Buchanan, R.W. (1976), Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59, Judicature, 
478; Strawn, D.U., Buchanan, R.W., Pryor, B. and Taylor, K.P. (1977), “Reaching and Verdict, Step 
by Step,” Judicature, 383, March. 
67 Young, W., Cameron, N. and Tinsley, Y. (2001), New Zealand Law Commission, Report 69, 
‘Juries in Criminal Trials,’ Wellington (also published as Parliamentary Paper E3169), [95] p.37. 
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incorrectly and this concern was compounded by the fact that many of them did not 
actually consider their incorrect interpretations of the judicial instructions to be the 
case.68 
 
What these studies highlight for me is that, first, we should be cautious of continuing to 
gauge juror competence, or assess their ability as fact-finders, by comparisons either 
with other mock jurors or judges.  Second, it is not so much that we should be 
continuing to focus on the language itself but rather that we should be focusing on the 
process of communication of that language.  If we do not begin to shift our focus, both 
in terms of our understanding of the trial communication as well as our understanding 
of the current responses to juror understanding of judicial instructions, we may be in 
danger of missing out on the opportunity for clarifying juror understanding in a more 
holistic way.  Indeed the majority of the solutions to be found currently are rooted in 
giving things to a jury with a view to enhancing their recall or improving their 
understanding of the legal terminology but that is where I suggest that the research is 
lacking and where I propose ways to develop the field.  I should also stress at this point 
that the existing trial communication and the current solutions to juror understanding 
are working on a “banking” style model whereas I propose moving more towards a 
problem-posing vision both of the communication during the trial as well as a possible 
solution where problems are identified.  Therefore, I argue that our research methods 
need to be realigned in order to achieve the most in-depth understanding possible and 
our understanding of the role of the jury needs to be reshaped in order to expand our 
understanding of their limitations.  I now expand on this in the following section as I 
advance some solutions to the problems faced by jurors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Thomas, C. (2010), ‘Are juries fair’, Ministry of Justice Research Series, 1/10, 
February. 
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3.5  Solutions proposed 
In this section, as I reflect on the solutions, I attempt to map out what is currently 
available for the jury when they need to gain clarification and as I do that I am looking 
out for gaps which could be filled with some solutions which have at their root Freire’s 
pedagogy and which I shall later propose. 
We have seen both in chapter two and in this chapter that the research suggests that 
jurors encounter hurdles which impact negatively on their understanding of both the 
judicial instructions and the legal terminology more generally, with the problems arising 
being compounded by the fact that jurors cannot seek clarification at the point when 
they arise.  Indeed, as Jenny McEwan highlights, legal professionals have often been 
reluctant to allow jurors to ask questions during the trial and as Archbold highlights, 
“The practise [sic] of inviting a jury to ask questions is generally speaking to be 
deprecated.  Jurors are not familiar with the rules of evidence and might ask questions 
which are difficult to deal with.”69  Thankfully not all those faced with the fact that 
there is a problem respond to it in such an unhelpful and limiting manner and one such 
example of a positive response is seen in the New Zealand project. 
The New Zealand Project was focused specifically on developing as much assistance as 
possible for the jurors in criminal trials.70  Their suggested solutions included note-
taking and question asking during the trial, albeit with a caveat that their questions 
may not be answered, viewing a video which stressed the importance of decision-
making, making clear the importance of selecting the foreman and for the foreman, 
making clear to him his duties.71  Whilst they found that there was a slight increase in 
juror understanding when the judge gave a “plain English” response to their questions, 
overall the jurors struggled with the definition of the various offences, they went 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Richardson, P. (ed.) (2001), Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practise, London, Sweet 
and Maxwell, 8.250. 
70 NZ (2001) above n.67. 
71 NZ (2001) above n.67, pp.366-7. 
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completely off the point i.e. they began to construct their own definition of the crime 
charged, in thirty five out of the forty eight trials tested, and they were totally 
confused about what was meant by intention. 72  Moreover, in the majority of trials, the 
judge did not explain the definition of the offences clearly when the jury voiced their 
concerns and / or confusion and what this indicates to me is that simply reinterpreting 
the problem in terms of cognitive-cultural terms is not necessarily the answer for jurors 
who are struggling to understand the language of the trial.73  Suggesting that judicial 
instructions are repeated or reworded was certainly not a new idea as we can see when 
we look to the early work carried out by Charrow and Charrow.74 
Rather than simply repeating the judicial instructions, as the New Zealand study 
suggests, Charrow and Charrow proposed the more radical solution of re-writing them or 
integrating them at a different point in the trial.  Thus in 1979 they re-wrote selected 
judicial instructions in an attempt to appeal more to the jurors’ regular modes of 
understanding.  In doing so, they simplified the language and they constructed the 
sentences in a more normal way, taking out the passive subordinate clauses which were 
known to cause a great deal of confusion.  Having done that, they found that it was 
indeed the structure of the language in the instructions that caused the most problems 
for the jurors and not so much the conceptual complexity.  The most prominent result 
of their study was that once the language had been simplified, there was a marked 
increase in juror understanding of the judicial instructions and they were able to recall 
the evidence more readily and from there they demonstrated a clearer understanding.75  
What these results confirm therefore is that it is not necessarily what is said but how it 
is communicated that is of vital importance.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 NZ (2001) above n.67 
73 For a US comparison on judicial instructions specifically see Tanford, J.A. (1990), ‘The Law and 
Psychology of Jury Instructions’, 69 Nebraska Law Review, 71 where the indications from the 
research were similarly negative. 
74 Charrow R. and Charrow V., (1979), ‘Making Legal Language Understandable:  A 
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions’ 79 Columbia Law Review, 1306. 
75 Charrow and Charrow above n.74. 
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In the Arizona project we can see some relevant and important suggestions for 
improving juror understanding.  In 1993 the Arizona Supreme Court called for a review 
of juror comprehension and as a result of that call and the subsequent growing concerns 
over the comprehension of jurors Judges B. Michael Dann and George Logan III began an 
investigation into the workings of jury trial at the Arizona Supreme Court.76  In their 
project we can see interventions such as video-taping and analysis of jury room 
discussions being used for the first time in US juror deliberation rooms with the 
intention of developing understanding of the jury, which would see more democratic 
and better educated juries. 77  Essentially, their aim was to “assist jurors in organising 
and understanding the evidence as they hear it, improve their recall, and reduce the 
chances of their applying an erroneous rule to the evidence”78 and their main suggestion 
to enable that to happen was to permit jurors to take notes, ask questions (in written 
form) and to provide each juror with a copy of preliminary instructions.79  Their other 
main suggestion was that jurors be allowed to discuss the evidence amongst themselves 
whilst the trial was in progress, and where it was deemed to be necessary, for the judge 
to be a part of those discussions.  Their reason for making this suggestion was to try to 
guard against there being a hung jury in trials where they had misunderstood the 
evidence.80   
Whilst Dann and Logan were at pains to stress that this suggestion was to guide the jury 
discussions rather than to force a particular verdict it seems to me to be a very strange 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Dann, B.M. and Logan III, G. (1996), ‘Jury reform: the Arizona Experience’, 79 Judicature, 
Number 5, March-April, 280 (subsequently referred to as the Arizona Project). 
77 Hans, V. (2001) ‘Inside the Black Box: Comment on Diamond and Vidmar’, Virginia Law Review, 
Vol.87, 2001, 1917-1932, p.1917. 
78 The Arizona Project above n.76, p.281. 
79 Despite having read and re-read this point it remains unclear as to whether the said written 
instructions were judicial instructions or more general instructions for jurors which would help 
them to orient themselves within the courthouse environment.  cf the New Zealand study, above 
n.69, which indicated specifically that jurors became confused by the trial evidence when they 
tried taking notes because they were unable to keep up with the pace of the oral communication 
when note-taking.  See also Jackson, J. ‘Juror Decision-Making in the Trial Process’ in Davies, 
G et.al. (eds.) (1996), Psychology Law and Criminal Justice, Berlin, de Gruyter, where they 
discuss the situation in Northern Ireland where note-taking is not advised because it is felt that 
the jurors would miss vital signs from the trial lawyers as well as the witnesses demeanour. 
80 This discussion was aimed at guiding the jurors in their deliberations not forcing a verdict. 
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suggestion indeed.  Indeed, if the discussions were only to guide understanding then, it 
is my opinion that the judge need not have been included in the equation.  My position 
on this point may understandably be regarded as slightly odd given that the thrust of my 
argument is for dialogue.  It is not the suggestion in itself that I am unconvinced by but 
rather the problems that I foresee if there are no protections in place to prevent the 
possibility of the judge controlling the process.  Research both in the US and the UK 
indicates that jurors will look up to a judge and so if we transfer this favourable 
assessment as Heffer refers to it, to a jury room where the judge is party to the 
decisions there would always be the concern that the jury would defer to his knowledge 
however impartial he may in fact be.81  Indeed, by allowing the judge to be a part of 
the jurors’ discussions could easily disempower them whilst at the same time 
completely undermining the expectation that the jury are impartial.  Therefore, 
without autonomy, I would argue that impartiality in a situation such as the one just 
described would be very difficult to achieve.   
Whilst I have no doubt that the intention at the start of the project was laudable I am 
unconvinced by the recommendations of the study.  I acknowledge that it is 20 years 
since the project and that we must consider the developments made within the scope of 
the technological and social advances at the time, nonetheless, I do feel that more 
could have been achieved if a few more boundaries had been challenged.  Whilst I 
acknowledge that permitting jurors to take notes or encouraging them to ask questions 
appears to include them and encourage their participation, which could ultimately 
enhance their overall understanding, all things considered I argue that it is little more 
than a glorified façade with very little substance.  Finally, but most importantly, Dann 
and Logan, like many before them and even more since, used language which includes 
“teaching” and / or “educating” the jury.  I strongly suggest that using such language as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Heffer, C. (2005), The Language of Jury Trial.  A Corpus-Aided Analysis of Legal-Lay Discourse, 
London and New York, Palgrave MacMillan p.158.  For juror deference to Judge’s knowledge or 
status see Zander, M. and Henderson, P. (1993), Crown Court Study.  Royal Commission on 
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105 
 
well as likening the courtroom to a classroom exacerbates the problems of 
understanding rather than alleviates them, especially where the mode of “teaching” 
emerges as “banking” style.  Second, isolating the jury in the research process only tells 
us what the jury does which is limiting given that their task is not done in a social or 
legal vacuum.   
Another type of solution which has been advanced is to provide the jurors with aides in 
the form of computer generated information.  For example, in 2006 Dunn, Salovey and 
Feigenson examined the influence of computer animations compared to diagrams on 
juror decision making.82  As was demonstrated in their study, computer animations are 
becoming increasingly popular in US courtrooms and have been used in a range of cases 
from vehicle crashes to murder.  The animations are offered as demonstrative evidence, 
similar to charts or diagrams, and their purpose is to illustrate witness testimony or aid 
the jury in understanding the testimony.83  Thus we can see here that another way to 
improve juror understanding of the evidence is to provide animations; however the 
associated problem with that is that the animated evidence could turn out to be 
regarded as too persuasive by virtue of the fact that it is animated.  In their research 
Dunn et.al found that whilst there was no direct research to suggest that jurors would 
be more persuaded by computer animations, there was a very strong possibility that 
they would be.  This opinion they based on similar research where evidence included 
such visual aids as videos or photographs.  Additionally, they found that the more 
visually impressive the evidence, the more persuasive the jury found them.  Therefore 
problems arise with such visual aids because the evidence that is given by a witness, 
and which is accompanied by an animation, is then regarded as more persuasive 
evidence than that given by the other witnesses.  I accept that in the study just 
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discussed the focus was on enhancing understanding of evidence and not of legal 
terminology however, I am keen to document it as an example of research which uses a 
variety of visuals in an attempt to address hurdles which could arise for the juror.  
There have been many studies carried out using visuals, be they photographs, video-
tapes or diagrams but they are mainly focused on gauging the jurors understanding at 
the decision-making stage.84  The problem with this type of analysis as I see it is that 
the researchers do not engage the jury when the jury is examining the visual but rather 
wait until the end of the trial to assess the verdict against a verdict which has had little 
or no visual aids.  What seems significant here is that so much weight is placed on the 
deliberation process and, as I have previously suggested, that is far too late to respond 
to the problems.  Moreover, when dealing specifically with the use of visual aids or aide 
memoires generally, the trend seems to be to introduce them part-way through the 
trial.  Whilst this may work for some people, it may be interesting to see how, if we 
were to introduce them right at the start of the trial, the jury would fare in terms of 
their overall understanding.  Indeed, as we saw in section 3.3 above, Freire introduces 
the codifications right at the start of the process to enhance and guide understanding 
rather than in the middle or at the end thus giving both scope and clarity from the 
beginning.   
Along similar lines, what we can see in the current research is the jury being treated in 
Freire’s words, as a receptacle to be filled with information which they later should be 
able to recall and the aides given to them are meant to enhance that recall but at the 
same time keep the jury contained, as a unit, passive and mute throughout the trial.  
To my knowledge, no researcher has yet suggested that the jury be encouraged to 
interact actively in the trial as it is in progress and so in order to understand the view of 
the role of the jury a little more deeply, in the section to follow I explore the trial as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 See for example, Bell, B.E. and Loftus, E.F. (1988), “Degree of Detail of Eyewitness Testimony 
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narrative as another way to understand the part that the jury play in the trial whilst 
concurrently reflecting on the view taken of the jury by the researchers themselves. 
3.6  The trial as narrative 
So far I have addressed the key areas identified in the research as problematic for jurors 
in terms of their understanding of the judicial instructions.  In order to gain a deeper 
insight of how juries understand evidence and argument in the criminal trial, thereby 
broadening our perspective on the trial more generally, I turn now to the body of 
literature that is concerned with the trial as narrative.  My goal at this stage is not to 
try to identify any more deficits in juror understanding but rather to allow us to try to 
understand through the mediums of narrative and storytelling, why and how they come 
to the decisions that they do.  This is an important aspect in jury research because it 
highlights clearly how, if left to their own devices, jurors will default to systems that 
they are comfortable with in order to make some order out of the trial process.  Whilst I 
acknowledge that autonomy of thought is a good thing, I would say that a framework 
which has room for unguided or chaotic thinking - which may result in complete 
misinterpretations of the trial evidence or the judicial instructions - needs serious 
reassessment.  I accept that narrative, as a form of communication, is neither unguided 
nor chaotic.  I also acknowledge the research which explains that lawyers and judges 
use narrative techniques as a way to try to guide the jury and that narrative has a 
particular kind of inner structure.  I argue however that within the basic narrative 
structure there is no room for anyone other than the narrator himself and so in that 
respect, where the narrator conveys information which is for example, confusing, 
unrepresentative of the truth, vague or a little dull, there is no room for the listener to 
interject for clarity or interact for discussion.  Thus, in the trial we can see a situation 
whereby the narrator (whoever he may be) guides (or controls) the story on his terms to 
the exclusion of all others for as long as he has the stand.  Therefore, my objection is 
not so much to the narration itself but rather to its exclusivity in terms of its scope for 
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interaction as well as the power it affords the narrator to take control of the listener.  
In short, I would much rather develop a forum on which, if narrative is a part, it is not 
to the exclusion of all other forms of communication. 
3.6.1 The story model 
Bennett and Feldman showed in their 1981 study that legal judgement is much more 
complex than a formal set of rules, processes and procedures, by arguing that those 
formalities must engage at some level with the parallel social judgment that anchors 
legal questions in everyday understandings.  Their study represents the most influential 
and important study carried out in this area and so I now explore it further with the aim 
of understanding the jury in more detail as a result. 
Bennett and Feldman’s Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and 
Judgement in American Culture focused on how justice is done by ordinary people, 
sitting as jurors, in criminal trials.  They concluded that the [American]  
“criminal trial is organized around storytelling[….] The story is an everyday form 
of communication that enables a diverse cast of courtroom characters to follow 
the development of a case and reason about the issues in it.  Despite the maze 
of legal jargon, lawyers’ mysterious tactics, and obscure court procedures, any 
criminal case can be reduced to the simple form of story.  Through the use of 
broadly shared techniques of telling and interpreting stories, the actors in the 
trial present, organize, and analyse the evidence that bears on the alleged 
illegal activity.”85   
Therefore, as Bennett and Feldman point out, the significance of the storytelling in the 
criminal trial should not be underestimated because it is through stories that people can 
begin to shape the trial evidence into something tangible for them.  Insofar as the jury 
is concerned, Bennett and Feldman highlighted that it is through the structure of the 
stories that the jury can begin to make comparisons between different versions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Bennett and Feldman (1981) above n.60, p.3 
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events and so can make value judgements on such things as reasonable doubt.  Thus, 
through these comparisons with elements that were familiar to them (i.e. their stories), 
the jury begin to formulate for themselves levels and standards onto which to compare 
the standards as they see them revealed in the trial process.  Moreover, Bennett and 
Feldman demonstrate that it is through the use of the story that the jury are able to 
make order out of the often unstructured evidence, retain the information, solve the 
problems, organise the information and so on.  They acknowledged that this form of 
information retention and organisation is a common feature of everyday life, thus the 
effect was made more potent as they explored its application in the legal setting of the 
criminal trial.   
 
The way that Bennett and Feldman demonstrated the jurors’ construction of stories 
from adversarial presentations of the facts was through analysis of the trial of Patricia 
Hearst, a story which dominated the news headlines in the 1970s.86  Hearst was 
kidnapped by a terrorist group calling itself the Symbionese Liberation Army - the 
kidnap became international news and attention remained as her kidnappers continued 
to send messages with demands, to the press.  Several months later, Hearst was 
identified on videotape carrying a gun as she entered a bank with members of the group 
and stood guard as the group robbed the bank.  At the trial both the prosecution and 
defence agreed that she had been kidnapped so the issue was whether she was a willing 
participant or was displaying signs of Stockholm Syndrome.87  If Stockholm Syndrome 
was a relevant factor then the jury needed to address several normative questions, 
inter alia, if she had been in fear of her life, could she be found not guilty or at least be 
regarded as less responsible than if she had acted of her own free will.88  Throughout 
the trial the defence tried to establish, as an explanation of Hearst’s behaviour, threat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Hearst was the daughter of a wealthy newspaper magnate and was kidnapped at a time of great 
political and social upset over the Vietnam War and the alleged role of capitalism in creating 
unjust conditions in society see Vidmar and Hans (2007) above n.65. 
87 Thus, the question would be did she identify with her captors as a reaction to terror and abuse 
experienced at their hands? 
88 Vidmar and Hans (2007) above n.65, p.133. 
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and coercion, whereas the prosecution put forward stories that, at the time of the 
robbery, she had become a loyal member of the group, highlighting that there were 
ample opportunities for her to escape if she was genuinely in fear of her life, none of 
which she took.89  Hearst was found guilty and Bennett and Feldman suggested that the 
verdict of the jury may have been quite the opposite if the defence had tried to 
establish that she had been brainwashed rather than coerced, the former presumably 
prompting the jury to consider a different set of societal norms and human emotions, 
designed to prompt the jury to be compassionate or sympathetic towards her.  Instead, 
what Bennett and Feldman argued was that the story from the defence was only 
persuasive as long as the jurors accepted the view that Hearst would have followed 
similar rules to those that members of society follow when they are in similar coercive 
settings.  Conversely the prosecution delivered a story which had at its core that Hearst 
had not adhered to the accepted rules of society.90  What this shows clearly is that the 
conflicting narratives can have a very powerful effect on the jury.  For example, the 
prosecution will construct the ‘he is guilty’ story and may do so by developing the facts 
in an order which creates a compelling story.  The defence on the other hand constructs 
the ‘he is innocent’ story, developing their information in such a way as to compete 
with, disrupt or undermine the prosecution’s story.  Endless possibilities could emerge 
as the respective sides vie with the other to capture the attention of the jury and so 
long as that is a feature of the trial there will always be room for the jury either to be 
so captivated by one of the narratives that they base their judgement on it or, become 
so confused, or remain so unconvinced that instead they begin to fill in the gaps (in the 
competing narratives) to make the story fit for themselves.  As a result what then 
emerges is a subsidiary story that may not be grounded in the trial evidence but the 
extent to which it is removed from the evidence will remain a mystery within the 
communicative confines of the current framework.  When the jury begin to experience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 For example they put forward instances where she was in a car with keys in the ignition therefore 
suggesting that she could have driven off or that she regularly went jogging on her own, again 
demonstrating that if she had wanted to, she could have escaped. 
90 Vidmar and Hans (2007) above n.65, p.133. 
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problems or they become confused and so begin to fill the gaps in the narrative with 
their own schemata or elaborate enhancements, it is at precisely those points that I 
suggest the jury are able to enter dialogue making provision to prevent the emergence 
of subsidiary stories.  I do not suggest that these subsidiary stories are in themselves 
bad, nor do I suggest that there is only a single narrative that is the ‘correct’ one.  I do 
however suggest that in order to guard against jurors empathising with one narrative 
over the other, for the sake of the narrative and at the expense of the careful 
consideration of the trial evidence, we may be wise to enter in a dialogue with the 
jurors in an attempt to address what of the trial they have really heard and whether 
that is shadowed by the narrative that the lawyers wish them to hear.  Therefore, as 
long as the trial process remains as it is, with the jury ostensibly excluded and silent, 
the possibility for clarity emerging from dialogue is slim.  Indeed people intuitively use 
scripts or schemas91 to make sense of situations and so to expect a jury to do otherwise 
is unrealistic.  
 
The first thing to say is that I acknowledge that narrative theory does not suggest that 
there is a pre-framed understanding of the trial and I understand that narrative 
structures understanding, enabling the jury to make sense of the facts of the trial, 
without which they may find very difficult.  Thus, in any one trial there will always be 
competing narratives and juries will judge according to which one they find most 
coherent or convincing and this may be consistent with the evidence to a greater or 
lesser degree.  However, from my point of view, this reliance on or judgement of, 
competing narrative does not enable a clear distinction for the jury between fact and 
fiction –which is at the heart of most understandings of the jury – but instead suggests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 A cognitive framework which allows the person to filter, often large amounts of information for 
interpretation purposes.  When using schemas people tend to conform to stereotypes thus 
making it difficult for the person trying to organise the information if the said information does 
not fit with the stereotype or norm.  Schemas can usually be categorised as “nonspecific but 
organized representation of prior experiences” – Neisser, U. (1967), Cognitive Psychology, New 
York, Appleton Century-Crofts.  One of the primary functions of the schema is “to provide an 
answer to the question: ‘what is it?’” - Taylor, S. and Crocker, J. (1981) ‘Schematic bases of 
information processing’, chapter in Higgins, T. and Zanna, M. (eds.) (1981) Social Cognition: 
The Ontario Symposium, Vol.1, Hillsdale, New Jersey, Erlbaum, at pp.89-134. 
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that this kind of separation cannot easily be drawn by a juror in the context of the trial 
as it is currently organised.  Thus, whilst I do not regard the competing narratives as 
necessarily problematic, I suggest that if there were a device for clarification available 
for when those narratives may become problematic this could be regarded as a useful 
device for the trial communication.  This is also linked to Freire’s understanding of 
learning when he suggests that it does involve a kind of narrative but that narrative 
should not be the dominant communicative method, preferring as he does to promote 
the use of dialogue.   
After Bennett and Feldman’s research, there have been a number of similarly focused 
studies.  Reid Hastie et.al for example carried out a study which had at its roots the 
impact of narrative.  They concluded that, where the verdict of the jury was considered 
to be deviant, because it was not in accordance with the verdict of the judge,92 this was 
associated with poor comprehension of the facts of the case, the legal definitions of the 
crimes and the details of the evidence of individual witnesses which became poorly 
understood and confused as a result of the competing narratives which did not 
necessarily make any sense for the jurors. 93  This was followed in 1991 by a series of 
studies in which Pennington and Hastie built on the premise that jurors rely on 
competing narratives in constructing the grounds for their verdict.94  They based their 
hypothesis on the idea that jurors “impose a narrative story organization on trial 
information”95 and they considered that juror decision-making consists of three stages: 
developing stories from the trial evidence, considering the verdict alternatives from the 
legal instructions provided by the judge (e.g. murder, manslaughter, self-defence) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 In this context Hastie et.al. (1983) above n.61, mean that the verdict of the jury is not in 
accordance with the opinion of the judge.  They base this finding on the research conducted by, 
inter alia, Kalven and Zeisel above n.64; Chabereski, G. (1973), “Inside the New York Panther 
Trial,” Civil Liberties Review, 1, 111-155; Ostrom, T.M. et.al. (1978), “An integration theory 
analysis of jurors’ presumptions of guilt or innocence,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 36, 436-450; Diamond, S.S. (1974), “A Jury experiment reanalysed,” University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 7, 520-535. 
93 Hastie et.al. (1983) above n.61. 
94 Pennington, N. and Hastie, R. (1991), “A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision-Making: The Story 
Model,” 13 Cardozo L.Rev. 519. 
95 Pennington and Hastie (1991) above n.94, p.521. 
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then matching the various stories to these verdict categories.96  Thus, they suggest that 
the verdict of the jury is the narrative that best fits the verdict category.   
 
As part of their large-scale study into the functioning of the jury, Hastie, Penrod and 
Pennington assessed the idea that jurors had already formed their opinion, sometimes 
prior to hearing the evidence.  Indeed their studies revealed that jurors tended to rely 
on storytelling models which lend themselves well to being reinforced by pre-trial 
publicity and so when evidence was introduced that did not fit with their preconceived 
ideas, they would distort it to fit instead.97  Hastie et.al.’s research was built in part on 
the work carried out by Bennett and Feldman98 who have argued that the verdict of the 
jury was based in part on relying on the storytelling aspect of the narrative which they 
understood (for example, a “detective” story that they were familiar with) rather than 
the trial evidence as it was delivered in court and which they did not understand.  Thus 
the detective stories were the representation of what the jury had understood whereas 
the trial evidence was what they had misunderstood because of, inter alia, its 
convoluted delivery.  
 
An almost identical conclusion was reached in the study carried out by Kurt Carlson and 
Edward Russo.99  In 2001 they carried out two experiments in which they analysed 
whether jurors distorted new evidence in order to fit it into the verdict which is 
primarily favoured from the start.  Whilst I acknowledge that this may not be directly 
related to the trial narrative it is nonetheless important because from studies such as 
these we can gain a better understanding of what is likely to disrupt a juror’s focus on 
the trial.  The point of the experiment was to see whether instructions from judges 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Hastie et.al. (1983) above n.61, p.135. 
97 Hastie, Penrod and Pennington, (2002), Inside the Juror, above n.61 put forward the idea that 
jurors are more likely to adopt the story-telling model when trying to make sense of the evidence 
and the trial process. 
98 Bennett and Feldman (1981) above n.60. 
99 Carlson, K.A. and Russo, J.E. (2001), “Biased interpretation of Evidence by Mock Jurors,” 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, June, Volume 7, No.2, 91-103. 
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would prevent pre-decisional distortion100 or whether their study would reveal similar 
results to those indicated by Hastie et.al (1983) or Bennett and Feldman.  Like Hastie 
et.al, Carlson and Russo found that jurors did tend to distort new information, moulding 
the evidence through the trial into their pre-decisional opinion.  Their ability therefore 
to listen and to evaluate objectively was formed at the start rather than throughout.  
Therefore, returning to the issues over their ability to act as impartial fact-finders it 
seems that there is now a fair deal about which doubt could be cast. 
 
Like Bennett and Feldman, Pennington and Hastie applied the knowledge and research 
which suggests that people base their interpretations of situations on schemata (topics 
that they are familiar with) and scripts (information delivered in a coherent form) and 
alarmingly what this suggests is that when jurors struggle to follow or understand the 
evidence in the order that it is presented to them, they will resort to relying on 
schemata and superimpose their own narrative on the trial which, as should be clear by 
now, does not necessarily accord with the actual evidence being presented.  Given that 
stories generally are open to subjective interpretation - and whilst subjective 
interpretation is not a bad thing per se, indeed, one of the roles of the jury is to give a 
subjective interpretation - the room for misinterpretation of the events in the trial 
(both the speeches and questions that are delivered by the legal players and the 
descriptions in the trial which includes descriptions of what happened when the crime 
was committed) is high.  Thus, I suggest we begin to challenge the generally accepted 
method of one-way communication in a courtroom by importing Freire’s communication 
devices.  In doing that we would be in a position to see and hear the process, or path to 
the verdict to see whether it is more focused and is based on the evidence in the actual 
trial rather than a mixture of extra-legal information, stories or schemata.  I suggest 
that predominantly because, whilst I accept that accounts such as those made by 
Bennett and Feldman or Pennington and Hastie are fairly accurate, they nonetheless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 This means the jurors biased interpretation of new evidence to support their preconceived or 
favoured verdict. 
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raise further questions because they could causes problems for the trial as I shall now 
discuss.  
 
One problem with this kind of account is that it mixes up the delivery of the story with 
its performance and in so doing the core power of storytelling, as an autonomous 
communicative device, is firstly missed and secondly becomes confused as it is merged 
with elements of performance.101  Therefore, the essence of the story could become 
distorted if its performance is designed to shift attention, to draw the listener into an 
alternative or sub-plot, or simply to mislead.  Thus, to be clear, when thinking about 
storytelling it is crucial to understand that art as an art in itself which is driven, first 
and foremost, by the message in the story and not by dramatic performances of the 
story.  Indeed, I suggest that we separate the two in order to gain a more holistic 
understanding of their respective core points thereby understanding more clearly their 
respective power in a trial situation.  Indeed, stories come in myriad shapes and sizes 
and are conveyed through a variety of descriptive mediums which includes oral and 
visual.  Regardless of their medium however, what links stories is that they are 
recognisable by people generally, and, as Bennett and Feldman point out the story “is 
an everyday form of communication”102 contending that, through the use of storytelling 
techniques, employed by legal professionals, jurors are able to construct their own 
versions of events, for better or for worse.  But, what Bennett and Feldman, and the 
others here mentioned, do is to draw a link between the story and the telling of that 
story, hence merging the story with the storyteller and this I suggest is slightly 
misleading if we are to consider the power of both within the criminal trial.  For 
example, if we automatically link the story with the storyteller we may then produce a 
false image of what the trial narrative actually is, because we may be in danger of 
superimposing the skills of the storyteller onto the substance of the story and, as I later 
argue, we should try where possible to detach the act of storytelling from the story 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Brooks and Gewirtz, (1996) above n.62. 
102 Bennett and Feldman above n.60, p.4. 
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itself.  In reality, a skilled storyteller has the capacity to enhance the substance of any 
story which could, in turn, persuade or alienate the jury but this does not help us to 
understand a jury and nor does it help a jury to understand the legal language in the 
trial and in that sense it could be fair to say that this is a little misleading.  This may be 
regarded by the reader as a little pedantic, however I see that the sense that a juror 
may have about his task, the picture that popular culture portrays about the criminal 
trial and so the general impression of the trial may be significantly altered if we are to 
assume that the narrative of the trial is in some way transformed into a performance of 
sorts.  To do that is to misinterpret the core essence of storytelling.   
 
It is true to say that the narrative is a powerful medium through which stories are told; 
however I suggest that, if stories are regarded as a platform for imparting information 
within a criminal trial, then there is scope for manipulation on the part of the narrator 
or misinterpretation on the part of the listener.  We could recognise manipulation as 
greater emphasis on certain details or as vocal inflections in the form of volume, tone 
or timbre used deliberately by the narrator as a device to draw the listener in or to 
divert the listeners attention or focus to the story that he wishes them to hear.  
Additionally, the research indicates that the jurors create their own narratives from the 
evidence and so it would be fair to say that different jurors create different narratives 
but this can be manipulated in the ways just highlighted.  Where there are strong 
disagreements about how to interpret the evidence, the jurors are then forced to 
reconcile these differences in the deliberation room103 and that could lead to jurors 
deviating completely from the trial evidence and so may result in the opinion of the 
strongest characters underpinning the verdict.  When put like that, the introduction or 
integration of Freire’s methods seems to me to be increasingly logical and appealing.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Holstein, J.A. (1985), “Jurors’ Interpretations and Jury Decision Making,” 9, Law and Human 
Behaviour, 83. 
   
117 
 
This very problem was the subject of research by James Holstein in which he presented 
48 groups comprising five or six former jurors with a 20 minute video-taped simulation 
of a trial which involved stealing bricks.  During the deliberations Holstein’s jurors 
focused on different interpretations of “what really happened.”  Using their own 
experiences and norms the jurors in this study came up with 15 different versions of 
what happened as they tried to develop a coherent narrative that would justify the 
verdicts, thus demonstrating realistic and serious problems with continuing to use juries 
within a framework which sees them defaulting to their own interpretation of the 
stories which emerge throughout the trial.104  Indeed, one of the immediate problems 
identifiable is that the jurors interpret the evidence in story order and not witness 
order in an attempt to make sense of the information.  What transpires however is that 
the facts may become confused and this is due largely to the jurors organising their own 
stories in story order rather than witness order.105  In such cases the jury are apt to 
confuse fiction with fact and from that point we “endanger the truth-finding function of 
the adjudicative process.”106  So with all of this information, it is not surprising that 
there continues to be a scepticism or a lack of confidence in the verdict of the jury.  In 
that respect therefore, I should clarify that this is not necessarily a negative of the story 
per se but we must be aware of the problems which could arise when juries rely on 
narratives, especially if those narratives are ones that they have created themselves.  I 
discuss this in more detail now, with specific reference to critical pedagogy. 
 
I have previously made clear that discussions of story-telling or trial narrative are fairly 
often referred to by researchers and theorists when considering the validity of trial by 
jury and juries’ ability to understand the trial in its present structure.  By studying the 
trial narrative we consider the communication aspects and exchanges that take place 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See also Feigenson, N. (2000), Legal Blame, How Jurors Think and Talk About Accidents, 
Washington DC, APA Books, especially chapters 2 and 3 which look at how jurors make 
decisions. 
105 Kassim, S.M. and Wrightsman, L.S. (1988), The American Jury on Trial: Psychological 
Perspectives, New York, Washington, Philadelphia, London, Hemisphere Publishing Corporation 
106 Dershowitz, A.M. ‘Life Is Not a Dramatic Narrative’, in Brooks and Gewirtz above n.62, pp.99-
105 at p.101. 
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therein and, as noted by Paul Gerwitz, the trial is “an arena of speakers and listeners, 
that the trial’s search for truth always proceeds by way of competing attempts to shape 
and present narratives for particular audiences…”107  Where the scholarship however is 
lacking is in consideration of how people tell the stories, how they are listened to and 
how they are interpreted as I highlighted above.  For example, if we consider that a 
fundamental component of critical thinking pedagogy is the relationship between facts 
and values, we can see why jurors may emerge with several different interpretations of 
the same story if those facts and values are narrated using performance devices aimed 
at subverting attention and so on.  How those individuals select, arrange and sequence 
the information in order to construct their picture is, as Henry Giroux points out, more 
than a cognitive process.108  On this point therefore I am convinced that there needs to 
be a communication device, such as dialogue, which can clarify the narrative or at least 
sit side by side with it in an attempt to re-address the default devices for 
communication in the criminal trial.  Dialogue is therefore a means of communication 
which sees those involved engaged at a common level and it is through the dialogue 
that we can see and hear the thoughts, ideas and opinions of the other and in that 
sense, a transparency emerges.   Therefore, in a trial we can identify clarity and 
precision in the thought processes of the jurors, something which I argue is a vital 
component for a verdict.  It follows therefore that we can also identify where there are 
misunderstandings, misinterpretations and clouded understanding.  I believe that it is 
possible to create an environment where dialogue is central to the critical learning 
process and this I demonstrate below when I explore alternative ways to create a trial 
which sees all trial participants communicating in a way which is conducive to 
understanding of the trial.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Paul Gewirtz, ‘Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial’, book chapter 
in Brooks and Gewirtz above n.62, p.136. 
108 Giroux, H.A. (1978), “Writing and Critical Thinking in the Social Studies”, Curriculum Inquiry, 8:4, 
291, p.299. 
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Up to this point I have established that stories are very important devices for sorting 
information which could otherwise become confused or forgotten. Bennett and Feldman 
have highlighted for example that stories allow the jurors to keep track of the 
information109 and more importantly they allow them to interpret the central issues in 
the cases by identifying them as central actions in the stories.110  They stress that for 
justice to have meaning, “it must reflect the social understandings common in 
society…”111  Thus, in this section I am not criticising Bennett and Feldman’s theory but 
I am stressing that having established, as they do, that everyday knowledge is extremely 
important in the role of juror, that everyday knowledge, or put differently, a person’s 
pre-framed idea of a given situation, must be monitored to lend credence to the 
verdict.  Indeed, if we recall the other studies that I have identified in chapter two 
which suggest that jurors fail to understand evidence of key legal terms together with 
the suggestions that jurors may default to their own schemata when trying to decipher 
the trial evidence, there may emerge justification for monitoring and dialogue in the 
course of the trial.  In this respect therefore I argue that we would do well to pay close 
attention to Freire’s work when he stresses the importance of reading and 
understanding the word within the persons’ world.  To clarify my point at this stage, I 
do agree that to acknowledge communication mediums such as stories is useful for all 
trial participants not least because they are accessible to all.  Bennett and Feldman 
recognised that stories are judged by a combination of elements and so ultimately the 
listeners112 asked “did it happen that way?” and “could it have happened that way?” and 
they concluded that the structural characteristics of the story are often critical in 
determining its truth or not. 113   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Bennett and Feldman (1981) above n.60. 
110 Bennett and Feldman (1981) above n.60, p.19 (emphasis added). 
111 Bennett and Feldman (1981) above n.60, p.21 (emphasis added). 
112 In their study the listeners are the other people in the courtroom and include the people 
watching from the public gallery or spectators as they refer, the judge, the clerk of the court and 
so on. 
113 Bennett and Feldman above n.60, p.33. 
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To conclude, therefore, if we accept the story model, there are two obvious problems 
that it creates in the trial.  First, the narratives are just that – narratives.  Therefore, as 
I highlighted at the start of section 3.6 above, there is little or no interaction, instead 
the narrator assumes the attention of the listener and the listener has little option but 
to conform to the passive stance of the hearer.  The mode of communication therefore 
is one-way and that is problematic in terms of juror understanding of the judicial 
language and our understanding of juror understanding.  The second problem which I 
also identified above is that in the criminal courtroom the storytellers have the 
opportunity to control the central action, animate the central characters and guide the 
listener through clever narrative, in the way that they have designed.  Whilst I have set 
out an argument which says that the true essence of storytelling should be detached 
from the notion of performance, or at least that the two should not automatically be 
regarded as one, it is nevertheless the case that the legal professionals do develop 
stories for the jury and the jury listen to them as if they are stories.  One way to 
address these issues is to integrate Freire’s theories for understanding into the trial, 
thus disrupting the communication as we know it and replacing it with a communication 
which has at its core problem-posing methods and which sees the jurors move from 
being only present in the courtroom to being participants in the trial.  I shall 
demonstrate those ideas in chapter five when I contextualise the concepts that I 
develop through the thesis however, for the moment I have chosen to reserve this 
chapter to description alone. 
 
3.7 Conclusion to chapter three 
I said at the beginning of this chapter that I would develop an argument for integrating 
Paulo Freire’s theories for understanding to demonstrate that, through putting dialogue 
at the root of the mode for communication in the trial, it may be possible to alter our 
perspectives on how we view issues of juror understanding in the future.  Throughout 
the chapter I have introduced the core theories in Freire’s critical pedagogy and I have 
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argued for their use as a default communication device in my concept of a criminal trial 
process.  I have given scope to what inspired Freire to develop a system of 
communication which was inclusive of those on the edges of society with the result that 
illiteracy was transformed within months and in doing so I have demonstrated the power 
of integrating a person’s world with his learning process.  I then introduced the core 
elements in his pedagogy before identifying the problems with their use in a criminal 
trial, placing much focus on the problems which may arise if the trial communication is 
regarded predominantly as a narrative.  In chapter five I shall contextualise these ideas 
to demonstrate how, if we shift our mind-sets, a new way of communicating could be 
possible for trials in the future.  I do that by demonstrating how my concept for a trial 
communication could work by embedding codifications into the trial dialogue and from 
there reflect how understanding could be transformed.  In the chapter to follow I shall 
introduce the work of Augusto Boal partly because his work is regarded in small part as 
a practical manifestation of the work of Freire but predominantly because it is in his 
theories for communication through participation that we can see empowerment in 
action and through that empowerment of people a stronger sense of understanding and 
empathy occurs. 
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Chapter four 
Participation in the trial: 
Augusto Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed 
4.1 Introduction to chapter four 
In chapter three I argued that if we incorporate elements of Paulo Freire’s critical 
pedagogy, especially his problem-posing theory, into the system of trial by jury, there 
would be enormous benefits in terms of enhanced communication which could bring 
with it more clarity in understanding for jurors in the trial.  In this chapter I suggest 
that if we add to Freire’s work some of the practical communication devices developed 
by Augusto Boal, this would further develop the potential for understanding, by 
engaging with elements of space and structure in the criminal trial.  The changes that I 
suggest in this chapter build on the suggestions put forward in chapter three and are 
based predominantly on devices for communication through participation, which are 
rooted in Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed.  Theatre of the Oppressed is the 
amalgamation of the various ideas and techniques that Boal developed in his lifetime, 
some of which include: Legislative Theatre; Aesthetics of the Oppressed, Games for 
Actors and Non-Actors and Forum Theatre.  Of all his work, Boal is undoubtedly best 
known for his development of, and work in Forum Theatre, and it is on Forum Theatre 
that I concentrate most in this chapter.  What underpins much of this work is Boal’s 
emphasis on communication through participation as a means to empowerment, to a 
sense of inclusion, or to enhanced understanding of any given situation.  In this next 
step in my exploration of the role of the jury I argue that if we truly understand the 
difference between presence and participation in the courtroom, we will come to 
realise - in a practical sense - the untapped potential of both the jury and the spaces 
within which it currently functions.  Additionally, at this stage I draw on my practical 
experience of working in performance arts and so view the possibilities for the jury from 
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an artistic perspective, thus drawing into the exploration the diversity of ways that the 
jury can be integrated into the trial as it progresses, as well as demonstrating in my 
work another research method for use when trying to understand the jury.  By using 
Forum Theatre as the method through which people are empowered to communicate 
and to participate, I aim to highlight the points in the trial where the jury could 
participate meaningfully and I offer practical ways to make that happen.  Thus, whilst I 
do challenge the presumption that the jury, as it currently stands, participate in the 
trial, I do not make the challenge as a negative but rather I use the current presumption 
as our starting point as I refocus our image of the role of the jury to broaden further our 
expectations of its capacity in the criminal trial. 
Thus, at the centre of this chapter I draw out the dominant aspects of Forum Theatre,1 
which include the Joker and the spect-actor, because it is through these vehicles that I 
propose change, not only by re-thinking communication through participation but also 
by re-thinking how we respond to or regard the space in which that communication 
takes place.  I do not propose to alter the structure of the courtroom because I believe 
that my aims can be achieved through alternative communication styles that are based 
in participation thus avoiding the need for architectural or interior design alterations.  I 
do however make a brief exploration towards the end of the chapter into the impact of 
architecture where I place my focus on the subliminal influence of allocated space on 
those using it.  I do that to emphasise the way that people, often unconsciously, defer 
to allocated space with that deference serving only to hinder their sense that they are 
able to or even allowed to participate, so subconsciously undermining their inherent 
abilities.  Therefore, in this chapter I introduce methods which encourage active 
participation in our communication, and in so doing I am opening the space to enable or 
encourage as many of the jurors as possible to take their part in the process. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Which I discuss throughout the chapter. 
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Boal did not develop his Theatre of the Oppressed from purely artistic decisions or 
experiences but rather it “grew out of a determined battle to make socially engaged, 
life-affirming theatre in a climate of extreme repression” with the participatory 
theories and techniques being developed over time.2  He did this through collaboration 
with other theatre practitioners and educators, creating something which had, as he 
saw it, real tangible value for the people with whom he worked.  His Forum Theatre 
techniques have at their core participation by both actors and spect-actors3 and it is 
this aspect of his work I am most interested in exploring.  By discovering the power of 
his method in other spheres I propose to apply it within the criminal trial process. 
In chapter three my research was driven by inspiration taken from the work of Paulo 
Freire but I made it clear from the start that I was not using his critical pedagogy as my 
basis for ‘teaching’ the jury; rather I used it for opening our perceptions and awareness 
of the lines for communication and understanding in the trial proper.  Along similar 
lines, therefore, whilst I have chosen to draw on Augusto Boal’s Theatre of the 
Oppressed, I am not suggesting that the future for trial by jury is to elaborate on its 
already perceived theatrical dimensions by imposing some Forum Theatre techniques.  
Indeed, I should say that the links thus far drawn in the literature between the theatre 
and the criminal trial are rooted, mainly, in their similarities in terms of aesthetics and 
dramatic performance and should not be confused with my use of Boal’s work. 4  
Therefore, I do not rely on the trappings of the theatre and by that I mean the tip-up 
seats, the scene changes or lighting designs and nor do I rely on theatricality or 
spectacle derived from directorial opinions and styles found in the imagery, sound, and 
stylistic decisions each designed to affect an audience either by drawing them in or 
forcing them out to draw links to or advance my ideas for using Boal’s form of theatre 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Babbage, F. (2004), Augusto Boal, London and New York, Routledge p.2.   
3 The spect-actor is the term used to refer to the spectator when he interacts at the intervention 
points in the Forum piece. I discuss the role of the spect-actor in more detail in section 4.2.2 
below.  
4 I discuss this in more detail below in chapter five when considering aspects of theatricality and 
ceremony. 
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practise in the criminal trial.  Indeed, the aesthetic space of the theatre – the platform 
– in my opinion only serves to create separation and division between the space of the 
actor and the space of the spectator.  My work is focused on drawing the two together, 
not endorsing the gap between them, and so my primary purpose is neither to describe 
the current system nor to draw out the similarities between theatrical and legal 
performance.  Therefore, examples such as Howard Zehr’s comparisons of the 
administration of criminal justice as, “a kind of theatre in which issues of guilt and 
innocence predominate.  The trial or guilty plea forms the dramatic centre, with the 
sentence as the denouement”5 I find to be fairly limiting in terms of broadening our 
understanding of how information is conveyed.  He draws a parallel with a traditional 
‘play’ where the story arches around the central character(s) and makes a link between 
a criminal courtroom and a theatre – not at any point acknowledging the rich diversity 
in theatre practice, not unsurprisingly because he is viewing the issue ostensibly from a 
socio-legal background.  This link is tenuous because it relies heavily on theatre 
performances of ‘straight’ plays as well as assuming that the ‘stories’ told in court are 
structured, either into a coherent story form, or at least a recognised dramaturgical 
form.  We know from the discussion in chapter three that the stories told in court are 
far from coherent for jurors and I would go so far as to argue that reference to theatre 
performances is, in this instance, a little clichéd.  Moreover, in terms of staging, the 
kind of productions to which Zehr refers are, to the great extent, created to be 
performed traditionally in conventional theatres to passive and mute audiences sitting 
in their allotted space observing the acting from the stage afar. 6  It is clear then that 
drawing distinctions with jurors who are passive and, to the greater extent, separated 
from the rest of the trial players, is easy to do.  In general, little more than lip service 
is given to the needs of either the actor or the audience in the theatre and this is 
typical of many of the comparisons between the courtroom and the theatre which rely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Zehr, H. (1995), Changing Lenses: New Focus for Crime and Justice, Scottdale, PA, Herald 
Press p.77. 
6 Indeed, if theatre were only about such performance styles and spaces then perhaps the link 
would be more authentic. 
   
126 
 
on the theatre in the stereotypical sense as though this was the very definition of 
theatre and nothing more.  Moreover, often these comparisons rely on the “face-to-face 
encounters in the courtroom” as a kind of drama thus endorsing the trial as some sort of 
theatrical performance.7  These points are made more acute when we consider that 
Boal’s work does not rely on theatre buildings or stages, or indeed any of the trappings 
commonly associated with theatricality and performance, to have a direct and lasting 
impact on its audiences.8  Additionally, a cursory glance at theatre performance today 
demonstrates that seeing the performance does not necessarily require us to attend a 
theatre.  For example, Catalonia’s La Fura dels Baus stage their macro-performances 
outdoors not least because their sets prohibit performance inside any space let alone a 
purpose built theatre space9 and Edinburgh’s site responsive theatre company Grid Iron 
sees audiences attend such venues as a disused paediatric hospital,10 airports,11 
anatomy departments12 or public houses13.  Or when we do visit a theatre, what we see 
on the stage may be communicated in ways designed to disrupt or distort our ideas of 
convention.  For example in Robert Lepage’s The Seven Streams of the River Ota we 
can see both the direction and the design activating simultaneity in the performance 
itself with the effect on the audience of seeing thousands of stampeding actors with the 
employment of three people and a bank of ingeniously staged mirrors.14  Thus, whilst 
this image of the theatre (be that a proscenium arch, a studio, a black box) may well be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Mulcahy, L. (2011), Legal Architecture, Justice, due process and the place of law, Oxon and New 
York, Routledge, p.176. 
8 Boal’s work is not the exception and so for other examples we can look to theatre directors 
Robert Lepage or Ben Harrison for inspiration on the use of a variety of theatrical conventions. 
9 See for example their first macro-performance Pepsìclope watched by 10,000 
http://www.lafura.com/web/eng/obras_ficha.php?o=62 or their 2004 macro-performance of La 
divina comèdia http://www.lafura.com/web/eng/obras_ficha.php?o=79 [live at 03/07/2013]. 
10 Ghost Ward, Directed by Ben Harrison for the National Theatre, location disused paediatric ward 
in disused hospital (2005). 
11 Roam, Grid Iron Theatre Company, location airside Edinburgh Airport (2008). 
12 What Remains, David Paul Jones and Ben Harrison for Grid Iron, location Edinburgh University 
Anatomy department, 2012. 
13 Barflies, David Paul Jones, locations various public bars in the UK. 
14 Robert Lepage is considered as one of the most visually inventive theatre directors and The 
Seven Streams of the River Ota was the first piece created for his own company Ex Machina 
http://lacaserne.net/index2.php/creation/ [live at 03/07/2013] 
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the point of the comparison, what life shows us is that that is not the case and so I 
demonstrate briefly in this chapter and more closely in chapter five, that, certainly in 
part, these comparisons may well be out-dated.   
 
What would it be like if we began to integrate some of the elements of Theatre of the 
Oppressed into trial by jury?  What would the trial look and sound like if Boal’s theories 
were central to the criminal trial framework?  Would that bring us one step closer to 
understanding all of the trial participants, as well as making participation possible for 
all participants?  In this chapter, then, I shall attempt to show how the trial might look 
or sound different if elements of the Theatre of the Oppressed were integrated into its 
framework.  As a by-product of that investigation I shall show how, in my exploration of 
the trial ‘theatricality’, Forum Theatre could be a way in to broaden our perspectives 
on what ‘theatricality’ really is and so demonstrate the tremendous power of a 
different style of theatre when we consider whether or not it (theatre performance) “is 
a mirror in which may be seen the true image of nature, of reality.”15   
 
Augusto Boal believed absolutely in the power of drama to change society and transform 
lives.  Through his Theatre of the Oppressed he gave voice to the oppressed and through 
his life he continued to so do maintaining until his death that “all forms of expression 
and communication are in the hands of the oppressors” and so to offer tools or avenues 
for expression which bypassed or surmounted those was his primary aim.16  He argued 
that “theatre is the human language par excellence”17 and in that he meant that using 
theatre as a form of communication, human beings are able to observe their own 
capacity to witness the “possibility of our being simultaneously Protagonist and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Shakespeare, W. (1600) Hamlet, III.2.20-24. 
16 Boal, A. (1998), Legislative Theatre, Using performance to make politics, translated by Adrian 
Jackson, London and New York, Routledge at p.7 (subsequently referred as Boal (1998) 
(Legislative)) p.21. 
17 Boal (1998) (Legislative) above n.16, p.7. 
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principle spectator of our actions…to reinvent the past and to invent the future...[and]  
therein lies the immense power with which theatre is endowed.”18  I do not agree 
completely with Boal when he refers to the language of the theatre as the ultimate 
mode for clear communication and as a forum through which to alter situations because 
it is only one mode of communication, and one which may or may not be accessible to 
many.  It should not be elevated to the level of the ultimate because in that 
perspective we may lose sight of other opportunities for change.  I have, however, 
chosen to integrate the work of Boal for a variety of reasons, not least because I believe 
that there is certainly a place for practical experience alongside theoretical enquiries as 
a way to understand better how to integrate jurors practically.  Boal’s work has the 
power to break and / or transcend barriers to transform situations which have hitherto 
remained static for centuries.  Thus, through integrating his work as part of my 
investigation into trial by jury I aim to develop bridges of dialogue between all of those 
involved in the criminal trial.  In this respect, the exploration of Boal’s work builds on 
the work already undertaken in chapter three, as I depart from focusing only on the 
spoken word to demonstrate how physical interaction can also play a part in enhancing 
understanding and participation through overcoming barriers to communication. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  First I chart the life of Augusto Boal and I illustrate 
the significance that his early work at the Arena theatre had on his later Theatre of the 
Oppressed.  Thereafter, I consider the potential of the Theatre of the Oppressed as a 
device for enhancing participation in the current trial.  Subsequently I assess the impact 
of the courtroom architecture and the staging of the trial on all of the trial participants.  
In so doing I shall look at the extent to which clear communication currently exists 
between the legal professionals and the jurors and where Boal’s techniques might offer 
possibilities to improve or transform that capacity for communication.  The chapter 
concludes with the script of a short trial that I have created for the purposes of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Boal (1998) (Legislative) above n.16, p.7. 
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demonstrating Boal’s Forum method at work.  While the limitations of the PhD thesis in 
written form prevent me on this occasion from physically showing the work in action, I 
do the very best that I can to communicate its power within those parameters.  Thus, 
my trial has Forum devices intercut with trial dialogue and where I expect the 
interventions to be I have ‘rough-cut’ them to include Joker/Spect-actor or Spect-
actor/Actor dialogue.  This hopefully allows the reader to assess the effect of the 
interventions, the use of the Joker and the transformation from passive observer 
(spectator) to active participant (spect-actor) in a criminal trial.  
4.2 The life and work of Augusto Boal 
Augusto Boal (1931-2009) was born in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and grew up under the 
dictatorship of Getúlo Vargas.19  In 1952, after graduating with a chemistry degree, he 
spent a year studying theatre at Columbia University, New York.20  At that time Boal 
was influenced by a variety of artists and playwrights who included Abdias Nascimento, 
founder of the Teatro Experimental de Negro, who introduced him to the black 
literature and theatre of Harlem, and through those meetings and his subsequent work 
at the Teatro de Arena São Paulo his own techniques and theories began to take 
shape.21  Following his studies in New York he returned to Brazil in 1955 and took up the 
post of in-house director and writer at the Arena.  It was this work, and his 
experimentation with different theatre techniques that would eventually lead to his 
Theatre of the Oppressed and it was in this early work that the foundations for the 
Joker as we now know him were laid.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 For an in-depth look at the political climate of the time see Bethell, L. (1994), On Democracy in 
Brazil Past and Present, London, Institute of Latin American Studies generally and more 
specifically at pp.7-11 for particular reference to the Vargas government. 
20 At the time the Brazilian government discriminated against the Arts and so for Boal to study in 
this area he needed continue his studies in science in order to be supported financially, thus he 
concurrently studied a postgraduate degree in chemistry. 
21 The Teatro de Arena was founded by José Renato.  The importance of the work at the Arena 
has been widely recognised as contributing to the development of Brazilian theatre.  
(Subsequently referred to as the Arena). 
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Undoubtedly, the work that was done at the Arena was amongst the most influential at 
the time in Brazil.  When it opened in 1955 it did so as a theatre-in-the-round with the 
intention that the company would create Brazilian theatre.22  The creation of such 
theatre was not the case for several reasons which included the lack of Brazilian scripts 
and an influx of foreign plays which were better suited to traditional proscenium arch 
theatres.23  In 1958, following a period of financial and artistic uncertainty the then 
artistic director, José Renato took a chance in directing a new play written by 
Gianfrancesco Guarnieri who was one of the young actors in the company.  The piece, 
Eles não usam black-tie (They Don’t Wear Black Tie) became synonymous with the 
change of direction at the Arena and it was shortly thereafter that Guarnieri and Boal 
collaborated on Zumbi which I discuss in more detail below.24  Essentially there were 
five stages of work for Boal at the Arena, each distinct in their style but it is with the 
fourth and fifth stages that I am most interested because it is there that we see the 
emergence of Boal’s Joker and his Forum Theatre.25   
In the fourth stage a series known as Arena Conta shows (Arena tells of…), also known 
as the Coringa plays (Joker plays), were produced.  The most important in terms of its 
communication of the text to the audience was Arena tells about Zumbi.26  This was 
written in 1965 by Guarnieri and Boal with music by Edu Lobo, was first performed in 
São Paulo in the same year.27  Zumbi was the piece that is intrinsically linked with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See for example Boal’s own account of his aspirations at the Arena in Boal, A. (2001), Hamlet 
and the Baker’s Son: My Life in Theatre and Politics, translated by Adrian Jackson and Candida 
Blaker, London and New York, Routledge at pp.141-157 (subsequently referred to in this 
chapter as Bakers Son). 
23 Boal (2001)(Bakers Son) above n.22. 
24 Boal (2001) (Bakers Son) above n.22. 
25 Stage one was the Realist (1956-8) stage where the work of Stanislavsky was explored in-depth.  
Stage two was known as Photography (1958-64) because the productions largely reflected the 
political climate on the streets of Brazil.  Stylistically, Stanislavsky was still the main influence.  
The third stage at the Arena was known as the Nationalization of the Classics. 
26 Subsequently referred to as Zumbi.  This was a story which was based on an episode in 
seventeenth century Brazilian history when a colony of escaped slaves in Palmares, who 
resisted the Portuguese-Dutch troops trying to prevent a rebellion, were attacked and 
subsequently slaughtered by federal troops. 
27 Zumbi was followed in 1967 by Arena Conta Tiradentes and in 1971 by Arena Conta Bolivar. 
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work of Boal at the Arena at that time and it is in the development of the piece that we 
see the destruction of known theatre conventions and the development of both the 
Joker and the spect-actor.  The primary aim of Zumbi was the deconstruction of all the 
theatre conventions that had come to represent obstacles to the aesthetic development 
of the theatre.  It challenged theatre conventions by quite literally breaking down the 
barrier between theatre performer and theatre spectator through the integration of the 
Joker.  To that point the full integration of the Joker had not been experienced and as 
a result the developed integration of theatre spectator to become spect-actor had not 
yet been an experience of the theatre audience.  Thus, Zumbi destroyed empathy and 
identity with the character(s), and challenged audiences to become emotionless 
observers of the action.  Boal wanted to tell the story in real time and from the 
perspective of the Arena, its performers and its audience.  Crucially, therefore, the 
story was not narrated as if it already existed, it was narrated solely in relation to the 
narrator and, as we shall see when we look at the Joker in more detail below, it was the 
Joker who was the original narrator (although in Forum Theatre the scope for narration 
comes from each person in the theatre or playing space, because of the invitation to 
interact which is crucial in Forum pieces).  Thus, in terms of narration in relation to the 
narrator what I mean is that however many times the piece has been performed it will 
always, in Forum, be different and this is largely due to the re-acquaintance with 
performativity in the moment of the piece, by all of those in the room.  So, to be clear, 
through the Joker as the ‘embodiment of performativity’ we can see the spect-actors 
and the audience aware that they too are in the performance and so the meaning in 
each show is a different meaning for each person in that moment and, as Schutzman 
says, “across time.”28  The use of the Joker as a technique of performance, to my 
knowledge, is still only used in Forum Theatre performances and should not be confused 
with productions where there is a narrator who acts as communicator of information but 
as a third party only.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Schutzmann, M. ‘Joker runs wild’ in Cohen-Cruz, J. and Schutzman, M. (eds.) (2006), A Boal 
Companion, Dialogues on theatre and cultural politics, New York and Oxon, Routledge p.144. 
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Zumbi was without doubt the Arena’s greatest success, not only from an artistic and 
production viewpoint but also in terms of its impact on the audience.29  It was in Zumbi 
that we see a member of the audience become frustrated with the actor who – at the 
point of intervention – did not carry out her idea the way she wanted it and so she 
(without prompt) got up and came to the playing area to physically show the actor what 
she meant him to do.  At this point Boal recognised the need for the Joker as the person 
or device that could offer a solution to the challenges of creating a revolutionary 
theatrical aesthetic.  This was so because it was the Joker who would act as the vehicle 
through whom the spectator could voice his reaction to what was happening on stage 
(to the Protagonist) and as a result, alter the path more positively for the Protagonist.  
Thus, developing the Joker as an autonomous participant allowed for a more nuanced 
development of the form we now know as Forum Theatre as well as greater clarity in 
terms of understanding.  With the emergence of the Joker came the emergence of the 
spect-actor and these two characters form the basis of a Forum Theatre piece.  Before 
looking in more detail at those elements, and to add a little more depth to the nature 
of his work, I now draw a brief picture of the core works in Boal’s scholarship.   
In the 1960s Brazil endured two military juntas, the first in 1964 and the second in 
1968. By 1967 many people working in the Arts in Brazil “had become targets of 
aggression and censorship enforced by the military and its sympathetic right-wing 
groups.”30  In 1971 Augusto Boal was arrested by the military in São Paulo who cited his 
theatre work as “crimes against Brazil.”31  As a result the Department of Political and 
Social Order imprisoned and tortured him for three months before he was released, 
thanks “in part to the outcry from many artists around the world who signed a petition 
against his imprisonment.”32  On his release and despite being acquitted of the charges 
against him, Boal was forced into exile in Argentina and it was during this time that he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Boal (2001) (Bakers Son) above n.22, p.241. 
30 Babbage (2004) above n.2, pp.14-15. 
31 Babbage (2004) above n.2, p.15. 
32 Babbage (2004) above n.2, pp.15-16. 
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developed his understanding of power relationships between the performers and the 
audience in a theatre.  From that understanding came his development of the dialogue 
between performer and audience member, a fundamental strand of his Theatre of the 
Oppressed, an interactive theatre style which, as we have seen, encourages 
communication through participation.  Just as Freire argued for dialogic education as an 
essential element for the emancipation from the oppression of hierarchical education, 
so too did Boal argue for dialogic interactive theatre as a means to empower the 
oppressed of Brazil through action and interaction.  It is from that political climate that 
I now contextualise his key texts starting with The Theatre of the Oppressed.   
Boal argues in Theatre of the Oppressed that “all theatre is necessarily political,” and 
in this context Boal is using the word political more fundamentally than that of party 
politics. 33  For him ‘political’ “implies not a specific position or set of attitudes but the 
fact of connectedness to the system by which a society is organised and governed.”34  
Thus, his reference to all theatre being necessarily political is meant to convey the idea 
that theatre affects the way that society could be organised as well as reflecting the 
way that it is organised and this is possible through dynamic engagement with the 
systems underpinning it.  In Theatre of the Oppressed, Boal is trying to show both an 
analysis of the historical journey of theatre as a process of domination as well as to set 
out a “manifesto” for a new type of theatre. 35  His argument is not that theatre is 
necessarily an instrument of propaganda, as I said earlier, but that it is “a training 
ground for action.”36 
Following the publication of Theatre of the Oppressed, Boal spent twelve years teaching 
the approach to theatre practitioners in Paris and in so doing he established a number 
of centres for the Theatre of the Oppressed.  In 1986, following the removal of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Boal, A. (1979), Theatre of the Oppressed, translated by Charles A & Maria-Odilia Leal McBride, 
London, Pluto Press (subsequently referred to as Oppressed). 
34 Babbage (2004) above n.2, p.39 [emphasis original]. 
35 Babbage (2004) above n.2, p.40. 
36 Babbage (2004) above n.2, p.40. 
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military junta in Brazil, Boal returned home to Rio de Janeiro where he lived and 
worked until his death in 2009.  In that time he established the major Center for the 
Theatre of the Oppressed as well as establishing over twelve companies which 
developed community-based performances.  The vehicles through which these 
community performances were presented were Forum Theatre and Image Theatre.  
Where the centre point of Forum Theatre is the presentation of a short scene which 
represents problems reflective of a given community, Image Theatre uses the 
individuals involved to sculpt relationships between people, emotions or situations 
which are sometimes accompanied by a narrative and which is developed ostensibly in a 
workshop setting.  Finally, Boal ran as a candidate for Vereador of Rio de Janeiro, 
similar to the seat of City Councillor.  He won the seat in 1993 and whilst in office he 
integrated Theatre of the Oppressed into the political arena and from that came his 
Legislative Theatre.  When he was in office he used the theatre as his method for 
effecting change, thus by using Forum Theatre he was able to let the constituents 
express their feelings about what was wrong in their communities and it was those 
representations and discussions that formed the basis of the legislation and as he said in 
Chambers: 
“Hamlet says in his famous speech to the actors that theatre is a mirror in which 
may be seen the true image of nature, of reality.  I wanted to penetrate this 
mirror, to transform the image I saw in it and to bring that transformed image 
back to reality: to realize the image of my desire.  I wanted it to be possible for 
the spect-actors in Forum Theatre to transgress, to break the conventions, to 
enter into the mirror of a theatrical fiction, rehearse forms of struggle and then 
return to reality with the images of their desires.  This discontent was the 
genesis of the Legislative Theatre, in which the citizen makes the law through 
the legislator.37  
I now move on to explore the key concepts of his Theatre of the Oppressed and I begin 
with his Forum Theatre.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Boal (1998) (Legislative) above n.16, pp.9-10. 
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4.2.1 Key concepts of Theatre of the Oppressed 
Forum Theatre is an interactive style of theatre where there are both actors (those 
taking the roles in the playing arena) and spectators (those watching the piece from the 
surrounding area).  The subject of the piece is usually centred on people who are living 
in some sort of oppressive situation and the cast are made up of people from those 
communities.  For example, Headlines Theatre’s latest production was focused on 
people living with homelessness and was the biggest piece of interactive Forum Theatre 
that has ever taken place, with on-line Jokers facilitating interactions from spectators 
(and spect-actors) participating on-line around the globe.38  In a Forum Theatre piece, 
which is also known as the Model, the central character, (or Protagonist) starts off in a 
good place, that is to say he is in a positive position in his life.  As the piece unfolds he 
meets a series of obstacles.  At each of the obstacles he makes decisions which are 
negative for him with the result that by the end of the piece he is in a very negative 
position.  For example, the piece may have as its subject drug addiction.  The 
Protagonist starts in a place where he is not a drug user, he has a job, he has a house 
and so on.  In the course of the piece he makes a series of decisions which see him 
move towards an end in which he is addicted to a substance and to feed the habit he 
has sold everything he owns, he has lost his house, he has alienated himself from all 
support networks and, put bluntly, he has nowhere else to turn.  Boal is keen to point 
out that at that end point the Protagonist should be left with no options whatsoever.  
Then the Joker steps in and addresses the spectators.  He tells them that the piece is 
going to be re-run and he tells them of their options in the re-run.  He makes clear to 
the spectators that they have the chance to shout STOP when they have an idea for a 
more positive outcome for the Protagonist.  When a spectator shouts STOP, the Joker 
steps in to facilitate the spectator’s transition from spectator, to spect-actor.  Boal 
introduced the term spect-actor to demonstrate his passion for teaching people to act 
as well as to draw together any gaps in status that may be at play by the use of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 http://www.headlinestheatre.com/pastwork.htm [live at 03/07/2013]. 
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engagement in the issues as well as a critical analysis of them.  The spect-actor then 
improvises with the other actors with his idea to deal with the obstacle more positively.  
This is known as the Anti-Model.  Throughout all of this the Joker is the facilitator, 
whose role is to enable the dialogue between the spect-actor and the other cast 
members.  His role is also to keep the spect-actor on point and to guard against him 
going off on an irrelevant tangent. 
Thus the Joker is the person who, on the one hand, performs the commentary for the 
production spontaneously and, on the other, and probably more vitally for our purposes, 
stitches the scenes together, facilitates interventions, and offers supplementary 
information where needed for the spect-actors.39  The Joker both instigates and 
facilitates dialogue and, just as Freire put a great deal of emphasis on the importance 
of praxis, so too did Boal see the real benefit in acknowledging “the inseparability of 
reflection and action, theory and practice.”40  This is clear to see in his use of the Joker 
as both the narrator who addresses the spect-actor directly, and also a ‘wild card’ who 
is able to jump in and out of character, in any role, at any time, thus the versatility of 
this person should not be underestimated.  It is essential that Jokers remain impartial at 
all times when participating in the Forum scene and people trained as Jokers expect 
and accept this as an integral part of their task.  There is always scope however to 
perceive the role of the Joker as a negative one, being regarded as, for example, the 
manipulator able to abuse his skills and so use them to negative effect.  I discuss this 
later when forecasting the objections to my suggestions. 
The Joker should not be the controller of the Forum piece – he is only the facilitator of 
the interventions.41  Therefore, he takes control of the situation only in so far as he is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The spontaneity in Forum is what distinguishes it from other theatre forms.  Moreover the un-
rehearsed element both adds to the dynamic and is one of the few styles of performance art 
which directly impacts on the spectator and is directly influenced by the spectator. 
40 Schutzman (2006) above n.28. 
41 Boal (1979) (Oppressed) above n.33, p.178 and Schutzmann above n.28, pp.143-5. 
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sensitive to, and reflective of, the spect-actor’s voices.42  He does not at any point 
intervene in the Forum piece and so, if the spectators do not intervene, the piece will 
progress to its original conclusion.  Finally, he should be acting in accordance with the 
ethos which underpins Boal’s Forum Theatre which is that in situations where people 
are oppressed, lines of communication are opened, thus enabling the oppressed to have 
a platform on which their voice can be heard and their opinions taken on board when 
considering their path forward.43  
Whilst each Joker may have his own personality and way of approaching the various 
interventions, it is nevertheless imperative that they adhere to the unspoken, but 
obligatory rules of responsible Jokering.44  First Jokers should avoid all behaviour which 
could manipulate or influence an audience.  They should not draw conclusions and they 
must always open the possible conclusions to debate.  They should avoid ‘yes’/‘no’ 
answers, instead enabling debate by the use of open questions in the third party.45  
Second, Jokers should never give their personal opinion and should not make any 
judgements or decisions.46  The Joker should constantly relay any doubts which arise on 
the stage47 back to the spectators by asking such questions as “does this work or not?” 
or “Is this right or wrong?” so that it is the spectators that will always make the final 
decision at the intervention points.  This principle is especially important when the 
Joker deals with spect-actor interventions because without sensitive jokering the 
interventions could turn into debates which, as I have already said, are neither the aim 
nor the recommendation for a Forum scene.  Jokers should also be on the look-out for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See for example Diamond, D. (2007), Theatre for Living the art and science of community-based 
dialogue, Trafford Publishing from p.172. (subsequently referred to in the chapter as Living) 
43 See for example Boal (1979) (Oppressed) above n.33, when he discusses the need for the Joker 
in chapter 5 pp.174-6. 
44 The information on the skills of Jokering has been developed through talking directly with a 
practising Joker who learned her skills in workshops with Augusto Boal and Adrian Jackson 
therefore to give precise citations is not possible however, for the standard theory see Blatner, 
A and Weiner, (editors) (2007), Interactive & Improvisational Drama: Varieties of Applies 
Theatre and Performance, Lincoln NE, i.Universe Books, chapter 21. 
45 Discussion with practising Joker and see also Boal (1979) (Oppressed) above n.33, chapter 5. 
46 Discussion with practising Joker. 
47 Or in the game if it is a Theatre of the Oppressed workshop. 
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‘magic’ or ‘inadequate’ solutions.  For example, sometimes the spect-actors will stop 
the action and offer solutions which are unrealistic and / or unattainable.48  In such 
situations the Joker should step in and crucially first ask the audience what they think 
rather than highlighting that the spect-actor has intervened with a ‘magic’ or 
‘inadequate’ solution as clearly this may only serve to undermine the confidence of the 
spect-actor.49  The conduct and physical stance of the Joker are also very important 
factors in the communication.  Whilst he may be tempted to sit next to the spect-actor, 
this should be avoided because it can be intimidating or demobilizing and could be 
extremely counter-productive when trying to encourage interaction, communication and 
participation.  Finally, the Joker is there to help the spectators gather and formulate 
their thoughts and through question asking and addressing their doubts he can guide 
them to their actions which, ideally, can see new lines of communication and ways 
forward for them.  The training for the Joker is, by-and-large, transmitted orally 
through work-shopping with other Jokers and Theatre of the Oppressed practitioners. As 
such there is no official rule book or guidelines to which Jokers must adhere.  Like many 
things, the learning and teaching of such skills comes from building relationships with 
practitioners in the field and working with the skills at a practical level rather than 
theoretic discussion of the sort which may be more likely in other fields.  
In Mady Schutzman’s analysis of the Joker she highlights that there is no place in 
Theatre of the Oppressed for a trickster who is disguised as a Joker.50  She argues that 
this type of character, who remains on the periphery, acts only for his own gain, is loyal 
only to himself, and acts for political gain rather than common beliefs should be 
avoided.  This is so because it is Boal’s Joker who has learned the rules and should 
therefore adhere to them in order to avoid any negative outcomes.  Schutzmann also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Boal, A. (1992), Games for Actors and Non-Actors, translated by Adrian Jackson, London and 
New York, Routledge, p.234 (subsequently referred to as Games) and discussion with 
practising Joker. 
49 For a more in-depth discussion of the nuances of the magic solutions see Boal, (1992) (Games) 
above n.48, p.233. 
50 Schutzman (2006) above n.28, pp.133-145. 
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suggests that there is no place for the Joker who stands on the periphery and refuses 
permanency, but I would argue that that is not such a bad thing, and certainly in a 
criminal trial I would argue that this could prove to be invaluable.  Overall, the Joker 
reminds us that the situation we are trying to function in cannot be understood in 
isolation and, as I shall demonstrate, this may be very pertinent and applicable in a 
criminal trial as we see him building bridges of dialogue to enable clear understanding 
for all of the trial players.  On that note then, I move now to consider the function of 
the spect-actor before assessing the relationship between him and the Joker. 
Boal was passionate about creating democracy and the way that he saw to do that was 
by empowering the oppressed.  To this end, he viewed the theatre as a language that 
every single person, both actors and non-actors, has the right to use and, just as “actors 
talk, move, dress to suit the setting, express ideas, reveal passions […] so too do 
everyday people in their everyday lives.  The only difference is that actors are conscious 
that they are using the language of theatre, and are thus better able to turn it to their 
advantage.”51  Therefore, Boal believed that the key to enabling non-actors to use 
language to their advantage was in teaching them.  This is the practical root of the 
Theatre of the Oppressed techniques, particularly those used in the workshops which 
include Forum Theatre.  Boal says that there are no passive spectators in the Theatre of 
the Oppressed, arguing that people are active in the fact that they have come to take 
part and that participation is up to them.52  Crucially for our purposes when thinking 
later about the trial, the difference between the passive juror and the passive Boal 
spectator is that the former does not have the option to become active whereas the 
latter is positively encouraged to act.  Indeed when interviewed Boal said, “I want the 
spectator to act not watch. It is obscene for a human being who is fully capable of doing 
to merely watch. The first principle in my Theatre of the Oppressed is liberation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Boal (1992) (Games) above n.48, p.xxx. 
52 Boal (1992) (Games) above n.48, p.238. 
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spectator.”53  The word “spect-actor” should therefore be understood both in practical 
and theoretical terms.  With reference to its practical application we see it as a feature 
of Theatre of the Oppressed workshops as well as Forum pieces – when the spectators 
enter at the intervention they become the “spect-actor” – the term based on the words 
spectator and actor.  In theoretical terms the “spect-actor” is an acknowledgement by 
Boal of Freire’s critical pedagogy.  Based in the development of the critical 
consciousness, with the result that as the “spect-actor” is encouraged to engage in the 
action he, or the other participants, may enact, he is also encouraged by the Joker to 
be critical and to analyse the action.  Therefore he steps back and sees the whole 
picture and not simply the part that he is involved in at that particular moment.  What 
we can see begin to emerge is a very interesting dynamic whereby the “spect-actor” is 
being fully encouraged to commit to his part as the actor, whilst simultaneously he is 
mindful of his spectator status.  Ideally, the participant would give equal weight and 
commitment to both of his roles, however, in practical terms (very important for our 
purposes later in the chapter) full engagement occurs when the spectator is actively 
engaged in the action of the Forum or the games or structured exercises of the 
workshop techniques.  When the Joker is included in the scene the dynamic is once 
again changed; indeed he, by virtue of his commentary and interviews (in the 
workshop), disrupts conventions or norms by switching roles.  I discuss this in more 
detail in the section to follow but, to clarify, the emergence of the “spect-actor” is a 
demonstration by Boal of his deep passion that every person should be taught to act and 
the way that he saw to do that was through full and frank engagement in an issue and 
then a critical and self-reflexive analysis.  This issue of the spectator being encouraged 
to act and actively participate in the action is something that I address later in the 
chapter, when I consider the possibilities for and the attitudes towards participation in 
the courtroom.  I should highlight at this stage however that the critical difference as I 
see it between the criminal trial and the Boal Forum is that in the former there is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Selman, J. (1978), ‘Augusto Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed,’ Canadian Theater Review, 
Vol.19, summer, 113 [emphasis original]. 
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currently very little room for participation whereas in the latter it is very clear that 
there is every opportunity for participation within the limits of the Forum itself.  In 
many ways it is safe to say that the Joker and the spect-actor each rely on the other to 
function properly.  Ostensibly the Joker lies redundant until the spectator takes on the 
role of the spect-actor and only then can we see the transformations occurring, but also 
begging the question – what if the spectators never stop the action? 
 
Boal was very clear that people cannot remain spectators when in a Forum Theatre 
session and he agreed with Cuban poet José Julián Martí Pérez (1853-1895) who said 
“Doing is the best way of saying.”54  He was not saying that participation should only be 
regarded as such if it is demonstrated overtly and as such he recognised that those 
taking the time to attend a Forum Theatre piece were participating by virtue of that 
attendance alone.  Indeed he said of Forum Theatre audiences that no-one could:	  
“remain a ‘spectator’ in the negative sense of the word.  It’s impossible.  In 
Forum Theatre, all the spect-actors know that they can stop the show whenever 
they want.  They know that they can shout ‘Stop!’ and voice their opinion in a 
democratic, theatrical, concrete way, on stage.  Even if they stay on the 
sidelines, even if they watch from a distance, even if they choose to say nothing, 
that choice is already a form of participation.  In order to say nothing, the spect-
actor must decide to say nothing – which is already acting.”55 
Having thus far drawn a broad picture of the work of Boal and the key concepts in his 
Theatre of the Oppressed, I now consider some of the limitations and developments of 
his work. 
4.2.2 Limitations and developments of Augusto Boal’s work 
So far I have identified the key techniques in Forum Theatre and I have shown how they 
can be used to transform communication in a theatre setting first, by breaking down the 
barriers between the spectator and the actor and second, by facilitating the input from 
the spectator, we can see a transformation at the end of the Forum piece.  
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55 Boal (1992) (Games) above n.48, p.244. 
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Additionally, by using Boal’s techniques we see the transition from passive spectator to 
active, engaged and involved spect-actor.  Whether or not the barriers discussed so far 
are actual or perceived is a matter of subjective opinion or interpretation, but the fact 
remains that through Boal’s methods we see a coming together of the two and as a 
result the meaning of participation changes from something that someone else may do, 
to something that everyone can do if they wish to.  By looking now at some of the 
limitations and subsequent development of his work I aim to give as broad a perspective 
as possible of it, before proposing to integrate it into the criminal trial.  I begin with the 
limitations that Boal saw of and in his own work before looking to some of the 
constraints observed by others of his work.  I have already highlighted that Theatre of 
the Oppressed encompasses all of Boal’s work, however, given that my thesis is 
concerned predominantly with his Forum method, I have contained the discussion at this 
point to focus on that aspect alone.   
First, Boal recognised that Forum will not be appropriate in every single situation.  He 
cites a variety of examples where it would not be appropriate, each one Forumed in an 
actual workshop situation: where a man is trapped in a gas chamber moments from his 
death and the executioner opens a cyanide capsule; when a young girl is raped by four 
men when standing alone in a deserted subway station; or when a woman is beaten by 
her husband.  In such situations Boal is clear that there is practically nothing that can 
be done to bring a different ending.  “The girl can run and call the station-master.  The 
woman can scream.  The man can call for help.  Then what?”56  Essentially, what 
differentiates these stories from Forum scenes is that these are about physical 
aggression and so the solutions in the Forum scene primarily lie in physical responses.  
Thus, such situations are not fitted to Forum Theatre because they “do not present 
oppression against which one can struggle but aggression which one cannot evade.”57  
This is a very important point to clarify given that in section 4.5 below the reader will 
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57 Boal (1992) (Games) above n.48, p.225. 
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see that I have chosen a murder as the subject of my fictitious trial which, by any 
standards involves physical aggression.  In this respect, it would be understandable to 
challenge my choice of crime, indeed, to challenge my entire argument for using Forum 
and the Joker in the trial process.  However, my point is not to ask the jury to 
participate in changing what has already happened (or not) in the crime charged.  I am 
not suggesting that the jury deliver the ‘magic’ answers, but rather I am asking them to 
participate in real time in the trial and where they have difficulty in understanding, 
that they are empowered through Boal’s theories to participate with the point of 
enhancing their own understanding of the language that, hitherto they may have found 
difficult.  
The next thing to consider is whether it is necessary to come to a solution when in a 
Forum scene, something that Boal was undecided about.  Essentially the solution is not 
the primary objective, but rather, as Boal was keen to highlight, it is better to have a 
good debate than to come to a good solution.  Thus through the dialogue came the 
debate and the critical analysis of the peoples’ situation by the people.  In turn came 
real understanding and real solutions for action and progress which were rooted in those 
peoples’ ideas rather than rooted in what was being told or dictated to them.58  I 
acknowledge, of course, that the trial must come to a solution, however I would argue 
that through integrating these methods we can develop a system whereby jurors are 
given the opportunity to clarify their understanding before coming to their conclusion. 
One of the most important problems encountered when using Boal work is that in the 
Forum pieces there is usually only one protagonist and therefore the scope for 
intervention is necessarily limited.  This is something which is discussed and thereafter 
developed by David Diamond.  Whilst Diamond is renowned for his Forum Theatre 
productions, with the influence of Boal very plain to see, he is nonetheless critical of 
some aspects of Boal’s work, viewing the world from a social systems theory lens as 
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developed by Niklas Luhmann.59  In this regard therefore systems theory “recognises 
that the binary poles of oppressor and oppressed are actually part of the same large 
organism living in some kind of dysfunction.”60  What Diamond is saying, then, is that 
people are not prisoners of the structures in which they live.  “Nature teaches us that 
structure is created in patterns of behaviour – not the other way round.  Working 
politically to alter the structures in which we live without changing the behaviour that 
creates those structures is futile.”61  Diamond in his Theatre for Living sees the 
communities that he works with as living organisms, and so when they create the plays 
they do so not just to challenge and change the structure (as Boal’s work does 
predominantly) but to change the behaviour which creates the structure.  In this 
respect Diamond challenges Boal at a fundamental level.  He stresses the need for 
multiple interventions thus allowing for a greater scope for the spect-actor.  This is very 
different from Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed, where Boal stressed that the “spect-
actor” should be a person who has had the same, or similar, experience as the 
character, either by identity or by analogy.  As a result then, in Diamond’s Theatre for 
Living, he literally “broadens out the invitation of who can replace who in a Forum 
Theatre event.”62  Probably the most obvious example of this broadening out is seen in 
Theatre for Living’s 2004 production Practising Democracy which was created and 
performed by people living in chronic poverty.  The entire play was structured to have 
no obvious oppressors or oppressed, thus the interventions could be with anyone, by 
anyone and about anything.  What this does therefore is it breaks the boundaries of 
Boal’s work quite significantly, taking it to a new level in which all of those involved 
could be challenged, perhaps to levels that they had not expected.   
If we consider the broadening aspect of Diamond’s work as a further way in which to 
engage jurors in the courtroom I suggest that we could, ideally, develop communication 
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around a hybrid of the work of both Boal and Diamond as a starting point.  I have 
continually suggested that lines for communication must be enabled to facilitate clarity 
of understanding by jurors whilst a trial is in progress, therefore, by using Diamond’s 
extended Forum style we may be able to encompass more individuals into the 
communication of the trial thus allowing for multiple points for intervention which 
could lead to enhanced understanding.   I have already indicated that I do not suggest 
extending the interventions to include questioning the accused because, in my opinion, 
that would undermine the ethos of Boal’s work.  Indeed, if we accept at the most basic 
of level that an accused person is innocent until proven guilty, together with the idea 
that justice is achieved through a trial process, then essentially the accused is in a 
position of oppression as he stands trial.  Thus, if we were to open the floor to 
investigations and / or questions from the jury this could be regarded as further 
oppressing the accused, something which undermines the work of both Boal and 
Diamond and is something that I am keen to avoid.   
Boal’s Joker asks that a problem be investigated through performance rather than as a 
truth to be demonstrated in performance and the integration of his Joker as facilitator 
enables that investigation.  I suggest that we integrate the Joker in this way to develop 
scope for juror participation and I argue that the beauty of the Joker in this context is 
two-fold.  First he opens avenues for interaction, both physical and oral for all of the 
trial participants.  Second, not only can those trial participants test their own 
understanding of the proceedings or clarify their interpretation of the evidence and 
legal terminology as and when they need to, but at the same time the on-lookers, for 
example, the researchers or analysts can see and hear where these things are 
understood and where the understanding strays from the legally expected and accepted 
norms.  Whilst part of the role of the jury should perhaps be to challenge these norms 
and their application, there still remains the issue of when their attention in the trial, 
or their understanding of it, becomes so detached as to render serious concern over the 
formulation of their verdict.  I should however point out that I do not see that there is 
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one right way or one right decision that the jury should be expected to achieve, but I do 
believe that the process through which the jury formulate their verdict should come 
from a positive point where they are able to participate rather than a negative or 
neutral point whereby either they are not, or they perceive the situation to be just 
that.  Ultimately therefore, the integration of Boal’s Joker could be a key to breaking 
new ground both in the way that we carry out future research as well as a device for 
use by juries in live trials.  For example, not only could integrating a Joker be the key 
to understanding better how the criminal trial works more generally, it could also 
enable the jury to understand the trial in a more organic and critically reflective way.  
Finally, the Joker could turn out to be the link to understanding, with a little more 
clarity, what works, and what does not in respect of advancing research in this area.  
Therefore, in an ideal situation, his part, and so the subsequent participation between 
the other trial players, may aid in the creation of a fresh new perspective in his part of 
the justice system which has been the subject of debate for several decades.   
 
I have already demonstrated in chapter two that participation by the jury has long been 
regarded by many as crucial for a variety of reasons which includes that they bring a 
sense of legitimacy to the trial that it would not otherwise have.63  I have suggested 
that this might be due to a variety of reasons which includes their ability to reflect 
community standards or their superior fact-finding ability.  Whilst these arguments are 
valid in themselves they none-the-less hinge on the assumption that the jury are 
participants – in real time - in the trial process, something that I do not believe to be 
the case.  Indeed, I have argued from the start of this project that whilst the jury are 
undeniably present in the trial process their presence does not equate to their 
participation within the current trial format.  Thus, to make my position very clear I 
shall now unpack the concept of participation before drawing a picture of what I 
forecast it could look like and why I suggest that, with the inclusion of Boal’s Theatre of 
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the Oppressed, my ideas could amount to true and meaningful participation for the jury 
as the trial progresses.   
 
4.3 To what extent do the parties participate currently and what solutions 
for enhanced participation have been advanced to date? 
In chapter one I drew attention to the different forms of participation in a very general 
sense and then to the types of participation which, I argue, are a feature of the trial as 
it is currently structured.  In this section I look more closely at the different parties in 
the trial and to the scope for their participation before then looking to the ideas which 
have been put to enhance juror participation within the criminal trial.   
“When an accused is charged with a criminal offence […] he is called to answer a 
criminal charge brought against him, and if he is criminally responsible, to account for 
his conduct.”64  This model of the trial dictates the format of the proceedings and 
entrenched within that are the places for the different voices to be heard through 
participating in oral form.  The rules of procedure currently dictate that the 
prosecution makes its case and the defence then follows with its account.  As part of 
the trial, the judge may interject as can the jury but as we have come to understand 
their scope to so do is limited.  The witnesses must wait their turn and their 
participation is pared down to answering carefully constructed lines of questioning, 
delivered in closed-question format, thus forcing little more than single word answers.  
There is no room for spontaneous dialogue, no scope for auditory clarification and very 
little space for communication outwith of the procedural norms.  I should remind the 
reader however that this is a conceptual thesis and so I do not claim to offer ideas 
which I foresee being implemented practically anytime soon.  
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In this format we can see clearly that whilst it is in progress, the legal professionals are 
obviously participants in the trial and not only is their participation active, we can also 
see them control the participation of the others through their choices in narrative.  
Their intentions for taking part may be different at a nuanced level but, prima facie, 
the point of their participation is to win the case.  The Judge is also an active 
participant in the trial with his role in an adversarial system often defined as the non-
partisan over-seer or umpire.  It is also fair to say that the accused may choose to be a 
proactive participant, as I have highlighted in reference to Duff et.al’s 2007 Trial on 
Trial above, although, more typically we see him participating in a rather limited way 
by only giving evidence in his trial – this is not essential but it is certainly an option 
should he choose to take it.  Members of the public and members of the press 
participate proactively in asserting their choice to attend the trial for their own reasons 
which may range from general interest to securing a broadsheet headline.  Those latter 
categories of people are only able to participate passively, but their presence is 
nonetheless considered as participation in the general sense and their choice to so do is 
a proactive one.  What links the accused and the members of the public and press is 
that whilst they may not ‘be heard’ in the courtroom, their participation in the process 
is self-evident.  Generally, then, it is my opinion that those who actively participate in 
the trial process can be narrowed down to the legal professionals acting on behalf of 
their clients, the judge and the witnesses.  I have mentioned that the public and press 
may too proactively participate but this does not bear any relation to the verdict and 
there is a very strong argument to say that - like the jury - their participation can be 
pared back to mere presence.  
 
When looking now to the extent of juror participation, first I reiterate my opinion that 
whilst it is so often assumed that the jury are participants in the trial, I do not consider 
this to be so because I do not equate their physical presence with their participation in 
the process.  Indeed, in my opinion, the current level of their participation does not 
reflect the importance of their role causing me to question why their positive and 
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fruitful participation seems to be regarded as a norm within the current process.  
However, if it is argued that that is not the case in a practical sense, we cannot avoid it 
being so as a reference in the language of the research as I have continued to stress 
throughout this thesis. 
 
The first thing to say is that contemporary juries are, ostensibly, reactive participants in 
the process and this is clear from the start when a prospective juror must react to their 
summons.  They must appear at the courthouse and they must adhere to the rules of 
that process.  Except in certain circumstances, they must wait to be called and if 
empanelled they must then play their part, passively, according to the rules of the 
process over which they have little or no control.  At this stage therefore the extent to 
which they can participate meaningfully is severely limited.   
 
Second, when empanelled as members of the jury, their part is most definitely passive 
and once again I argue here that what we see is not meaningful participation but rather 
a state where the jury are merely present in a passive role.  In chapter two I highlighted 
the core research projects which suggest that there are several failings in the system of 
trial by jury if when it comes time for them to retire to consider their verdict they are 
unclear about such fundamental aspects as the meaning of the instructions or what to 
base their verdict on and I argue that this may be down to the fact that they are in this 
reactive, passive role.  I argue therefore that if jury understanding is to be brought to 
the attention of the court, it should be the jury who instigate that and they should be 
permitted to so do as the trial is in progress.  Only then may we begin to see the 
transition from juror presence to juror participation and only then may we see the ideal 
of participation realised in a practical sense.   
 
Of course, at the crucial moment when they must deliver their verdict we see one of 
them at least in an active position but as a general rule their part, as a unit, could not 
be considered as anything other than passive / reactive and even when the foreman 
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actively delivers the verdict, he does so from a reactive standpoint.  Thus, when we 
strip everything away and consider the extent of jury participation, I suggest that there 
is very little to persuade that juror participation is a practical reality of the trial.   
 
Indeed, none of the material that I have explored has made suggestions which amount 
to true juror participation as I have just described.  Moreover, I have said that I can see 
a contradiction at play in the trial and its analysis in as much as, if there is any 
participation by the jury I regard it only as reactive participation.  Thus, currently we 
see a framework that gives jurors permission to participate only in so far as they are 
allowed to ask questions at specific points in the process with those points dictated or 
directed by the legal professionals, or perhaps more accurately, a legal protocol which 
is seldom questioned.  I do not regard this as true participation on the part of the juror 
because, by definition, they adopt a static and passive stance until they are told that 
they can react otherwise.  I have also argued that I do not believe that the mere 
inclusion of lay people, in the form of these reactive, passive players either contributes 
to a sustainable system of trial by jury and nor do I believe it is enough to placate with 
the notion that without it, the system would be regarded as unfair.  I regard such 
arguments both as futile and limited.  Indeed, I say that whilst there is a wealth of 
critical literature on the subject of participation within a criminal trial, there is actually 
very little by way of practical, down-to-earth solutions to what appears to be a shared 
and real concern.  Therefore, I suggest that the jury be regarded as just one part of the 
whole with the acknowledgement that gaps in understanding should be an inevitable 
result of involving the public in a legal environment.  The participatory models that I 
suggest would therefore be equipped to support each situation and each juror and so 
aiming for a fixed or static model which could be compartmentalized or case 
transferable in its entirety is not only limiting in terms of expanding understanding for 
all involved but is also a little dull in terms of re-imagining the trial process.  Rather, 
what I regard as more interesting for our purposes is to reconsider our understanding of 
juror participation and in that journey to reassess the juror’s status, or position, or of 
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our assumptions of that person and how they may be altered in an instant with the use 
of the Joker within the parameters of the criminal trial.  These are points that I 
consider in more detail in chapter five.   
 
To clarify, my vision is not so much about seeing juror participation as a means to 
validate or justify individual trials or trials by jury more broadly, but rather to create a 
forum or framework within which each person who is required to be involved, both the 
professional and non-professional actors, are given every opportunity to participate 
with the collective focus of open understanding and clarity of thought throughout.  
Thus, before moving on to demonstrate my ideas for what participation could look like - 
first in respect of reimagined human interactions and second in regard to the physical 
interior designs and architectures of the courtroom space as something that is as 
malleable or adaptable as the human form itself - I shall conclude this section with 
looking to the solutions which have already been offered to enhance juror participation 
in criminal trials.   
 
In chapter three I argued that the proposals made, to date, to improve juror 
understanding all have weaknesses because the majority have tended to regard giving 
things to the jury in the form of glossaries of terms as adequate to enhance their 
understanding of the trial language.  Here I argue the same can be said of those 
proposals that have been made to try to improve juror participation primarily because 
they tend to endorse the stance that jurors are passive reactors by catering for a 
reactive style of participation (if indeed we can call it that) – one in which the legal 
professional or the researchers will provide the jury with, for example, an aide memoire 
or a glossary of terms.  Whilst I understand that some people may well respond to such 
solutions if they require them, they are nevertheless not proactive and nor are they all 
encompassing in that they only cater for those people who gain from such types of 
interaction.  Moreover, I question these types of responses because, whilst they may 
enhance understanding for some jurors and by extension be regarded as a solution to 
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juror understanding, they do not encourage or make space for proactive participation.  
Indeed, continuing to provide such extrinsic aids could result in pushing to the 
periphery, further alienating, or excluding entirely the jury because it could turn out 
that with ever more extrinsic aids, designed to promote participation for the jury in 
future could in fact be hampered rather than enhanced.  I do not mean however that 
providing for extrinsic aids should be disregarded altogether; on the contrary, as I have 
said in chapter three, I would argue that in an ideal situation a variety of provisions 
should be made available to suit all learning types and not just those who respond well 
to, for example, note-taking.  With that said however, it is very important to draw a 
distinction between supplying extrinsic aids for, for example, memory recall and 
presenting a framework or model within which all the trial participants can participate – 
the two, I have argued, both in chapter three and earlier in the current chapter, are 
very different and so care should be taken not to confuse them.   
 
I suggest that the importance of participation lies in the ability to take control of our 
understanding and so in a trial, if the verdict of the jury is to be indicative of 
knowledge, then I agree with Duff et.al who argue that that “knowledge is gained 
through a proper participatory process.”65  Indeed, if we dwell for the moment on the 
emphasis on the participatory process, we have already seen in my discussions in 
chapter three that the major inadequacy in the current solutions is that they are pre-
designed, and given to the jury when the legal professionals or administrators of the 
trial process see that they are necessary.  Therefore, we must call to question these 
processes which are regarded as being able to enhance juror participation because if 
they are one-sided then in my opinion they are doomed to fail.  Thus, until such time as 
there is a simple way for jurors to communicate - in as normal a way as possible - within 
the scope of the trial as it progresses, we will continue to struggle to understand both 
what they know and how they came to know it.  My position now is that the time has 
come to re-think those values on which we seem to keep relying and begin to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Duff et.al. (2007) Trial three above n.64, p.199. 
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acknowledge new ways to participate for the future.  I suggest that we aim for a 
position where there are a variety of forums for participation which are adaptable to 
each situation and where there is not the presumption that the mere act of providing 
extrinsic aids is the signal that participation has been achieved.  I now consider the 
ways in which my vision could become a reality. 
 
4.3.1 How can we achieve meaningful juror participation? 
I have made a case for why I think that meaningful participation is important, and now I 
consider how we could achieve that by exploring both what it could look like and who 
would be involved.  I suggest the first thing to do is to try to change our mind-sets to 
consider what shape(s) participation should or could take in the trial process.  In that 
shift we will hopefully be drawn away from continually gauging juror participation in 
terms of what aides they have been given and how they coped with them, or from being 
satisfied with the fact that they are, in theory at least, given the opportunity to ask 
questions, with that opportunity being regarded as participation in itself.  Rather, my 
position is that we could learn much more about the jury if we consider, as valuable, 
practical and realistic solutions, more proactive forms of participation, perhaps even 
being so bold as to suggest placing the onus for understanding on the jury and by that I 
mean to encourage them first to realise their own potential and second to empower 
them to speak out when they do not understand the process or proceedings.  This is a 
technique that we saw in Freire’s work and which I discussed in the introduction to 
chapter three and which I discuss in more detail in chapter five when I contextualise the 
work discussed only in theory to that point.  Ultimately jurors have the capacity to 
understand in their everyday lives and when they do not understand the automatic and 
normal course of action is to seek clarity.  The same scope should be enabled in a 
criminal trial with the first step being to integrate the jury and regard them as active 
participants in the process rather than, as now, using them as an extra part of the 
process.  Thus if my suggestions were to become a part of criminal trials in the future 
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the benefit would be two-fold:  first, we may begin to understand the jury more fully 
and second, by providing a space for them (i.e. by drawing them in), the jury may 
understand the language of the trial with a little more clarity.  
 
I acknowledged earlier that I understand fully that the fact that jurors may ask 
questions is regarded by many as a form of participation and I agree with that in 
principle.  However, it should be clear from what I have just said that I question the 
way in which this process occurs, the circuitous route that must be taken to gain 
clarity,66 and I conclude that there must be a way to integrate them in a more down to 
earth and normal way.  Therefore, I continue to argue that the participation which is 
currently available to jurors is not participation, but rather a complicated way of asking 
questions which serves only to exclude or demean them further because they are forced 
into a subservient situation where they must, quite literally, wait until they have 
permission to speak.  Whilst I am not advocating a ‘free-for-all’ in terms of people 
asking questions, I am saying that if there really is to be meaningful participation by the 
jury that there needs to be a seismic shift in the mind-set around what participation is.  
The jury are told by a judge at the beginning of a trial that they play a very important 
part in the process, but until such time as there is space for them to ‘play’ in the sense 
that they actively participate, then those words, in my opinion shall remain just words 
with little or no substance.    
 
What then do I propose to tip the balance in favour of true participation?  Put very 
simply, my idea of participation based on Boal’s theories is that, where a person wishes 
to be actively involved in the process he should have the chance to so do.  In a criminal 
trial my idea for the jury is that when they have a question to ask of a legal 
practitioner, a question which they regard as pertinent in their understanding of the 
testimony or the judicial instructions, there should be a forum in which they can do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Currently in the UK if a juror wishes to ask a question he must first wait until there is a break in 
the proceedings.  He then asks the clerk of the court who then (when appropriate) will relay the 
question to the judge who then will return an answer via the clerk to the juror. 
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that.  So, to be clear, I imagine that the forum for their inclusion would, in time, be a 
normal part of the trial process and not something which is tagged on as just another 
attempt to ‘help’ them or ‘aid their memory.’  Moreover, within this forum there would 
be space for a Joker to instigate clarification with the jury as we shall see when I 
contextualise my ideas in chapter five.  I acknowledge that this idea may not be viewed 
by all as a positive move and I anticipate that there may be several objections.  For 
example, interruptions by jurors could break the flow of the argument or the 
presentation by legal counsel; juror questions may be about inadmissible evidence; 
jurors may ask questions that they do understand but go to the substance of the offence 
charged or question the conduct of the case by challenging why counsel are / are not 
pursuing a certain line of questioning.  In response to that I would say that we need first 
to recognise that juror questions should not be regarded as an interruption in a negative 
sense.  Rather, juror question asking should be regarded, as a positive means to gaining 
clarity as early as it is required.  Questions directed at the legal professional from a 
juror should in my opinion be regarded as important and should therefore be afforded 
the same respect as, for example, a question from the judge or legal counsel.  Indeed, 
if the jury in the recently publicised case against Vicky Pryce were to have voiced their 
questions as they arose then the reported situation whereby “fundamental deficits in 
understanding” were discovered and a retrial ordered may never have arisen.67  And, 
perhaps more importantly, if those reported questions had been asked as they arose we 
may not have seen a situation whereby the collective ‘intellect’ of jurors was subject to 
ridicule with the result that the entire system of trial by jury was called into question 
again.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Caroline Davies, The Guardian, February 20th 2013, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/feb/20/vicky-pryce-retrial-jury.  The case against Vicky Pryce 
(R v. Huhne and Pryce), charged with perverting the course of justice, collapsed on February 
20th 2013 after it was discovered the jury had fundamental deficits in their understanding of both 
the trial language and the part they were to play and the information upon which they should 
base their verdict.  Judge the Honourable Mr Justice Sweeney dismissed them and the case 
was re-tried on February 25th which ended in Pryce’s conviction on March 7th 2013.   
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In order to facilitate juror question asking, it is necessary to provide clear guidelines 
and parameters which are regarded as acceptable and logical for the trial to progress 
and the person to voice these guidelines would, in my vision, be the Joker.  I suggest 
that this happens in open court and so questions in relation to the capacity of the jury 
to understand may be set aside permanently.  With clear guidelines for communication 
as a norm, the worry that the jury would be permitted to ask ad hoc questions 
whenever and to whoever they wished, would hopefully be set aside.  Therefore in the 
first instance the Joker would be on hand to state clearly the rules of the court and to 
whom questions should be directed, making clear that the substance of the questions 
should be about aiding the jurors’ understanding of the trial language rather than 
questioning the course of the trial or targeting specific individuals in the trial for 
negative gain.  In this respect I acknowledge the argument that my ideas for 
participation should not be regarded as anymore real for the juror than those 
suggestions we have had previously.  I would say however that my ideas do create a 
more participatory forum because they do allow for the jury to act and react when they 
feel that they need to.  Crucially and in direct contrast to the current position, they 
should be able to participate at the point that their question arises for them.  Critical in 
this is that the participation should be viewed as normal, indeed, as I said previously, 
be regarded, in time, as a norm of the criminal trial process.  Ultimately, a criminal 
trial involves real people, be they the accused, the jury, the witnesses or the legal 
practitioners.  In that respect therefore, there is a very strong argument for carrying 
out the trial in as real a way as is possible and the starting point for that is a tangible 
method for communication, which very basically is a normal everyday communication. 
 
What I propose therefore is to establish a forum where at the core there is mutual 
respect for all parties involved in a trial.  I suggest that we aim for a process which has 
at its core clear and open channels for communication with the combined aim of making 
the trial as easily accessible - both in respect of the language used and the scope for 
participation - for both the jurors and the legal professionals.  So far I have suggested 
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that the jury is permitted to ask questions when they arise; however I accept that there 
may be times when those questions are regarded as being irrelevant or interpreted as 
having been designed to undermine, disrupt or distort the process.  This is where the 
Joker would come into his own, as it would be his responsibility to step in and to 
manoeuvre the question asking and subsequent dialogue back on track.  There may be 
obvious questions arising from this suggestion, for example, some may ask who the 
Joker would be.  Would he be a legal professional?  Would he be an expert in the laws 
surrounding the case being tried and so able to spot rogue questions?  How would this 
work?  Would that mean there were several Jokers on hand, each an expert in a specific 
crime: the culpable homicide Joker; the rape Joker, the fraud Joker?  Or, would he be a 
member of the court administration who would have as part of his job the remit of 
jokering jury trials, in which case is he a Joker with no specialist knowledge but rather 
an all-rounder, able to turn his hand to individual trials?  To answer these questions we 
need to understand the heart of the Boal Joker.   
 
We have already seen that Jokers for Forum Theatre productions or Theatre of the 
Oppressed workshops are specifically trained as facilitators, they are prepared to be 
fully aware of all possible lines of questioning and through their experience they are 
able to spot rogue or unrelated lines of questioning or dialogue, in the situations in 
which they are jokering.  To be clear, a Joker jokering a Forum Theatre piece about 
homelessness does not need to have first-hand experience of living rough or having to 
fight for safe, clean accommodation, to joker the piece effectively and with empathy.  
What he does need to have is the ability to remain completely impartial.  To listen 
intently, to be aware of all of the participants in the space and to act and react to 
situations as they arise in order that the piece reaches its conclusion in the Forum with 
each person involved having been heard and understood and, most importantly for our 
purposes, that he has enabled all of those who wish to, to participate.  In other words, 
the key for the Joker is to make absolutely sure that what a person wants to convey is 
conveyed and where there is dubiety or confusion to enable enough dialogue to reach 
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mutual clarity.  I have given a great deal of thought to who the trial Joker could be and 
remain undecided at this stage as to who would be best suited to the role.  Indeed, on 
the one hand I can see that a Boal-trained Joker could take on the role very successfully 
with no legal training whatsoever; however on the other hand, I can see that there are 
obvious benefits to be had if the Joker has an understanding of law or perhaps even has 
a legal background.  Just as the Joker in the Forum piece on homelessness does not 
need to have first-hand experience of living rough, my instinct tells me that the trial 
Joker does not need to have first-hand experience of legal education because it is not 
the Joker’s background that is important, rather it is his ability to skilfully guide and 
support the dialogue between the juror and the legal professional that is the crucial 
point to bear in mind.  
 
As I have already highlighted, in their idea of participation, Duff et.al suggests that a 
trial which “encourages active decision makers who ask questions of the accused and 
respond to evidence during the trial”68 is a positive step to a more participatory 
process.  I agree with what they suggest, especially when we understand that their 
context is focused on positive communication, by legal professionals, and that they 
highlight the obvious concerns which could arise if negative communication were 
permitted.69  In terms of the actual participatory element I should also say that, in 
principle at least, I see no harm in allowing those who wish to participate passively to 
so do, however I should be clear that there is a marked difference between creating a 
forum in which they can choose to be passive and one where they have no alternative 
but to be so.  Indeed, I acknowledged earlier in this chapter the arguments made by, 
inter alia, Schäfer and Weigend70 who suggest that active fact-finders are more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Duff et.al. (2007) Trial three above n.64, p.201 
69 Referring specifically to the points that they raise at pp.201-202 (2007) Trial three above n.64 in 
relation to mutual respect between the parties being expected. 
70 Schäfer, B. and Weigend, O.K. (2006), ‘It’s Good to Talk-Speaking Rights and the Jury,’ in 
Duff A., Farmer L., Marshall S., and Tadros V. (2006), The Trial on Trial, Volume Two: Judgement 
and Calling to Account, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing (subsequently referred to as 
Trial two; McEwan, J. (2003), The Verdict of the Court: Passing Judgement in Law and 
Psychology, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing. 
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effective fact-finders but equally I say that some people cope much better in the 
passive stance and so should be allowed to carry out their task in that position.  Ideally 
therefore, I would like to see a forum which allows for all types of participation and not 
one which only caters for static passivity for the jury. 
 
So, how does my ideal image of the trial participation manifest practically?  The short 
answer is to say that it would work in a similar way to a Forum Theatre piece, with two 
obvious differences: one being that I do not intent the end verdict to be altered and the 
other that I do not intend for the trial to be re-run as in a Forum piece, but rather I am 
using the intervention points in the live trial to clarify understanding as and when 
challenges arise.  Thus I am suggesting the jury’s inclusion to enhance understanding en 
route to verdict deliberation.  I see a situation whereby if a juror is unable to 
understand as I have thus far described then he will simply stop the trial by raising his 
hand.  From that point the Joker would facilitate the discussion between the juror and 
the legal professional whom he is having difficulty understanding.  The trial would 
essentially be in a suspended state until such time as clarity is achieved and then the 
process takes off from where it was halted.  In a Forum piece the spectator would shout 
STOP from the auditorium and at that point the Joker steps in to facilitate the dialogue 
between spectator and actor, or to allow for the spectator to become the spect-actor 
by physically going to the playing area and taking the part of the actor and moving the 
story to its anti-model.  As in a Forum piece, I suggest that there is a trained Joker in 
the courtroom ready to facilitate as and when he is needed.    
 
I see that it is important to understand why juror participation is seen as such an 
important element of the criminal trial and how participation might work.  As I have 
said previously, the principal reasons given for this include: jurors bring with them a 
sense of fairness and their presence in the justice system seems to enhance the 
legitimacy of the trial process.  Whilst I do not wish to undermine the importance of 
those arguments, I suggest that it is equally as important to understand, from the juror 
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perspective, why their participation is so important and I strongly suggest that this 
latter perspective has suffered from a lack of attention until now.  Thus, until such time 
as we are in a position to have a face-to-face dialogue with the jury about their feelings 
about their role, we will not be in a position to develop ways forward for their inclusion 
and participation.  However, if we were able to have a face-to-face dialogue with the 
juror and understand his view of his role from his perspective then I argue that we 
would be in a much better position from which to start to respond directly to his hurdles 
as and when they arise in the course of the trial. 
 
I fully acknowledge, that in certain situations people may be fearful of others and so 
the scope for participation should be monitored; however I do not think that that should 
act as a barrier to breaking new ground for participation per se.  Indeed, I have already 
argued that I do not think that there should be interventions between the jury and the 
accused as this may lead to negative manipulation both of the trial process and of 
Boal’s participation techniques being used in that process.  Whether certain types of 
participation are pre-framed as potentially negative, manipulative or aggressive would 
be a matter for each individual trial and so all the more reason that those involved are 
in the moment, they are relying on their integrity, their wisdom and their ability to 
communicate clearly thus taking control of a potentially negative situation and turning 
it into a useful dialogue through actual participation.  If trials were to proceed on that 
basis then there would be ample opportunity for negative communication to be 
identified and dealt with as and when it arises as I discussed earlier in this section.  
 
The model that I imagine is one which takes account of all of the trial participants, 
allows for autonomous participation which is facilitated by the Joker within the trial 
proper.  Therefore, in respect of the jury, they shall be transformed from passive on-
lookers to active participants able to communicate with legal professionals at regular 
points within the trial.  Therefore I propose shifting the onus of speech from the 
professional actors to create parity across the board.  I argue that each person who has 
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a right to be involved in the process of the trial should have a right to participate – both 
professional and non-professional in equal measure.  Whilst I do not argue for a return 
to the historical jury nor do I advocate a move towards a more inquisitorial system to 
replace the adversarial model, I do contend that the current framework needs to be re-
thought dramatically to accommodate a more participative jury or at the very least to 
allow space for more active participation than is currently possible.  If we agree for the 
moment that one of the core values of the jury is that it “manifests the ‘sense of 
justice’ of the community […] that it represents not some community, but the 
community of the defendant” then perhaps the time has come to make space for that 
essential part in the process of justice and to allow the jury into the trial proper by 
allowing them autonomy to participate as and when they feel it necessary to clarify 
their understanding of the trial in their journey to delivering justice.71  For as long as 
we have a framework which keeps them on the periphery and predominantly mute, then 
the ‘sense of justice’ will surely remain just a sense and the participation that is 
defended in the research and literature, whilst both encouraging and enlightening as far 
as it goes, remains only a vision with no practical application.  I hope that in this 
section I have demonstrated how my ideas could transform our understanding of the 
scope of the role of the jury in the criminal trial. 
In chapter five I attempt to demonstrate how these ideas could work in a practical 
sense by using a fictitious criminal trial.  I aim to show how, if we shift our mind-sets to 
understand the capabilities of those involved in the trial, as well as to understand that 
the architecture and interior design of the courtroom space need not act as a barrier to 
interaction, then communication and participation may be enhanced and improved for 
future trials.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Dubber, M.D. (2004), ‘The Criminal Trial and the Legitimation of Punishment’ in Duff A., Farmer 
L., Marshall S., and Tadros V (2004), The Trial on Trial, volume one, Truth and Due Process, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing at p.98 (subsequently referred to as Trial one). 
   
162 
 
4.4 Conclusion to chapter four 
At the beginning of this chapter I said that I would put forward suggestions to improve 
juror understanding through integrating devices for participative communication which 
are found in Augusto Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed.  I was particularly keen to 
highlight his Forum Theatre and the use of his Joker as a way to demonstrate the shift 
from juror presence to juror participation in the courtroom.  Indeed, I hope that up to 
this point in the thesis I have communicated the heart of Boal’s work: his emphasis on 
participation as a means to empowerment, to a sense of inclusion, or to enhanced 
understanding of any given situation.  I have argued that this was important because it 
may allow us to understand better the difference between juror presence and juror 
participation in the courtroom and from that point to recognise the untapped potential 
of both the jury and the spaces within which it currently functions.  In the chapter to 
follow I shall contextualise the ideas to demonstrate how the trial may proceed if we 
were to integrate these theories and, as I said at the beginning of the chapter, I shall do 
that by relying on my own experience of working in performance arts.  In that regard we 
can see me moving away more deliberately from the social science research method 
which places emphasis on pre-arranged questions, interviews and testing, to a method 
which places emphasis on artistic devices as a way to develop knowledge.  Therefore, I 
suggest a ‘hands-on’ approach where each person involved starts, and ends, on exactly 
the same footing and so there are no power imbalances which (however much we may 
try to avoid them) are inherent in social science research methods.  In the chapter to 
follow therefore I present an imagined trial communication and, to reiterate my 
position, this is advanced as a concept alone and should not be read as a practical 
solution to the issues which surround the use of juries in criminal trials currently.   
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Chapter five 
Communication and participation in the trial contextualised 
5.1 Introduction to chapter five 
In chapter three I argued that if we integrate Paulo Freire’s problem-posing into the 
trial process we may see benefits in terms of enhanced communication for jurors and in 
chapter four I suggested that if we add to Freire’s work some of the practical devices 
for communication found in the work of Augusto Boal, this would further develop the 
potential for juror understanding, by engaging with elements of space and structure in 
the criminal trial.  In this chapter I shall contextualise the concepts that I have thus far 
advanced to try to bring to life in a tiny way the work thus far only discussed in a 
theoretical sense.  Before doing that however, I shall look briefly at some examples of 
where the work of Freire and Boal is integrated into projects, in life today.  As we shall 
see, these projects see groups of people able to communicate through a variety of 
participatory forms with the result that, in some cases, they have had their voices 
heard for the first time in their lives. There are many projects like the ones I shall draw 
attention to and which span a variety of areas each reflecting the importance of finding 
ways for every person to hear, and be heard thus reinforcing my argument that it is not 
so much what we say, but how it is communicated that is the most important element 
when considering how people learn in any given situation.1  In the projects that I 
highlight we shall see that the challenges to participation – and so integration into 
communities in some cases - have been overcome through the integration of Freire and 
Boal’s devices for communication and it is that aspect of the work which I suggest is 
fundamental for this thesis.  Thereafter I turn my attention to the challenges found in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Other projects include Headline Theatre, Meth, Directed and jokered by David Diamond – the 
piece explored the root causes of addition in Vancouver.  Creative Training Unlimited, The 
Cynthia Show, directed and jokered by Amy McDonald – the piece explores the impact of 
mental ill health in the workplace. Cardboard Citizens, Navigation, devised by a group of 
unaccompanied asylum seeking children, the piece was jokered by Adrian Jackson and 
explored the needs, desires, fears and expectations of these people. 
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the architecture of the trial before ending the chapter with examples of how my ideas 
could play out in a trial setting.  The overall aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how 
effective the work of Freire and Boal has been in areas outwith of the trial setting as a 
way to encourage the idea that their theories may be valuable in furthering our 
understanding of the jury as well as offering tools to enhance communication through 
participation for the jurors in future trials.  
The chapter proceeds as follows.  First I present a small ‘crowd of witnesses’ whose 
work presents a supportive platform and environment for my own thesis.  Thus, as I 
have said previously, I look to the work of El Sistema and Headlines Theatre to explore 
how Freire and Boal’s theories translate in daily life to positive effect for countless 
people around the world.  Thereafter I reflect on the barriers to participation that are 
currently found in the courtroom with the aim of demonstrating that, whilst there may 
be physical barriers contained therein, those need not present as actual barriers to 
communication in the trial.  Moreover, I am keen to consider our deference to space 
and to explore the parameters of the architectural and interior design of the courtroom 
as factors which are perceived to prevent participation by jurors in the current trial 
process.  Following that, I test Freire’s problem-posing by considering how his 
codifications could work to build bridges of dialogue in the trial communication.  
Thereafter I introduce a mock trial in which we can see where the Joker may aid 
understanding through allowing for jurors to enter dialogue with legal professionals 
during the trial process.  As I contextualise Freire and Boal’s work I reflect on the 
objections which may arise and I address concerns which I foresee may be made in 
opposition to their integration into the trial communication.  
5.2 Contemporary applications of Paulo Freire and Augusto Boal’s work 
As I have previously said, the work of both Paulo Freire and Augusto Boal is seen in a 
variety of guises in contemporary society – too many to mention in this thesis so, for our 
purposes I have chosen to look to the El Sistema Project to the work of David Diamond 
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and Headlines Theatre and to the work of the Cardboard Citizens because it is in those 
projects that we can see clearly how, though engagement at a grass roots level with 
disenfranchised groups of society, those groups become empowered to take control of 
their own lives, something that many had never ever thought could be possible.  
The El Sistema programme is a programme which is designed to encourage 
communication through dialogue in areas of high social and economic deprivation.  
What distinguishes El Sistema is that the method for dialogue is through the learning, 
and then playing together, of musical instruments within an orchestral setting.  The 
programme for children which was started in a parking lot in Venezuela almost 37 years 
ago is a project in which we can see Freire’s methods for understanding through 
dialogue at work.  El Sistema’s founder, Dr Jose Antonio Abreu, believed that symphony 
orchestras, like society, can enrich, can support and can nurture one another to make 
for a community where respect and understanding are at the roots.  Its current musical 
director, Gustavo Dudamel himself a product of the music education system is devoted 
to the belief that classical music is a vehicle for social change.  El Sistema is firmly 
based in the philosophical frameworks of Paulo Freire and Lev Vygotsky, and so we see 
at the roots the comprehensive education of the individual and the collective nature of 
learning.  El Sistema is known in Scotland as the Big Noise project which has been on-
going for the past four years.  It started in the Raploch Estate, Stirling and there are 
now projects emerging throughout Scotland each of which sees children on the 
periphery of society given the chance to grow and learn in an environment which, in the 
end they have created with the support of people passionate about using critical 
pedagogues such as Freire’s to empower with the view that that empowerment will 
actually grow those people who otherwise may not have their opportunities fostered.  
Thus, in the El Sistema projects we can see Freire’s pedagogy being used to cross 
divides in society, to break boundaries in understandings, to alter peoples’ negative 
pre-framed notions of what is possible in such areas and, most importantly, to 
demonstrate the flexibility of his theories to create an impact by enabling, through 
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tools designed to empower, the oppressed to act and own their lives.  I see such 
projects as crucial because in them we see people become empowered through 
programmes which have been born out of from respect, humanity and integrity.  
Moreover, in such projects we can see barriers to participation overcome because the 
foundations are set up to include all of those who wish to take part without exception.  
Since its inception, the El Sistema programme teaches music to over 500,000 of 
Venezuela’s most vulnerable children and there are several such programmes available 
throughout the US2 and now, developing steadily, in the UK with Scotland’s The Big 
Noise an example of that development. 
 
Turning now to the work of Boal, Headlines Theatre in Vancouver and Cardboard 
Citizens in London are two of the very few companies dedicated to producing Forum 
Theatre which crosses boundaries and so enables those on the periphery to overcome 
barriers and participate.3  Their work is devised by people living on the boundaries of 
society and so sees dialogues with those people with the result that voices which 
ordinarily are disregarded or thought not worthy of hearing are central in the action.  
For example, in 2004 Headlines Theatre produced Practising Democracy which was a 
Forum piece designed to enable the people of Vancouver to voice their reactions and 
opinions in the face of proposed benefits cuts which could have resulted in those 
already living in deprivation to be rendered, in many cases, as homeless and penniless.4  
Through creating the piece we can see Forum theatre in action because we are able to 
see those sections of society given a voice and perhaps most importantly, the chance 
for those voices to be heard with the result that the proposed benefits cuts were not 
sanctioned by Vancouver City Council.5   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See for example El Sistema USA at http://elsistemausa.org/ or The Big Noise, Sistema Scotland 
at http://makeabignoise.org.uk/big-noise-raploch/ 
3 www.headlinestheatre.com; www.cardboardcitizens.org.uk  
4 Headlines Theatre, Practising Democracy, Directed and Joked by David Diamond, Vancouver 
2004 
5 For an exploration of the piece see 
http://www.headlinestheatre.com/past_work/pd/how/index.html 
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More recently Headlines produced Us and Them (the inquiry) and Us and Them (the 
play.6  The project was 5 years in the making and culminated in a live, on-line, 
interactive production which questioned and explored people’s responses to social, 
class, and political divides.  What is very exciting about this piece in particular is that 
we can see the work of Boal expanded to include several on-line Jokers each facilitating 
dialogue between people from around the world who wished to have their voices heard 
in response to the subjects explored in the piece.  Thus, we can see in Us and Them the 
potential for Boal’s theories for participation to be accessible by many people with the 
result that people are empowered to act in, and react to, issues which are central in 
their lives.  What this also demonstrates is that, by and large, there are no boundaries 
to participation even when at first glance we may think otherwise. 
 
Boal’s devices for communicative participation are often used outside of the theatre 
genre and one good example of this is CTU’s Cynthia Show which, for the past five years 
has enabled dialogue about Mental Ill-Health in the workplace to be addressed in a 
mock up talk show situation.  The work is designed using Forum Theatre and Theatre of 
the Oppressed techniques, it is performed by people who have personal experience of 
mental ill-health and so their experiences informed the initial formation of the work 
and it has, to date, enabled issues of mental ill-health to be the subject of discussion 
and reflection in several workplaces in the UK.  At the time of writing this thesis the 
work is being developed to go on-line, thus demonstrating that boundaries to 
participation may not be relevant where Boal’s devices for communication are central 
in the focus and drive of any piece of work be that in a theatre or outside it.  
 
In all of the work mentioned in this section we can see that with the integration of the 
devices for communication and participation found in the work of Freire and Boal that 
there is a great deal of potential for enhanced understanding and participation in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Headlines Theatre, Us and Them, directed by David Diamond and Kevin Finnan, jokered by 
David Diamond, Vancouver 2011 
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variety of different situations.  I have demonstrated in the example given that barriers 
to participation can be overcome through integrating Freire and Boal’s work and I argue 
that the same is possible in the criminal trial.  Before going on to demonstrate how I 
suggest that may be possible it remains for me to address what barriers to participation 
there could be in the criminal trial and so in the section to follow I look to the design 
and architectural aspects of the courtroom.   
 
5.3 Barriers to participation 
In chapter one I highlighted that, despite being aware of the vast body of literature 
which explores the trial as theatre, I would not consider that area in any detail because 
it is not the body of work that I wish to contribute to, nor is it the body of work which 
adds to the arguments that I have put forward in my thesis.  Indeed, as should be clear 
by now, Boal’s Forum Theatre is a specific theatre technique which does not rely on the 
trappings of theatrical performance – an element which dominates the trial as theatre 
literature – nor does it rely on the use of a ‘traditional’ theatre space for the work to be 
communicated as I have just demonstrated in drawing attention to the work in the 
section above.  I am however more interested in considering what barriers to 
participation might be perceived within the courtroom and so in the paragraphs to 
follow I consider the aspects of theatricality and the links with the architecture in more 
detail.   
 
First I assess the impact that the architecture and interior design of the courtroom may 
have on all of the trial players.  More specifically I am interested in the in-built barriers 
which are perceived to prevent participation within a courtroom.  I assess the impact of 
those barriers and I consider how, if at all, Boal’s Joker could override those perceived 
barriers to participation and understanding within that space.  In this respect I am 
interested in how, if those physical designs were altered, trial participation could be 
altered.  Thereafter I consider the staging of the trial from the various different 
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perspectives, drawing particular attention to how each person regards his role.  For 
example, I draw on the professional roles and the imposed roles which are unavoidable 
in a criminal trial, assessing how communication between those roles could be made 
clearer with the help of Boal’s Joker.   
“I can take any empty space and call it a bare stage.  A man walks across this 
empty space whilst someone else is watching him, and this is all that is needed 
for an act of theatre to be engaged.”7 
 
“And this, surprisingly enough gets me straight to The Connection.  When you go 
to The Connection in New York you are aware, as you enter the building, of all 
the denial aspects of the evening.  There is no proscenium – (illusion? Well yes, 
insofar as the stage is arranged like a squalid room, but it is not like a set; it is 
more as though the theatre were an extension of this room) – there is no 
conventional playwriting, no exposition, no development,  no story, no 
characterization, no construction and, above all, no tempo.  This supreme 
artifice of the theatre - this one god, whom we all serve, whether in musicals or 
in melodramas or in the classics – that marvellous thing called pace – is there 
thrown right out of the window.  So, with this collection of negative values, you 
seem to have an evening as boring as life must seem to a young reluctant 
devotee sitting on the banks of the Ganges.  And yet, if you persevere you are 
rewarded – from the zero you get to the infinite.”8  
 
In the same way as it has been argued that theatre architecture and interior design can 
inhibit an audience, it has also been suggested that the physical architecture of the 
courthouse and courtroom can act as a barrier to participation.  Indeed, Linda Mulcahy 
argued that contrary to the space of the courtroom being regarded as neutral, we 
should look more closely to try to understand “the factors which determine the internal 
design of the courtroom” as that is a crucial element in gaining a “broader and more 
nuanced understanding of judgecraft.”9  She highlights how the design of the courtroom 
has changed over time with fluctuating space allocation and specifically she focuses on 
the space for the ‘spectator’ arguing that over time this has been reduced, therefore 
calling into question the notion of the public trial.10  Thus, in so doing she draws 
attention to the effect of sightlines, of the segregation and segmentation and of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Brook, P. (1972) The Empty Space Middlesex, England and Victoria, Australia, Penguin p.11. 
8 Brook, P. (1987), The Shifting Point: Forty Years of Theatrical Exploration, 1946-1987, London, 
Methuen p.27 
9 Mulcahy, L. (2007), ‘Architects of Justice: the Politics of Courtroom Design,’ Social and Legal 
Studies, Vol.16(3), pp.383-403 p.383 
10 Mulcahy (2007) above n.9, p.383 
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various other aspects of interior design which could be used (or seen) as forms of 
hierarchical power.  In 2010 she again assessed the impact of architecture in a person’s 
image of the law in Legal Architecture.11  She explored how the architecture of the 
courthouse and the courtroom can impact on a person’s ideal image of justice when she 
questioned, specifically, the impact of the interior design of the courtroom on peoples’ 
ability to participate.  First she suggested that a person’s image of justice is based on 
what he sees at the material time - no more and no less - and so the historical path of 
the architecture is a reflection of societal ideals, and second that his ability to 
participate, or his presumption on his ability to participate, is intrinsically linked to the 
interior design of the courtroom.   
 
This is a similar argument to the one made earlier by Clare Graham when she assessed 
how the English criminal trial came to be housed in the “purpose-built accommodation 
and what made that accommodation architecturally distinctive.”12  In her study she 
claims that we react, consciously and unconsciously, to our setting in its entirety, the 
interior design, the furniture, the other users of that space, their clothing, their 
gestures and so on and she says, of the courtroom specifically, that “it is a setting for a 
tense, tightly organized and complex drama.”13  She draws a distinction with the early 
trials which were not held in purpose-built courthouses, where the interior design was 
makeshift thus leading to less visually hierarchical spaces and so arguing that in those 
trials there were fewer barriers to communication because there were fewer visible 
barriers.  Both Graham and Mulcahy therefore share a similar view on this aspect of the 
impact of the architecture of the court.  I should note however that their views are 
slightly different in respect of the specific interior design of the courtrooms.  Whereas 
Graham is of the opinion that the interior design is less significant than the exterior of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Mulcahy, L. (2011), Legal Architecture, Justice, due process and the place of law, Oxon and New 
York, Routledge 
12 Graham, C (2003), Ordering Law.  The Architectural and Social History of the English Law Court 
to 1914, Aldershot and Vermont, Ashgate, p.2. 
13 Graham above n.12, p.2. 
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the building and that it is the exteriors therefore that have the lasting impact on those 
using the court, Mulcahy considers that the interior designs of the courtrooms impact 
dramatically on the individuals who enter them.  Indeed, Mulcahy devotes much space 
in Legal Architecture to considering the nuances and influence of the segmentation and 
segregation of the criminal courtroom, in the end arguing that the architecture and 
interior design of the courthouse and the courtroom does impact on the ability to 
communicate and participate.  She argues that the interior designs, whilst preventing or 
inhibiting these aspects of the trial, in tandem, are set up to control and whilst that 
may not always be so obvious in modern architecture (which sees courtrooms 
‘flattened’ and so less hierarchical at first glance) there are nonetheless features – such 
as glass exterior walls, atriums and camera surveillance – that add up to the courtrooms 
being places of control and which, by virtue of their controlled zones, inhibit 
participation by groups such as jurors.14 In that respect therefore Mulcahy infers that 
participation is hampered by the internal barriers of the space, whether those barriers 
are as obvious as those seen in the old Victorian courtrooms or whether they are more 
contemporary with clean lines and minimalist furniture as we can see in the images 1 
and 2 below.   
 
I agree that there are clearly issues with the traditional courtroom architecture in terms 
of the perception that participation is possible, or not.  The internal physical barriers do 
act as inhibitors and as long as there is segregation and segmentation in the courtroom 
it could be thought that there would continue to be such barriers to participation.  I do 
not agree with this argument, however, because we do not really understand fully what 
hampers a person’s ability to participate and that, I argue, is due in part to the focus to 
date on what words the jury do and do not understand to the neglect of other aspects 
of the trial such as the interior design of the courtroom.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Mulcahy (2007) above n.9, p.398 
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For example, it may seem obvious to think that the juror may be intimidated by the 
more grandiose interior of the Victorian courtroom as depicted in image 1 below, and 
less so by the notably contemporary interior of the courtroom in image 2. This is, 
however, no more than a subjective interpretation of how a person may react and not 
an indication of how he will act.   
Image 1 
 
Image 2 
My idea is a very simple one.  If we have Boal’s Joker as an integrated part of any jury 
trial - there to facilitate dialogue between the juror and the legal professional - then I 
argue that physical barriers to participation and communication can be overcome.  This 
is possible in the theatre where Forum pieces are performed and I see no reason why, in 
theory at least, the same cannot be the case in the courtroom.   
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With the help of the Joker, a juror who otherwise may be inhibited by the physical 
space can use as his intermediary the stance of the Joker.  He can speak in the first 
case to the Joker – thus immediately fostering confidence in his own ability – and from 
that point can open his questions for the court in respect of his understanding of the 
legal terminology.  The result would be that however hierarchical (or not) the 
courtroom is, the juror need not be intimidated by it.  Therefore, I do not see any 
immediate need to restructure existing courtrooms because I believe that 
communication through participation can take place despite the interior designs of the 
courtroom.  I acknowledge completely the tendency to defer to allocated (or the 
perception that it is allocated) space however I argue that Boal’s Joker can transcend 
those physical boundaries and barriers.   
 
Whilst I do not contest the notion that physical barriers can, and do, affect a person’s 
ability to participate, I argue that relying predominantly on this alone is a little limiting.  
Indeed, if any person feels unable to participate or the framework is such that he is 
prevented from so doing then this aspect of the justice system is in need of reform, 
however I think that a redesign needs to go beyond the scope of interior design alone to 
create a trial framework which is truly innovative.  Indeed, perhaps we need to use as 
our starting point an exploration of what Pat Carlen referred to as the temporal and 
spatial conventions when assessing the staging of the trial before suggesting some 
alternative ways to view its future.15  
 
For the moment however I refer back to Mulcahy’s Legal Architecture, in which we can 
see her raise a number of questions in relation to the use of the different spaces in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In Magistrates Justice Pat Carlen made observations which took account of the participants in 
magistrates courts in which she highlighted that the interior design of the courtroom disrupts the 
normal methods for communication and participation with many of the participants in her study 
complaining of the “sterile theatricality of the courtroom in which temporal and spatial 
conventions were successfully manipulated to produce a disciplined display of justice in which 
alternative performances evocative of unpermitted social worlds’ were suppressed. Carlen, P. 
(1976), Magistrates’ Justice, London, Martin Robertson. 
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courtroom.  She draws our attention to the segmentation and segregation of the 
courtroom and raises questions over whether the space allotted to the different user 
groups dictates to the user of that space his part in the action.  Ultimately she argues 
that it does and that those in their allotted zones defer to acting as they think they 
ought to within that zone.  Thus, in respect of the jury, she says that they act and react 
only according to their confined box in the courtroom.  Moreover, she is sceptical about 
the ability to transcend space in the way that has been attempted in the theatre 
context.  However, I argue to the contrary, as Boal and Brook have, by suggesting that 
we can transcend the allotted space of the courtroom.  I argue that the jury can 
transcend their architectural box, that they can physically move if they want to or, that 
their voices can be carried to the central ‘playing area’ by integrating Boal’s Joker who 
will facilitate that communicative participation.  In doing that we can begin to see that 
the actual space does not need to be the primary dictator or motivator for involvement 
or participation in a trial.  If we view the courtroom from this angle therefore we can 
see how Graham’s argument that the “‘theatre’” of the courtroom is set out in such a 
way as to encourage those involved to recognise its authority, a point which is echoed 
by Mulcahy in Legal Architecture, can be altered dramatically.  Indeed, the presence of 
the Joker allows for the barriers, both physical and metaphorical, to be dissolved thus 
creating a trial situation where there is no room for segregation and segmentation, 
where people feel able to move from their allocated zones to areas which they had 
hitherto been unable to enter physically and metaphorically.  Therefore what we can 
see is that the dialogic techniques integral to Theatre of the Oppressed may offer a 
communication device to those participants who would otherwise feel excluded or 
alienated, because the integration of the Joker may enable those who are ordinarily 
reticent to come forward, and participate in a way which otherwise would not have 
been open to them.  Additionally, what may transpire is a move away from overt or 
subliminal deference to self, and system controls. I suggest that these controls are 
inherent in the courtroom currently however through integrating Theatre of the 
Oppressed techniques we may find that their structural constraints be diminished 
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significantly.  Indeed, Boal argued that the potential of Forum Theatre was situated in 
its ability to create space where it is possible for people to “transgress, to break 
conventions, to enter into the mirror of theatrical fiction, to rehearse forms of struggle 
and then return to reality with the images of their desires.”16  In this respect therefore I 
argue that integrating Boal’s Joker to the trial optimises the chance for participation 
and this could result in the verdict of the jury being based on understanding and 
empathy rather than misunderstanding and apathy.  Moreover, I suggest that this can be 
done regardless of the physical architecture of the courtroom. 
“Audiences crave for something in the theatre that they can term ‘better’ than 
life and for this reason are open to confuse culture, or trappings of culture, with 
something they do not know, but sense obscurely could exist – so, tragically, in 
elevating something bad into a success they are only cheating themselves.”17   
 
The ‘trappings’ of a criminal trial mean that the jury may come to the courtroom with a 
preconceived idea of justice and so may have an image in their minds both of what that 
will look like and how their part in the story will play out.  Thus jurors may rely on what 
they think might occur, rather than concentrating on what is occurring.  As we saw in 
chapter two, for example, Ellison and Munro found that jurors frequently relied on what 
they thought should be the backstory rather than concentrating on the evidence as 
delivered throughout the trial.18  In terms of the staging of the trial, I have already said 
that the architectural hierarchy of the courtroom and the position of the participants 
therein only serves to feed that anticipation, craving, and excitement for the drama.  
When a stage is set, an audience is expectant.  The structure of the courtroom 
encourages the jury to want an interesting, possibly even an entertaining experience 
and so they may be apt to ‘elevate’ the proceedings into something that they are not, 
their judgement swayed simply by the ‘culture’ of the courtroom and their vision more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Boal, A. (1998), Legislative Theatre, Using performance to make politics, translated by Adrian 
Jackson, London and New York, Routledge p.142. 
17 Brook (1972) above n.7. 
18See for example, Ellison, L. and Munro, V.E. (2010), ‘Getting to (not) guilty: examining jurors’ 
deliberative processes in, and beyond, the context of the mock rape trial,’ Legal Studies, Vol.30, 
No.1; Holstein, J. (1985), ‘Jurors’ interpretations and jury decision making,’ 9 Law and Human 
Behaviour, pp.83-98.  
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expectant of the theatre we see in image 3 below rather than the courtrooms we saw 
above.   
Image 3 
In chapter two I identified that there are a variety of influences which could affect the 
jurors ability to remain focused solely on the evidence and those included the effect of 
extra-legal influences.  I have drawn out here, albeit briefly, the possible issues which 
could arise when jurors expect certain things from the trial: when they expect 
something interesting or exciting or intriguing all set within a space which exudes 
splendour and grandeur.  Indeed, in a courtroom the jurors are assembled side by side, 
their sightlines are not obscured; indeed they have a clear view of all the action and all 
of the ‘characters’.  As they take their place, they assume the part of the audience and 
just as the traditional theatre audience assume a passive role, so too do the jury.19  The 
critical difference, however, is that if the theatre audience found the story confusing or 
boring, or if they found the performances to be encapsulating to the point that they 
were swayed along with the drama and excitement, when the stage lights fade to black 
or the curtain falls, they are not bound to act on these emotions, interpretations and 
opinions.  The jury on the other hand are, and this is where the danger lies if their 
verdict is based on these subjective interpretations and emotions. In the sections to 
follow therefore I test the idea that if we disrupt the process of the trial with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 It would be a very interesting exercise to test the sense of ownership of space and empowerment 
generated by that ownership if the various participants ‘invaded’ the space allowed for the 
others and vice versa 
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introduction first of Freire’s problem-posing pedagogy to enable dialogue between the 
juror and the legal professional and second by adding to that Boal’s the Joker to enable 
the transformation from passive spectator to spect-actor, that all of the trial 
participants engage to the point that there is little or no dubiety over their 
understanding of the trial language. 
 
5.4 Testing problem-posing as an integral part of the criminal trial 
communication 
I have argued that the current system of trial by jury, and all of the solutions proposed 
to date in relation to juror understanding, are based more on the “banking” concept of 
teaching and communication than they are on a problem-posing system.  I now wish to 
shift emphasis towards a problem-posing style and so shall now explain, in detail, how I 
propose to do it by showing how these kinds of insights might be applied more 
systematically to an analysis of the criminal trial.   
 
What I propose therefore is that we integrate Freire’s problem-posing as the default 
trial communication and I shall show that his pedagogy can enable the shift from the 
current one-way (“banking”) communication to a communication method which is based 
in critical dialogue (problem-posing).  By doing that I trace the shift from passive 
players to active and engaged trial participants, each able to identify and express when 
either the points in questions or the lines of communication themselves have become 
cluttered or confused. 
 
To do that I will integrate six stills (codifications) (pictures 2-7 below) - each one meant 
as a topic for dialogue - and I propose their use at: the point of citation; the judge’s 
opening speech and three images meant as examples for discussions on trial specific 
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language such as mens rea, ‘consent’ and ‘intention.’20  By developing a forum which 
supports clear lines of communication I hope to show that I can create critically 
conscious participants in a trial, which sees jurors building their verdicts on realised 
wisdom rather than relying on myths or clichés, opinions or received wisdom.  Whilst I 
acknowledge that relying on opinion can be a positive, for example, assessing what 
evidence is most persuasive, equally I say that caution should be adopted if opinions 
prevail to the detriment of basing the verdict on clear understandings throughout the 
trial.   
 
When thinking about who would be present at these discussions, my instinct is that all 
of those who would usually be there would be present: the jury, the judge, the legal 
counsel, the witnesses and the accused.  This of course causes problems at the point of 
citation in terms of gauging a person’s thought processes and feelings because he is 
usually in private in his own home.  Thus, I ask the reader to adopt, as I have, a little 
creativity and imagine the dialogue that you would have when faced with a citation – 
how do you feel?  What impact will it have on you and the others around you?  At the 
other points where I have suggested codifications, we can assume that those ordinarily 
present would be present thus the discussions are taking place, at times, in open court.  
Where necessary therefore the trial would be stopped to make space for the 
discussions.   
 
The facilitator of the discussions would be an impartial mediator, whose job it would be 
to guide the discussions to the point where each person involved has a good 
understanding of their part at the relevant points.  Ultimately I would suggest the 
integration of a Boal Joker who is focused on supporting dialogue between parties – he 
is not a jester or comic character, sometimes also referred to with the same name, nor 
is he an ethereal or imaginary character.  He is a trained professional with skills in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Whilst I acknowledge that the prospect of a Judge using Latin terminology is slim it is 
nonetheless possible. 
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facilitating dialogue between diverse parties.  Finally, the codifications should provide a 
framework within which the juror can function as a truly integrated part of the bigger 
picture and so, having listed them earlier, I shall now examine those points in more 
detail.  I begin with the citation as this is the logical first contact that a potential juror 
will have with the criminal trial process. 
Citation  
There is evidence based research to suggest that on the one hand there is a high 
propensity to try to avoid jury duty21 and on the other that there is not.22  How then 
could problem-posing bring us closer to hearing what the prospective jurors think about 
the citation process and what lessons may we take from those dialogues in order to 
improve the system for future juries?  In Scotland for example the citation for jury duty 
consists of a letter telling the person when they should attend the court and a booklet 
entitled Jury Service23 that gives the potential juror information which includes: 
preparing for jury service; what happens when they arrive in court; the trial and the 
role of the judge; the role of the juror, and so on.  There is also a glossary of terms 
which curiously does not contain any interpretations of legal language such as mens rea, 
actus reus, or beyond reasonable doubt, some, or all of which could be used in a 
criminal trial and whilst I have already highlight that the use of Latin terminology such 
as this is unlikely, it is nonetheless possible. 24  In the rest of the UK the citation process 
is very similar.  The prospective juror receives a citation letter which is accompanied by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See for example, Darbyshire, Penny et.al. (2001), “What Can the English Legal System Learn 
from Jury Research Published up to 2001?” Commissioned Research for the Auld Report in which 
she indicates the various reasons for non-attendance includes problems with childcare or care for 
the elderly, ignoring the summons, not getting the summons.  On this point see “Reducing the 
Trials of Jury Service, 31st August 2000, Lord Chancellors Department Press Release in response 
to the proposals for the new Central Summoning Bureau. 
22 Thomas, C. (2008), “Exposing the myths of Jury Service,” Criminal Law Review, Issue 6, pp.415-
430 says 85 percent of prospective jurors do reply to summonses. 
23 Jury Service, issued by the Scottish Court Service with the approval of the Lord Justice General. 
24 I acknowledge that it would be very difficult to provide an exhaustive glossary of terms however I 
do think that the current glossary could be improved with the inclusion of such words and phrases – 
after all, they are terminology which will be used in a criminal trial and so their inclusion would 
seem to be no more than logical. 
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the Jury Summons Booklet.25  In addition there is a video which is accessible online and 
which acts as an introduction to the court and the expectations of the potential juror. 26   
 
I shall now move on to talk about the first codification and it will be based around 
picture 2.  I have chosen the image because of its familiarity and that means that most 
potential jurors will identify with feelings when they receive it through the post, thus 
the image is supposed to inspire straightforward dialogue about how potential jurors 
feel and what they think on receipt of their citation.   
Picture 2 
 
Additionally, picture 2 reflects, or has the potential to reflect, what the research 
indicates about how some people feel on receipt of their letter of citation.  For 
example, the feelings may include annoyance because you are being compelled to do 
something against your will, the pressure associated with having to take time out of 
work or having to find extra child-care for an indefinite period or excitement and 
anticipation at the prospect are all factors which could feed into the overall attitude of 
the assembled jurors. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/docs/infoabout/juryservice/jury_summons_guide09dec.pdf 
[live at 03/07/2013] 
26 http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/infoabout/jury_service/your_role_vid.htm  [live at 
03/07/2013] 
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The questions that follow could be used for any codification in any situation.  The aim 
of the questions is to generate discussion of the jurors’ understanding of the image in 
order to hear what they understand first-hand, thus giving scope to respond where 
problems arise.  I acknowledge that questions such as those suggested at level 1 below 
may at first seem a little patronising, however, the point of asking what a person sees 
in the picture immediately tells us something about their attitude in certain situations 
i.e. how they feel about be called for jury duty can tell us a lot about how they might 
perform.  For example the question at level 1 below may be met with such responses as 
“jury duty how exciting I wonder if it’s a murder!” or “jury duty what a pain, I am 
booked up work wise, this could cost me thousands of pounds, I need to get out of it.” 
 
Level one 
What do you see in the picture?   
Level two 
What do you understand your responsibility to be? 
Level three 
Do you think you will be able to carry out that task? 
Level four 
What do you understand the rules of jury duty to be?   
How important do you think it is to understand the trial? 
Do you know what to do if you do not understand? 
 
Having explored how a potential juror may feel on receipt of his citation I now move on 
to look in more detail at how we could begin to understand what jurors’ understand at 
the judge’s opening speech. 
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The opening speech 
First, I propose to include two codifications to base the discussion on the language 
which could be found in the judge’s opening speech.27  In an earlier draft of the thesis, I 
had also included codifications for the verdicts but on reflection did not keep in the 
final draft as they would always include assumptions about the jurors’ thoughts about 
the implications of his verdict which, in the starkest sense, is not a part of his duty.  
Having such a dialogue at this early point in the trial however means that there should 
be less doubt over what the burden or the standard of proof is and more context given 
to the legal terminology which otherwise, could become very confusing. 
 
In picture number 3 we see the traditional image of justice, the subtext of which is that 
a person accused is innocent until proven otherwise.  The purpose of the codification is 
therefore for the jury to come to their own understanding of the gravity of this 
expectation, thus, guiding them away from their preconceived notions, to focus  
on the trial evidence alone.  The questions could be as follows: 
Picture 3 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 I am aware that not all jurisdictions have opening speeches – i.e. Scotland do not but this is 
unusual and so I have decided to assume here that there is one and remind the reader that this 
is a conceptual piece of work that is rooted in ideas rather than the procedural rules of any 
particular jurisdiction. 
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Level one  
What do you understand the picture to mean and what responsibility (if any) is 
conveyed by it?  
Level two 
What is your understanding of justice and can you think of a time when you have had to 
think about it or act to do something about it? 
Level three 
Are certain people better at delivering justice than others?  If there are then what 
factors contribute to their elevated capacity?  Their education?  Their social status?  
Their ability to retain and then recall information? 
 
Next I turn to a brief exploration of how to tackle issues which may arise in relation to 
issues of ‘reasonable doubt.’ In picture number 4 we can see a prison cell.  I have 
chosen the image as a way to generate discussion on the importance of trying to 
understand what is meant by ‘reasonable doubt.’  When thinking about an appropriate 
image I encountered some difficulty and my current choice is not without a certain 
degree of reservation because, whichever way we view it, there will always be a degree 
of subjective interpretation in selecting an appropriate image.  However, I have chosen 
to keep it in with the hope that it can generate discussion about the seriousness of the 
task for the juror and where there is doubt in their minds that that should be taken 
extremely seriously.   
Picture 4 
I propose the following questions:  
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Level one 
What can you see in the picture?  
Level two 
What do you understand of the expectation that has been placed upon you in regard to 
your duty as juror? 
Level three 
As a juror, are you wholly responsible for whether or not the person ends up in the cell? 
If so, why? 
If not, why not? 
 
I suggest that the discussions about what ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ actually means for 
the accused and the juror are exceptionally valuable because not only will they enable 
a better understanding of the phrase, but such discussions may also guard against issues 
of nullification which could be used to act counter to the democratic principles 
underpinning the system.  Moreover these discussions should act as a stark reminder of 
the seriousness of the task, thus reinforcing the need to ensure clear, sharp and 
considered thought processes especially against a backdrop of empirical evidence some 
of which suggests that jurors do find it difficult to quantify such phrases as ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt.’28  I acknowledge that quantifying what in essence is an abstract 
phrase is extremely difficult – all the more reason therefore to try an alternative 
communication technique to bring some sort of cohesion to an area which is clearly in 
need of some.  The questions attached to the codification at this stage would follow the 
pattern that I have already established with the point being to try to verbalise the 
actual legal benchmark required thus avoiding verdicts based on a lesser, or greater 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See for example Darbyshire et.al. (2001) above n.21; Zander, M. (2000), “The Criminal Standard 
of Proof – how sure is sure?,” 150, New Law Journal 1517; Power, R.C. (1999), “Reasonable 
and other doubts: The problem of jury instructions,” 67, Tenn.L.Rev. 45; Saks, M.J. (1997), 
“What do jury experiments tell us about how juries (should) make decisions?” 6, S. Cal 
Interdisciplinary L.J., 1; Thomas (2010) ‘Are juries fair’, Ministry of Justice Research Series, 
1/10, February. 
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standard. Following this dialogue the hope is that the jurors are very clear about the 
impact of their understanding of this legal standard.   
 
Legal terminology 
Having established the importance of the codifications and subsequent dialogues to this 
point I move on to demonstrate why it is as important to carry those through to the 
close of the trial.  It is crucial that the jury are engaged as early as possible, indeed, if 
they become disinterested, confused or disempowered at the start it may be very 
difficult to try to re-engage them later in the process.  If, as I suggest, they are fully 
engaged, and by that I mean that they see themselves as a valid and valuable part of 
the process right from the start, then the hope would be that that engagement, in the 
form of dialogues, will pave the way for a more consistent and rational trial process 
where we see jurors who are active, 
thinking participants and who are 
empowered to act with a real 
understanding of the seriousness of both 
the situation and their part in that. 
To finish this section, I include three 
examples of codifications which could be 
useful for jurors when trying to decipher 
the legal terminology sometimes used in 
the course of the criminal trial.  I should say, as I did earlier, that a judge is unlikely to 
use such Latin terminology as mens rea or actus reus, however despite the improbability 
I argue it is important to demonstrate how, if it were to be a feature, we could aim to 
build a way to dialogue thereby supporting jurors in their understanding is actually 
meant by the phrase(s).  Thus in picture 5 I have chosen an image which I hope will 
instigate discussion on what mens rea means.  Images such as this one – but focused on 
different terminology – could be introduced at points in a trial that are forecast (based 
on past research) to cause confusion for jurors or could see them becoming disengaged.  
Picture 5 
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This could include terminology that is fraught with difficulty because it is alien to most 
of the jury but equally could include terminology that seems at first familiar for a juror 
but in its normality or familiarity problems arise because the terminology is understood 
outwith of its legal context.  For example codifications could be centred on the word 
consent as it is meant to be understood in a rape trial or intention as the mens rea for 
homicide and so on and the images I have chosen (pictures 6 & 7) would be used in the 
same way as the one in picture 5 above.29  The point of that would be that through the 
dialogue the jury would be able to clarify the legal definition of the word and so the 
necessity to understand that expectation rather than relying on their own subjective 
understandings of the word consent.  Against a backdrop of research which indicates 
that there are myriad misconceptions about rape, about consent, about what consent 
means within the legal framework30 and so on, integrating codifications on the subject 
could break new ground in our understanding of the way jurors think in such trials as 
well as clarifying for the juror the context of the terminology that is being used.  I have 
included here some examples of what those images might look like.  I suggest that they 
are relevant for discussions on such issues because they contain within them obvious 
triggers for discussion – for example, what did the person holding the gun intend to do; 
what is the signal post trying to tell us?  Are we clear on the incentive behind the 
image? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For example, in Scotland juries were previously told to give consent a common sense meaning 
whereas now consent is defined in the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, Part 2, s.12 
30 For example Finch, E. and Munro, V.E. (2006), ‘Breaking boundaries?  Sexual consent in the 
jury room,’ Legal Studies, Vol.26, No.3, pp.303-320; Finch, E. and Munro, V.E. (2008), ‘Lifting the 
Veil: The Use of Focus Groups and Trial Simulations in Legal Research,’ Journal of Law and 
Society, Vol.35, pp.30 51; Finch, E. and Munro, V.E (1995), ’Juror stereotypes and blame 
attribution in rape cases involving intoxicants,’ British Journal of Criminology, Vol.45, pp.25-38. 
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Picture 7 
Having said all of that I acknowledge that jurors often try diligently to follow the legal 
instructions however, that does not mean that they necessarily understand them.31  
Indeed, judicial instructions are currently composed with a firm eye on the letter of the 
law and so in this respect, their comprehensibility can often be a secondary 
consideration which obviously will impact on the jurors to whom they are directed.  I do 
not suggest here that jurors should employ their own standards in order to understand 
the law but there is some evidence to suggest that this may be what they currently do.32  
What I am suggesting is that if Freire’s problem-posing were central to the mode of 
communication then any juror bias, misconceptions, misinterpretations and so on could 
be both identified and overcome. 
 
5.4.1 Testing problem-posing more generally in the trial 
There are other parts in the trial where problem-posing could be used with decision-
making being one of the more obvious places.  Whilst I have chosen not to place much 
emphasis on that part of the trial in this thesis I acknowledge that it has attracted much 
interest, with volumes of literature and research available on what influences a jury in 
the decision-making stage of the trial.33  Indeed, there appears to be an almost 
insatiable fascination surrounding juror decision-making which is based partly in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Steele, W.M. and Thornburg, E. (1988), ‘Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate’ 
67, North Carolina Law Review, 77-115. 
32 For example see Thomas, C. (2010), ‘Are juries fair’, Ministry of Justice Research Series, 1/10, 
February; Darbyshire et.al. (2001) above n.21. 
33 See chapter two, section 2.3.4. 
Picture 6 
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fact that the decisions are made behind closed doors.  Until such time as the 
restrictions in the Contempt of Court Act 1981 are lifted, it will not be possible to 
observe actual jurors as they make their decisions but does this really matter?  As I 
suggested in section 2.3.4 above, if the stages thus far explored are put into practice 
there will be less need to be concerned with what does or does not happen in the jury 
room because, through the dialogues, any misunderstandings, confusion or reliance on 
extra-legal factors which may have formed the basis of the verdict would have been 
identified much earlier in the process.  I do not suggest that the inclusion of 
codifications will somehow eradicate from the process those jurors who are prejudiced 
and who may therefore have acted inappropriately, however, what I do hope is that 
through open dialogue, in open court, we are at least able to see and hear the jury in 
action and with that insight comes a more focused future research method as well as 
much more clarity on how verdicts are formed.  Finally, I do not suggest that Freire’s 
pedagogy has the ability to prevent those who wish to behave inappropriately from so 
doing but I do suggest that with his ideas integrated into the criminal trial process we 
will first be able to get a little closer to hearing the jury function and second, begin to 
understand them a little better by providing a way for them to communicate which 
allows them scope to take control of their part in the process – a control that I argue is 
currently lacking.  
 
To this point I have identified the parts in the criminal trial that could potentially be 
troublesome for the jury, I have acknowledged them as such and I have tackled them in 
a way that has not until now been tested.  These points are based predominantly on the 
indications from the research but also, in small part as I said earlier, from my personal 
experience testing the system in a conference setting where I reconstructed a trial for 
the purposes of testing these concepts.  I have demonstrated the questions that could 
be posed using the codifications and these are designed to appeal to all individuals 
involved as jurors and so acknowledge the different abilities for understanding and 
perspectives of their part in the trial setting.  Acknowledging these different 
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relationships as well as teasing out the various possibilities to allow for better 
communication in the trial is only the start in my search to find a model for 
communication that sees the jury shift from merely being present in the courtroom, to 
being participants in the trial process.   
 
Using codifications, I argue, is a positive way to engage all of the trial participants in 
dialogues which should prove to be invaluable in gaining a better overall understanding 
of both an individual’s part and an individual’s understanding of the trial.  I accept 
however that these ideas may not be met with such positive opinion from everybody 
and so in the section to follow I address what I foresee as the most obvious criticisms to 
using Freire’s theories in the trial before ending the chapter by contextualising Boal’s 
theories and addressing the possible objections to integrating those into the trial 
process. 
 
5.4.2 The objections to integrating problem-posing into the criminal trial 
I accept that the introduction of these ideas may be met with resistance on several 
levels which may include: the perceived disruption to the trial generally; the added 
costs involved in teaching people the methods; the extra time and cost needed to 
complete the trial; the possible juror resistance to having to take extra time off work, 
find extra childcare and so on; and the perception that my ideas contravene the 
restrictions in the Contempt of Court Act1981 because juror anonymity could be 
regarded as becoming seriously compromised.  I shall now try to respond to these points 
by looking first to the objections which may be made against integrating Freire before 
ending the chapter with the objections which may be voiced in opposition to Boal’s 
theories.  In terms of the objections relating to the perceived disruption to the trial, I 
would say that, yes, the process of the trial will be disrupted but that disruption need 
not be seen as a negative.  Indeed I prefer to see it as a positive opportunity for 
participation which is important because – as we have seen – the arguments in favour of 
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the jury are all based on the premise that the jury is allowed to participate.  Therefore, 
as an extension of the arguments which defend lay participation, I have tried to explore 
what exactly that means, specifically in relation to juror understanding, by advancing 
some practical solutions.  Whilst admittedly I have disrupted the status quo with the 
introduction of Freire’s codifications (and later the introduction of the Joker), I have 
done so with positive motivation rather than negative.  I foresee that in terms of the 
disruption those most affected will be the legal professionals.  The jury should be less 
affected because their time in court is usually isolated to one trial, thus the 
communication of the trial is something that they are entering into for the first and (in 
theory) the last time.  In that respect therefore their patterns for communication in the 
trial situation have not become embedded and so do not need to be unpacked or 
relearned.  The legal professionals on the other hand would need to re-learn their 
communication style, or even become mindful of it for the first time, and in this respect 
Freire challenges them the most in my ideas for change.  I do not however regard this as 
a negative point, indeed, if legal professionals were given tools which allowed them to 
reflect on their communication styles and from that point we began to see a shift away 
from a “banking” style communication to a problem-posing dialogue with the jurors 
then I would regard that as progress which has unmeasured potential for future trials. 
 
In respect of the objections to the added time and cost I acknowledge that if trials run 
for slightly longer than they presently do then the automatic reaction by many would be 
disgruntlement with worries over money being wasted and time being misused.  I 
counter that argument by highlighting that if the verdict of the jury is rooted in 
informed, critical thought and understanding then that is time and money which is well 
spent.  Moreover, if it takes a few days longer to get to the end of a trial but in that 
time we can see and we can hear that each person involved has understood each step of 
the way then surely that has to be regarded as a better use of time and money than the 
alternative which is a trial in which the jury are to all intents and purposes excluded, 
their questions go un-asked and their verdict therefore may be based on spurious 
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foundations.  I know that in other situations Freire’s work has had a dramatic impact on 
those learning.34  I have for example direct experience of using Freire’s pedagogy in my 
work as a teacher and so I know the positive impact that it has on those learning.  
Finally, it goes without saying that the transformations for thousands of people in Latin 
America and beyond can only encourage us to at least try to see beyond the obvious 
negatives which at first occur.  I should say however, that despite the obvious benefits 
of using Freire’s pedagogy in other spheres I would not insist that it were used if the 
result was extended trials which saw the accused being put into a more oppressive 
situation than he already is.  Indeed, whilst my thesis is reserved to theory alone at this 
stage, if the ideas were to be introduced as practical solutions for the future I would 
argue that they be used with discretion, empathy and respect for all of those involved 
in the trial with the accused’s well-being regarded as important as the other trial 
players. 
 
I have maintained throughout this chapter that until we can create a trial framework 
which supports dialogue as a form of communication as the trial is in progress we will 
never really know where in the process difficulties arise, who experiences them and 
why they encounter such problems.  Indeed, one of the most repeated arguments 
against the use of the jury is that it is impossible to tell what they have based their 
verdict on.  This worry is based on the fact that we do not know whether they really 
understand and apply the judicial instructions, whether they only take account of the 
trial evidence or whether they rely on speculation or stereotypes in their verdict 
formulation.  This is then compounded by suspicion by some who feel that the only way 
to get to the root of the problem is to see inside the jury room.  I have maintained 
throughout that concerning ourselves with what happens in the jury room is misplaced 
because if misunderstandings have arisen in the course of the trial then ideally they 
should be addressed at that point in the trial and not later in the jury room.  I have also 
highlighted that some of the research has tackled the issue of juror understanding of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 I discussed this in chapter three. 
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judicial instructions with the provision of written instructions, changed timing of the 
said instructions and having pre-deliberation discussions as we have seen in chapter two 
(2.3.2). On this last point Michael Dann suggested, in light of the assumption that the 
jurors have come to their decision before all of the evidence is heard through having 
discussions with their fellow jurors, which are not permitted, that it would be better to 
structure said discussions and have them be judicially controlled. 35  Whilst I agree with 
Dann’s point about facilitating the discussions, I do not agree that they should be 
judicially controlled.  In chapter four I discussed who, from my position, would be the 
best person in this role: skilled enough to drive the dialogue; sensitive to the needs of 
those in the discussion; and, engaged enough to gauge a situation and act on the unsaid 
as well as the said.  By using Freire’s theories I hope that I have demonstrated, in 
theory at least, that it is possible to develop a form of communication which sees the 
jury as actively engaged in the trial process. 
 
I now come to the issue of my ideas contravening s.8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 
in relation to juror anonymity because I foresee that that could be a point of real 
resistance from critics of my concept.  Put concisely, if the trial were opened up to the 
ideas that I put forward, then there would be concerns both for legal professionals and 
for jurors at the prospect of their anonymity being compromised.  I completely 
understand this objection and I agree that each person involved may feel compromised.  
However, I would say first that when the jurors are in discussion/dialogue about the 
codifications, they are focused on the difficulty with the language as their primary point 
of discussion.  They are not therefore required to reveal their own personal opinions on 
whether the accused is guilty or innocent and nor are they revealing anything about 
themselves which is superfluous to the trial.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Dann, B.M. (1993), ‘“Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and 
Democratic Juries’, 68, Ind. L.J. 1229. 
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The second thing to say is that the ideas that I advance in this chapter, and perhaps 
more challengingly in chapter four, are not designed to undermine the core aims of the 
criminal trial.  I am not making provision to empower the jurors so that they themselves 
can instigate some sort of trial within the trial.  Indeed, to so do would be to undermine 
the principles on which both Freire and Boal’s work was based.  Thus, to be very clear, 
any objection which may be directed at worries over the jury running wild in the trial, 
questioning and cross questioning witnesses and the accused is unfounded.36  Indeed, at 
this stage in my research I do not recommend that the jury are permitted to ask 
questions of anybody except the legal professionals and I mean them to so do only 
within the broader Forum Theatre rules.  The other thing to highlight here is that my 
ideas may be criticised for appearing to suggest that the legal professionals enter 
discussions about legal terminology which, if they are not careful, could give grounds 
for appeal.  I remind the reader that I am viewing things first and foremost through a 
conceptual lens and so do not consider the idea that a judge may contravene the rules 
of criminal justice procedure as sufficient grounds for not re-assessing what they say, 
and how they say it, when trying to lend clarity to juror understanding.  Finally, whilst I 
understand that there may be genuine concerns from both jurors and criminal justice 
professionals, I believe that creating transparency in the trial will alleviate such 
concerns rather than exacerbate them.   
 
I shall build upon the ideas for integrating Freire’s problem-posing into the trial by 
adding Boal’s Joker to the process of communication.  Thus, in the section to follow, I 
test out how the trial may proceed if Augusto Boal’s Joker were an integrated part of 
the process. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 I discuss this point in section 5.5.2 below. 
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5.5 Testing Forum Theatre as an integral part of the criminal trial 
Having discussed, in chapter four, the theory of integrating Boal’s techniques into the 
trial as a way to enhance juror understanding though participation and facilitated by 
the Joker, I now attempt to enact that theory in as practical a sense as is possible in the 
theoretical form and to do that I have written a short script of a fictitious criminal trial.  
I have chosen not to place the trial within any particular procedural setting and that is 
done deliberately to reflect the fact that I have not chosen to confine the research in 
my thesis to any one jurisdiction.  As such I start the trial with a judge’s opening speech 
which is an amalgam of different systems of criminal law.  The reader will see that I 
have used names which are slightly caricatured – this is deliberate to make clear the 
fiction in the script but also to guard against any links being made with actual trials and 
which could therefore generate pre-framed ideas about the outcome.   
 
I have set the scene by embedding mock-up newspaper articles designed to prompt the 
reader to consider his or her prejudices, pre-decisional notions or pre-framed ideas as 
they read.  The reader is invited, if he or she wishes, to read the following pages from 
the perspective of a juror, thus getting the sense of how the different pieces of 
language in the trial come across to them as jurors.   
 
What I propose in the following pages is to demonstrate how, when we integrate the 
Joker, the lines for communication and participation are opened and facilitated.  What I 
see happening therefore is that, at the points in the trial where the problems begin to 
arise for the jurors they, quite simply, stop the action by shouting STOP.  They are then 
approached by the Joker who will ask them who they would like to address (having 
made it clear from the start that they may only address the legal professionals) and 
from that point the juror may speak directly to the person whose language it is that has 
become confusing for them and for the purposes of this explanation I shall proceed by 
using the Judge as the example.  The Judge will then respond and the Joker will then 
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clarify whether clarity has been achieved.  If it has then we move on if it has not then it 
is up to the Judge to make himself clear.  Thus, if the Judge simply repeats verbatim 
what he has said previously that will clearly not be helpful and so I would expect to 
hear language which is adapted to suit the needs of the juror.  I should point out that I 
am well aware of the rules of evidence and the need for Judge’s directions not to err 
from their point and which could result in a misdirection, however, as should be clear 
from what precedes, this is a theoretical investigation – not to be judged initially on its 
practical workability, but rather, on its potential for reimagining the role of the jury.  
Thus, when I say the Judge should adapt his language so that it is understandable I am 
not suggesting he dumbs it down to the point that he is departing entirely from the 
relevant legal test, nor is he deliberately using language which undermines their 
intelligence or patronises the jury.  With that said, what I would expect to emerge from 
the interventions is that each person should become acutely aware of the impact of 
their words and actions on those around them, hence, over time, developing a sense of 
direct, sensitive, clear communication and for that to become the norm rather than the 
exception.   
 
The principles which underlie the Theatre of the Oppressed are designed to awaken 
people to their own potential by empowering them to take control of situations, rather 
than assuming that they will be the passive subjects in the action.  I have already 
highlighted, and agreed with some the research which indicates that jurors have 
difficulty understanding certain elements of the trial but I have not been content with 
the idea that this difficulty in understanding is necessarily their fault.37  Indeed, my aim 
has never been to apportion blame where perceptions of misunderstanding arise, but 
rather to clarify understanding, for all concerned, in as unambiguous a way as I can 
manage.  Finally, in terms of furthering our theoretical reimagining of the practice I 
argue that through integrating Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed, we may gain a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Whilst apportioning blame has not been the focus of the majority of the jury research there are 
subtle undertones in the early work carried out by Kalven and Zeisel and the Chicago project 
more generally. 
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holistic understanding of the jury in the trial process.  On that point I now move to 
demonstrate the ideas in the form of a mock trial which integrates Boal’s Forum 
Theatre methods with particular emphasis on the use of the Joker as facilitator. 
 
5.5.1 Integrated participation – the Forum trial 
First in this section I give a brief background of the crime, attached to which are a 
selection of newspaper headlines and snippets of news.  I then begin the dialogue of the 
Forum trial and I intercut that with interventions which are, largely, Joker-led.  The 
Joker is therefore seen using his discretion to intervene with the STOP device.  I have 
chosen STOP to demonstrate the transformation from passive onlooker to active 
participant as I evidence the positive results from that participatory aspect of the 
Forum Trial.  The other reason for the interventions being predominantly Joker-led is 
more practical than anything else.  At this stage in my assessment I think that it could 
be either too chaotic or too static if the interventions were jury led.  If, for example, 
my ideas were ever to make it to the courtroom, and if the interventions were jury-led, 
my worries would be two-fold.  First, there is a strong possibility that the jury would 
not shout STOP, even at points where it could be expected they would have difficulty, 
thus undermining the whole exercise.  Second, if the jury constantly shout STOP, there 
is a chance that it could become extremely chaotic and possibly a little too 
overwhelming for all the other trial participants as I have already discussed.  That 
having being said, it would be an interesting exercise to allow for predominantly jury-
led interventions for no other reason but to experience, first hand exactly what causes 
them the most difficulty in a live trial. 
 
For the purposes of the Forum trial, the reader should assume that the action takes 
place in a traditional courtroom with its inherent segmentation and segregation.  
Initially I had imagined it in-the-round, thus removing all physical barriers and levels 
which could invoke status imbalance, however I have opted for the traditional 
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courtroom because I have argued that 
Boal’s Joker has the ability to overcome 
those hierarchical barriers and so allow 
the trial players to participate despite 
their thinking or assuming otherwise.  
Indeed, it would have been easy, in 
addition to opting for a set in-the-round, 
to remove ceremonial clothing for the 
purpose of creating as equal a platform as 
possible, but hindsight told me that that 
would have actually undermined the core 
of my argument at this point by suggesting that we remove the barriers that I have 
argued can be overcome through the use of Forum methods.   
	  
Images 4 & 5 
 
Radio	  _Mix_1.mp3
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To follow is the Forum Trial with interventions built in.  In an actual Forum piece, whilst 
there would be intervention points written into the script they will not be set and so the 
cast would be ready to react to any STOP in the process from a spectator.  I have 
obviously had to place them into the script at pre-determined places otherwise my 
point would be entirely lost. 
 
[Back story] 
A young homeless man is charged with the crime.  The story has been broadcast on all 
platforms for the national media which includes internet, newspapers television, radio 
and so on.  Newspaper headlines and articles such as the ones above (images 4 and 5) 
and radio and television broadcasts are seen and heard on a daily basis. 
 
 
(Mock script to demonstrate the Forum) 
HM.Advocate v. Haggis 
The High Court in Glasgow September 2012 
Court number 1 
Judge: Hamish Haggis, you are here today accused of the murder of Ceilidh 
Dancer.  It is alleged that on the day of 20th January 2012 you did stab Mrs 
Dancer on her body and neck with a knife and that you did intend to kill 
her.  You are therefore charged here with the common law crime of murder.  
Do you understand the charge against you? 
Hamish Haggis: Yes. 
Judge: How do you plead?  Guilty or not guilty? 
HH: Not Guilty. 
 
Judge opening speech to the jury 
Judge: Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury the starting point in this trial is to make 
clear the presumption of innocence.  Hamish Haggis is to be presumed 
innocent at this stage in the case and this is particularly important given the 
very high profile media attention that this case has had.  Ladies and 
gentlemen it is your duty to make a fresh start.  Any knowledge that you 
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have of the story which surrounds this trial must be set aside.  Whilst there 
may have been unprecedented press coverage you, on taking the oath or 
affirmation to try the accused on the basis of the evidence, have assumed 
both an autonomous and a collective responsibility to put any prior 
knowledge to one side.  Your duty carries with it enormous power, 
profound responsibility and it is your obligation to see that that is not 
abused.   
The onus to prove the allegation of murder rests on the Crown prosecutor.  
It is therefore the Crown who must prove the charges against the accused 
and it must do so to the criminal standard that is beyond reasonable doubt, 
which, as you would expect, is a high standard.  The main question for the 
Crown prosecutor is what was Mr Haggis’ intention and did it fit with the 
legally required intention to constitute the crime of murder.  And ladies and 
gentlemen, for you to return a guilty verdict the Crown must prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that to be the case, that Mr Haggis’ intention was that 
required for the criminal standard.  If you think, based on the evidence, that 
the law of this country has been violated and that that violation is to the 
criminal standard then you must deliver a verdict of guilty.  If you have 
even the slightest doubt in your mind then it is up to you to return a verdict 
of not guilty. 
JOKER: STOP! 
At this stage the Joker stops the proceedings and asks the jury if there is anything that 
needs to be clarified or that they are not clear about so far. 
Bearing in mind as I said in section 4.2.1 above, the Joker should try where possible to 
pose open questions, a sample question might be: 
Joker:  What is your understanding of the judge’s directions so far?   
Juror #1: I don’t understand what he means by reasonable doubt being a high 
standard – that could mean anything couldn’t it? 
Joker:   Judge, can you explain that point further? 
Judge Reasonable doubt means that you, members of the jury must be sure in your 
own minds, on the basis of the evidence presented, that the accused, Mr 
Haggis did intend to kill Mrs Dancer.   
Joker  Juror #1 does that clarify your question? 
Juror #1 Yes. 
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What we can see from the above is that almost immediately, the jury are given the 
opportunity to participate.  They are presented with a platform on which to be heard 
and so any early misunderstandings are identified and addressed.  Almost immediately 
the jury are transforming from passive onlookers to active participants, or in Forum 
language, spectator to spect-actor. 
The trial has been continuing for three weeks and in that time there has been 
relentless media coverage on all news forums.   
-------------------------------------------------- 
Police testimony October 16th 2011 
Crown : At what location and at what time did you find the accused? 
Police: Mr Haggis was found in the park behind the house where the deceased lived 
with her husband Barra and twin toddlers, Harris and Lewis. 
Crown:  Can you tell us what state he was in? 
Police: He was very disorientated, a little tearful and a little aggressive.  There was 
blood on his face, hands and clothes. 
Crown: Was he carrying anything? 
Police: He was carrying a knife. 
 
The examination in chief is over and now the defence take the stand 
Defence: Can you tell the jury what you were doing on the day in question? 
Haggis: I was in the park which backs onto the house that she lived in.  I was having 
a drink at the kid’s play-park and all of a sudden I heard screams from the 
house.  I thought oh no, I jumped the fence and I ran over to the back 
garden, the door was open which led into her big kitchen and I saw her 
lying there, blood everywhere, slashed all over, it was a total mess.  First I 
tried to help her, got down on the floor and I pressed my ear to her mouth to 
see if I could feel her breathing and… and… and… then I panicked ‘cos I 
heard some old woman shouting from in the house and I thought - no-
bodies going to believe me, everyone’s going to think it was me but it 
wasn’t me…it wasn’t me...I was just there having a drink…I didn’t kill 
her... I didn’t kill her. 
Defence: Did you have anything when you ran from the house? 
Haggis:  Yes, I had a knife.  
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Defence: Was the knife your knife Hamish? 
Haggis: No…I lifted the knife from her when I tried to help her and it must have still 
been in my hand when I ran out…I panicked… I tried to help her…I didn’t 
kill her…I didn’t but nae’ body’ll believe someone like me…I’m scared…. 
 
in the Forum cut to here and assume now we have heard from the defence and the 
Crown take the stand for cross-examination 
Crown Mr Haggis, you told my learned friend and this court that the knife that the 
police found you holding at the scene of the crime was not your knife.  Do 
you honestly expect this jury to believe that you are an innocent man?  Do 
you honestly think this jury are so stupid as to believe that someone like you 
would try to help anyone?  That someone like you would have run to help 
Mrs Dancer?  Mr Haggis, have you got a job? 
Haggis:  No. 
Crown:  Have you ever had a job? 
Haggis:  No. 
Crown: I have a statement here from your registered doctor which says that you are 
dependent on the drug Diacetylmorphine Hydrochloride. (STOP – Juror’s 
may stop to clarify what this is, when asked to respond class-A drug heroin) 
Haggis: (confused). What?  
Crown: And, how do you get money for your heroin Mr Haggis?  It’s quite 
expensive isn’t it Mr Haggis?  I say to you Mr Haggis that you went out on 
the day in question, armed with your knife and with the sole intention of 
getting money to feed your pathetic habit.  I would suggest that you either 
intended to kill Mrs Dancer or you had a complete and utter disregard for 
her life.  Your mens rea therefore was intention to kill when Mrs Dancer 
stopped you in your tracks.  Isn’t that right Mr Haggis?  Don’t we concur on 
those points Mr Haggis? 
JOKER – STOP! 
A sample question at this stage could be: 
Joker:  Jury, what do you understand of the story so far? 
Juror #2 He is definitely guilty.  We have him in the house, we have him with the 
knife, we have him needing to get her money to get his drugs.  We have just 
about everything that the papers have been going on about from the start. 
Joker:  Judge would you like to clarify any points for the jury at this stage? 
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Judge: Ladies and gentlemen, may I remind you that you have sworn an oath of 
affirmation to try the accused on the evidence only.  It is your responsibility 
to cast side all other information which you may have heard prior to the trial 
and it is also your responsibility not to pay attention to media coverage of 
the trial. 
 
Trial continues and cut to closing speech 
 
Judge closing speech to the jury 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury I thank you for your attention during this trial.  Please 
pay attention to the instructions that I am about to give you.  It has been for the Crown 
prosecutor to prove that the victim was killed by Mr Haggis.  The Crown prosecutor must 
therefore have satisfied you, from the evidence brought to court in this trial, that Mr 
Haggis did kill the victim.  Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, if a reasonable doubt exists 
in your minds as to the accused’s guilt, he must be acquitted.  As I said at the beginning of 
this trial, you must make your decision based on the evidence that you have heard 
throughout the trial and you must decide the verdict based on the criminal standard which I 
shall remind you is beyond reasonable doubt.  If there is doubt amongst you, then that will 
constitute a level of responsibility below the criminal standard and in that event you must 
return a verdict of Not Guilty. 
[end of mock script] 
The Forum Trial would continue in this way until the end with the Joker coming in and 
out of the action at his discretion.  This is only a sample of how a trial could run as 
there are myriad possibilities in terms of dialogue between participants.  Above all, 
what I hope to have demonstrated is that by using Boal’s devices, participation can be 
enabled in a criminal trial.  Thus, with the inclusion of the Joker the passive jurors are 
transformed into active participants and through their interaction we can actually see 
and hear what they do and do not understand.  Where there are barriers to 
understanding, each trial participant is made aware of those barriers and so can adapt 
his communication skills accordingly.  In addition, if jurors do not want to participate 
then, as I have previously argued, they should not be compelled to so do, however I 
argue that the seriousness of their task is magnified by the presence of the Joker and so 
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the scope for apathy or disengagement, I argue, is greatly reduced.  Overall, I hope to 
have shown that through the use of these techniques meaningful dialogue is enabled 
which in turn should lead to verdicts based on thoughtful consideration.   
 
My aim at the beginning of this section was to re-create a snippet of a Forum Theatre 
criminal trial to demonstrate how Forum and the Joker could work to enable actual true 
participation by the jury during the trial.  In the final section of this chapter I address 
the possible objections to the ideas that I put forward.  
5.5.2 Objections to integrating Forum Theatre into the criminal trial 
I now come to the criticisms which could be raised in opposition to Boal’s theories.  As 
with Freire’s theories, I would not dispute that a number of practical objections might 
be made to the proposals to integrate some of Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed devices 
into trial by jury and I am quite sure that they would be met with resistance from some 
both inside and outside of the legal profession.  Before addressing what I anticipate will 
be the stiffest resistance, I should point out that the traditional trial has already been 
challenged, as well as its scope widened with the rise of alternative forms of 
adjudication such as mediation, restorative justice or Children’s Hearings (in Scotland).  
Additionally, we see more frequently the dissemination or fragmentation of the 
courtroom with the use of video links to transmit evidence from remote witnesses or 
the rise of specialist courts designed to deal with specific issues such as domestic 
violence or drug related offences.  Against this background, introducing Forum Theatre 
techniques such as Boal’s Joker would not represent quite as radical a shift as it would 
once have done and may provide an effective means to break down barriers to 
participation without having to engage in a wholesale redesign of courtroom 
architecture.  I anticipate that the most resistance to my ideas will be based in fear of 
change and the perceived threat that Boal’s work brings to the status quo of trial by 
jury.  This is understandable given that fear is a dominant factor in preventing or 
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obstructing changes in mind-set or perspective on a daily basis and so to make an 
exception in this field seems to me to be unrealistic.   
 
To this point I have set out my reasons for making Augusto Boal’s Theatre of the 
Oppressed an integral part of the trial process in an attempt to see if it would be 
possible to create a forum in which the jury could be supported in meaningful 
participation in the trial.  I have drawn out the key points of his work and I have 
demonstrated why I think that Theatre of the Oppressed, particularly Forum Theatre 
and the Joker, would be valid for use in a courtroom.  When reflecting on Freire’s work, 
my ideas may be met with some resistance and I accept that the same may be so with 
moves to integrate Boal’s techniques.  Indeed, I suspect that the introduction of Boal’s 
techniques may be more challenging at first glance than Freire’s because it is in Boal 
that we can see the physicality of participation coming to life whereas with Freire there 
may have been a sense of security in that, up until that point, I was putting forward 
ideas which, prima facie, could have seemed more contained.  With the integration of 
the Joker however there may be a more immediate sense of disruption which may 
provoke more resistance.  Indeed, as with Freire, I accept that the introduction of 
Boal’s techniques may see the same or similar opposing arguments as were highlighted 
in relation to Freire’s problem-posing and which include the perceived disruption to the 
trial; the added costs involved in allowing for the extra time needed to complete the 
trial; the possibility that jurors might want to ask questions of the witnesses or the 
accused and, the questions over the Joker more generally.   
 
I have indicated previously that I only envisage that the jury would be permitted to ask 
questions of the legal professionals and that in itself may be regarded by critics as a 
point to question.  Indeed, I accept that a jury may become frustrated when, on the 
one hand they are given scope to participate (and so they may have the impression that 
they will be able to ask any question, of any person involved in the trial), but on the 
other their participation is restricted when they are told to whom they may direct their 
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questions and the scope of content for those questions.  I also accept that this 
restriction alone could be regarded as rendering the jurors capable only of reactive 
participation and so, whilst I have already discussed my reasons for limiting the scope 
for juror participation in respect of the scope of their questions, I shall clarify my 
position once more.  The first thing to say is that the person in the Joker role would, 
ideally, be sensitive to the motivation underpinning juror questions – that is to say, that 
juror participation is to be enabled in order for a juror to clarify his understanding of 
the legal language, thus creating a forum which sees jurors able to base their verdicts 
on clearly understood information rather than possible misunderstandings or confusion.  
The second thing to say is that I see the integration of Boal’s Joker as a positive 
element for all of those involved in a trial and not just the jury.  Thus, to be clear, I do 
not suggest that a Joker be integrated into the trial to act on behalf of the jury and to 
allow them to create their own rules to the detriment of the other trial participants and 
so, in reality, can see their questions being limited to asking questions which allow for 
their clarity of understanding.  Finally, with the benefit of reflection as well as practical 
experience of the transformative potential of Boal’s work, I believe that my vision for 
future trials could be possible and effective for enhancing communication which then 
leads to clarity in understanding despite what might appear to be radical suggestions.  I 
now discuss in more detail those possible objections to my proposals.  
 
The first issue to address is the use of theatre devices in a criminal trial.  As I have 
previously said, Forum Theatre is a form of participatory theatre: an opportunity for 
creative community-based dialogue, culminating in the theatre being performed, 
predominantly, by the people living with the issues which form the heart of the Forum 
piece.  The Forum stories build to a crisis and stop at the crisis, with no options or 
alternatives available to the protagonist.  The piece is re-run, this time with the Joker 
who facilitates the interventions with the protagonist and spect-actor and, through 
dialogue, the piece ends on a more positive note than in the initial run.  There are 
several problems if this format were to be integrated into the trial.  First, in traditional 
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Forum the invitation is to replace an oppressed character and “do battle with an 
oppressor, to experiment with ways to break the oppression”38 is in itself, as David 
Diamond points out, limiting as it only allows for one protagonist and one oppressor at 
any one time and this, I argue, is unrealistic if we try to transfer to a criminal trial.  
Indeed, by the very nature of the trial set-up, it could be argued that there are several 
oppressors and only one oppressed, whoever we choose to regard as the latter, is 
dependent on our subjective interpretation of individuals in discrete trials.  However, 
the Forum style would be very difficult to integrate because a trial is not a piece of 
theatre, there is no rehearsal and there is no chance to change the ending once it has 
been realised, raising the obvious question over why we should consider its application 
in the first place.  I should be clear therefore that I am not suggesting the full 
integration of Forum Theatre into the trial situation but rather that the core principles - 
meaningful dialogue which is facilitated by a Joker - are integrated.  I argue that these 
are key to moving trial by jury from the static confined framework that we have 
become accustomed to, to a flexible and reflexive framework which is able to support 
such interactions which enable dialogue with jurors.   
 
This leads to the second, and what I consider may be the most crucial point of 
resistance to my ideas, the use of the Joker per se.  Ideologically Boal’s Joker is the 
impartial facilitator of the action, he is skilled in his position and he is ever astute in 
remaining on the periphery of the interactions.  Indeed, I suspect that most Jokers 
would say that they do not influence the process, that they are wholly selfless and that 
their vision is for the group or individuals involved in the interaction.  But, can this ever 
be the case if the Joker is a living person?  If looked at closely, the Joker can surely 
never be truly impartial because it is the Joker who asks such questions as “what is your 
experience of hurt” or, ”what is your understanding of the words just spoken.”  These 
questions are then followed up with questions of cause and effect.  Thus, what Boal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Diamond, D. (2007), Theatre for Living: the art and science of community-based dialogue, 
Trafford Publishing, p.40. 
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does in the Joker is he encourages us to “engage in the tough and courageous act of 
contact”39 therefore he becomes partial and if taken a step further, how can a Joker 
who has faced same or similar situations that arise in the Forum remain on the 
periphery?  We must therefore ask whether in this we see a transition from witness to 
subject and if we do then the idea that the Joker is the animator of the complexities of 
being both the subject and the object is problematic for our purposes.  For example, if 
we then transfer this to the courtroom situation, the list of objections to integration of 
the Joker becomes both obvious and endless.  He could manipulate the trial process to 
negative gains, he could oppress certain witnesses, he could be bribed prior to a trial to 
act for one side, he could use his skills to sway the jury and so on.  Whilst there is 
always the possibility that a Joker could act for these negative gains as Schutzman 
suggests when she refers to him as the ‘trickster,’ I argue that the chances of this 
becoming a reality are far less than the possibility of the legal profession achieving 
these ends of their own accord.40  Fundamentally, if, as Mady Schutzman says, the Joker 
runs wild, then he is not the Joker in the construct of Boal and should be treated with 
caution.41  Moreover, I suggest that to focus on an argument based in what the Joker 
could do in the negative sense is a futile argument predominantly because it is based in 
nothing more than negative speculation which leads nowhere unless substantiated one 
way or the other. 
 
With focus on the Joker as a way in which clarity could be facilitated in the course of 
the trial, it could be argued that the authority of the Judge may easily be undermined 
and this may emerge as a very strong point of resistance to the ideas that I put forward.  
I acknowledge this point, but would stress again that the object of integrating the Joker 
is not to undermine authority or place in the trial, but rather to open up the lines for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Salverson, J. ‘Witnessing subjects.  A fool’s help’ in Cohen-Cruz and Schutzman, M. (eds.) 
(1996), A Boal Companion, Dialogues on theatre and cultural politics, New York and London, 
Routledge 
40 Cohen-Cruz and Schutzmann above n.39, p.141 
41 Cohen-Cruz and Schutzmann above n.39, p.133. 
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communication between all the parties.  I accept that the idea of the Joker may seem 
to disrupt the trial at its very core, thus affecting, at a fundamental level, the expected 
norms from a variety of parties, not least the legal professionals.  Indeed, having spent 
a great deal of the thesis discussing and highlighting the benefits which could emerge 
from the integration of the Joker, I am nonetheless sensitive to his effect on the legal 
professionals in particular.  Indeed, it would be naïve of me to think that the 
introduction of this character would be accepted easily by legal professionals, who have 
been working in an environment of familiarity both in terms of the rules that they 
adhere to and the rules that they make in the duration of a criminal trial.  I should be 
clear when making reference to rules and what I am pointing at in particular are those 
rules of narrative which could be used in the delivery of evidence, used to manipulate 
or cajole or disorientate – subliminal unspoken rules but rules nonetheless and ones 
which may be challenged when the Joker takes his place as facilitator of the 
communication of the trial.  I remind the reader however that I have already drawn out 
very clear guidelines on the conduct of the Joker and I would expect that any person 
jokering would respect and adhere to those guidelines.  This is a given and, of course, if 
a Joker were to abuse his position then obviously there would be negative effects such 
as the possibility of integrating Boal into the live trial being completely undermined.   
 
Another argument against the integration of Boal’s devices would be over the extended 
amount of time that a trial could command.  Indeed, if we allow time for the Joker to 
facilitate dialogue throughout, trials could obviously last longer than they do currently, 
thus raising such concerns as financial and time burdens for jurors and other trial 
players.  In that respect therefore my ideas could come under pressure from those 
concerned with the efficient running (both financially and time-wise) of the trial.  I 
accept this and I do see the flaw in my own argument.  That is, if each trial takes longer 
because of the extended time needed for clarification of understanding, that the 
integration of the Joker could actually be a contributory factor in further oppressing 
those alleged and suspected offenders who may, as a result, need to wait unduly for a 
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trial date.42  Moreover, I accept that the added time which may be required could be 
seen as running counter to the aims of running trials efficiently so that the wider 
criminal justice system of which they are a part can run more smoothly.  I do however 
argue that if we are looking for legitimacy in a verdict as a means to play out justice, 
then we must allow time for that clarity to be gained by the jury.  Indeed, if the 
participants can see that their part is valid and that the jury especially can see that 
they are regarded as a vital part of the system, then the extra time needed for trials 
should not be considered overly problematic.  Moreover, when we recall the latest 
statistics for the number of jury trials43 we see that they contribute to a tiny fraction of 
the overall trials heard in any given year.  Thus, arguments over the added costs 
incurred are brought into perspective and, I argue, should not be given prominence 
because the benefits gained by enabling jurors who can make clearly informed verdicts 
outweighs any financial burden. 
 
Finally, the autonomy of the jury could also be called into question in this new 
structure.  Indeed, some may argue that making what the jury say and do visible may 
compromise their position entirely.  I would tend to agree with this fear if it transpired 
that the jury really are incapable of carrying out their task as some sceptics maintain.  
If however that turned out to be the case then there would be a strengthening of my 
argument because as a result of my vision we would be able to see and hear all of the 
communication and where that is made possible renewed faith in the system of trial by 
jury may begin to emerge.  Finally, 
“The “world’s most famous court trial” attracted media attention and headlines 
around the globe.  Radio and print journalists, photographers, and movie camera 
crews swelled the crowd and provided economic benefits to the community, 
since they needed hotel rooms, food services, and sundries.  Potential jurors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Duff A., Farmer L., Marshall S., and Tadros V. (2007), The Trial on Trial, Volume Three: Towards 
a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, p.61. 
43 http://www.justice.gov.uk/statistics/courts-and-sentencing/judicial-annual-2011 - in England and 
Wales the total number of trials heard was 1,734,579 of which 17,786 were trial by jury which is 
1.25% of the overall trials heard.  In Scotland the information suggests the figure was nearer 5% 
which reflects those proceeded against in the High Courts and Sheriff Court solemn 
proceedings http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/11/5336. [both sites live at 
07/07/2013] 
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vied with one another for a coveted place on the panel and hence in the 
spotlight.  Many testified that despite all the publicity they knew nothing about 
the affair that could prejudice them.”44  
Indeed, most of the jurors on the venire testified to not having heard anything about 
the Scopes trial, one amongst several in the past to have been dubbed “the trial of the 
century.”45  These few words sum up the confusion and difficulty which I have 
attempted to tease out in the course of this thesis.  On the one hand we have 
indications that the amount of apathy which weighs on jurors outweighs their attempts 
to engage in the trial.  There is information that suggests that jurors rely on spurious 
information in their journeys to their verdicts and here we have an example of the 
glorification of the criminal trial enticing potential jurors to get the central part and do 
their duty for the sake of a kind of justice. 
The impact of the glorification and glamour of the trial should not be under-estimated 
when it certainly is a large part of popular culture today.  This glorification and glamour 
could metamorphose the trial into something that it is not and so I argue that the 
integration of Boal’s Forum Theatre and his Joker will make in-roads to de-cluttering 
these distorted images of an almost Victorian theatricality currently attached to the 
trial.  As I have said before, but I feel it is worth mentioning a final time, in Boal we do 
not see the trappings of the theatre: there are no grand set designs, no elaborate 
costumes, soundscapes and music scores are, in my experience, kept to the minimum 
for nuance effect rather than elaborate accompaniment or creation of another voice 
and, most importantly, the work is accessible by everyone often in outdoor areas, 
streets, arenas and so on.  Moreover, in the template for a future trial that I have 
created we can still see the trial but not as a theatrical spectacle only to be watched 
but rather as something to be respected and guided through our own integrity – each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Garber, M. ‘Cinema Scopes: Evolution, Media, and the Law’ in Sarat, A. and Kearns, T. R. (eds.) 
(1998), Law in the Domains of Culture: The Amherst Series in Law, Jurisprudence, and Social 
Thought, University of Michigan Press, Michigan p.121. 
45 Others include the O.J. Simpson trial (1994); the Nuremberg war-crimes tribunal (1945-46) which 
I acknowledge did not have a jury, and the Leopold and Loeb trial (1924). 
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one is accessible but the latter I argue more realistic.  And it is this last point on which I 
shall dwell for a moment before concluding.   
The accessibility of the trial is, we must not forget, regarded by many as a fundamental 
principle of the law in contemporary society, but identifying exactly why and for whom 
is, as Duff et.al highlight, quite difficult to establish.46  There are the obvious 
arguments which include that justice must be seen to be being done, that verdicts 
should be delivered in public when people are called to account in criminal proceedings 
and it follows, as Duff et.al. highlight that the “‘Guilty’ verdict constitutes a 
condemnation of the defendant as a public wrongdoer.”47  There are also the less 
obvious images of the public side of the trial: the ceremony; the ritual; and the 
spectacle.48  All of the images of the trial can, in some guise or another be linked with 
theatricality, the more traditional norms of the world of theatre. 
I have argued throughout this chapter for integration of Boal’s Joker as a way to 
enhance participation in a trial.  I believe that these techniques can make a difference 
because through enabling meaningful participation jurors may be able to take control 
when they do not understand what certain language means.  Moreover, by developing a 
forum where participation is central then from a research perspective we can begin to 
quite literally hear what the jury do and do not understand.  However, given that what I 
am suggesting are interactive theatre techniques I am keen to stress that they must not 
be confused with somehow making the trial process more theatrical.  Boal developed his 
Theatre of the Oppressed as a way to give voice to those who otherwise could not be 
heard and I suggest similar for the jury as a way to enhance their understanding in the 
criminal trial. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Duff et.al 2007 (Trial three) above n.42, chapter 9. 
47 Duff et.al 2007 (Trial three) above n.42, p.268. 
48 McEwan, J. (2003), The Verdict of the Court: Passing Judgement in Law and Psychology, Oxford 
and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing. 
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5.6  Conclusion to chapter five 
In this chapter I have demonstrated how, if we integrate the devices for communication 
and participation found in Freire and Boal’s work, the trial communication between the 
jury and the legal professionals could be altered with the result that jurors may be 
better informed as the trial is in progress.  I have discussed the core methods used in 
both Freire and Boal’s work and I have argued that they would be valid for use in a 
courtroom to enable jurors who are empowered to act proactively in their roles.  The 
aim of this chapter was to consider the possibilities for improving juror understanding of 
the judicial instructions and legal language used throughout the trial, with particular 
focus on the benefits of dialogue as the primary communication device.  I turned my 
attention to the work of Paulo Freire in the first instance because I believe that through 
his problem-posing method we can enhance communication in the courtroom and by 
extension we should be able to enhance understanding.  I have explored the possibilities 
of using dialogue as the primary communication method maintaining that it is through 
dialogue that real understanding can occur.  Moreover, I have stressed that it is through 
dialogue that we are able to see and hear what really happens for the jury in the trial 
and from that point we can thus build our understanding of their part in the trial.  I 
have also maintained that dialogue empowers and that it is an avenue for integration – I 
have demonstrated therefore how, with the use of Freire’s problem-posing and Boal’s 
Forum method, we can physically see the jury involved in the process to which they 
play a crucial part.  In putting forward these ideas for change I have invited the reader 
to shift perspective on what he considers a trial by jury to be.  I have disrupted some of 
the norms commonly associated with this system and I have put forward ideas for 
change which do require quite major shifts in both the way that the trial should 
proceed, and the way in which we choose to take on those changes.   
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Chapter six 
Conclusion to the thesis 
6.1 Introduction to chapter six 
At the beginning of this thesis I claimed that I would explore alternative ways to address 
the issue of juror understanding in an attempt both to shift our own perspective of the 
scope of the role of the jury, as well as developing alternative research methods which 
may result in our enhanced understanding of what the jury do and do not understand in 
the course of a criminal trial.  I now argue that I have achieved what I set out to do and 
that in the course of the thesis I have developed our understanding of the extent or the 
scope of the role of the jury by advancing a concept which imagines communication and 
participation by the jury taking place at the point in the process where intervention is 
required for their clarity of understanding.  By remaining a conceptual thesis, I have 
challenged traditional conceptions of the role of the jury, with the result that the focus 
shifts from a passive jury to one who, given the scope to participate, may interact with 
the legal professionals.  Ultimately I have transformed the course of the trial from one 
in which there is very little space for the jury to participate to one which - as a matter 
of course - places the jury on an equal footing with the other trial players, treating it 
not as a subsidiary but rather as an integrated part of the overall process. 
I assessed the jury within the broader framework of the criminal trial to see when and 
where their problems arose and very quickly I concluded that in order to make that 
exploration I would need first to make space for the jury within that framework.  
Therefore I have maintained throughout the thesis that in the current system, whilst 
there is obviously a space for the jury, this amounts to little more than an allocation of 
physical spaces within the architectural interior design of the courtroom.  First, we see 
the jury box within which they must function in the course of the trial and second we 
see the jury room, an ante-room within which they are to come to their decision – in 
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both they are contained until they have completed their task to the level expected by 
the justice system.  Space for them to function I have argued is seriously lacking which, 
given that the entire trial rests on the verdict of the jury, is an area in need of 
reassessment.  Additionally, most of the research and literature on the jury takes 
participation as given, without exploring the nature of that participation.  I have 
however challenged this perception and have shown that presence in the courtroom is 
not the same as participation in the trial.    
I also highlighted in chapter one that I would offer practical ideas to heighten our 
awareness of juror understanding and in the course of the research I have drawn on my 
experience of working in both theatre arts and critical education to achieve this.  In 
that respect alone I am confident that my work is truly interdisciplinary, both in the 
combination and scope of the research areas as well as in its capacity for alternative 
forms for presentation of the ideas.1  I chose to look to Freire and Boal, whose work is 
not ordinarily associated with jury research, but whose theories for communication and 
participation, I felt, could bring clarity to understanding the role of the jury by 
transforming the way in which people are permitted to participate in the trial.  Thus, by 
considering the lessons to be learned from Freire’s critical pedagogy and the different 
perspectives of participation inspired by Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed, I have argued 
for a forum in which space is made for the jury and from that point I have introduced 
options which allow for both them and the legal players to communicate as openly and 
unambiguously as possible.  This type of open, unambiguous communication between 
these players is not a part of the current trial process.   
In chapter two I looked to the existing jury research and it was against that background 
that I began to look more closely at the scope of the role of the jury in the trial.  My 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 At the time of writing confirmation of full funding has been granted and the ideas contained in the 
thesis will be developed for a staged production to be performed at a site specific venue with 
Grid Iron Theatre Company.  This therefore is an example of my interdisciplinary research being 
realised practically with the dialogue that I have started being made available to a far wider 
audience.  
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primary focus therefore was to look at the kinds of problems identified in the jury 
research and literature and to look at the conception of understanding and participation 
that underlay this.  From that point I was able to gain a clearer picture of the reasons 
underpinning continued use of the jury and from there was able to develop both my own 
understanding of the jury in the trial, as well as to expand my ideas to advance the 
practical solutions that I do. 
I have set my ideas within the current procedural and architectural structures of 
adversarial trials.  However I have been clear from the start that, given that my work is 
conceptual, I do not always adhere to the procedural rules because it was never my 
intention for the ideas here to be considered as either realistic or workable for 
currently running criminal trials.  I should also say that in the future I would like to 
spend more time assessing the impact of space on the trial players and in that respect I 
would consider such things as deference to allocated space, the effect of environment 
on a persons’ willingness to participate, and the subliminal control factors at play in the 
very fabric of the courthouses which host trials today.  Therefore at the end of this 
chapter I point towards what could be a more nuanced exploration of those areas by 
discussing some of the work briefly mentioned in the thesis, including that of Peter 
Brook, Robert Lepage, Grid Iron and La Fura dels Baus.   
Before drawing the conclusions relating to the dominant themes of the project I should 
clarify for a final time where I consider my thesis sits in relation to other jury research, 
and why I think that my ideas represent a fresh perspective within this increasingly vast 
scholarship.  My thesis represents a conceptual exploration of the jury within the three 
disciplines of law, critical pedagogy and interactive theatre arts and in that respect it is 
both novel and innovative.  I have placed the understanding of the jury centre stage and 
I have attempted to treat the jury as a valid and valued part of the trial process.  In so 
doing I have not examined it in isolation, rather, where possible, I have considered its 
part and its place within the overall criminal trial process.  I now draw the conclusions 
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to the dominant themes that I discuss in the thesis.  Thereafter, I look briefly at how 
both jury research and our image of the scope of the role of the jury could be reimaged 
further as a result of my ideas. 
6.2 Conclusions relating to communication and juror understanding of 
legal terminology 
On the basis of the current research into juror comprehension, I would say that there is 
no doubt that the communication between all of the trial players in criminal trials 
currently is compromised.  Therefore, I suggest that there is a very real need to enable 
a more fluid and open communication style.  I have highlighted, for example, the 
research that indicates that when jurors become confused, frustrated or disinterested 
they will be more likely to default to relying on stereotypes, extra-legal information or 
defer to the stronger characters or opinions in the jury room.  These tendencies are 
exacerbated when, as it certainly seems to be the case currently, there are no clear 
avenues for clarification when confusion or ambiguities do arise, or if some argue that 
those avenues are available, I suggest that they are nonetheless ineffective.  I cite for 
example the permission to ask the judge for clarification of judicial instructions which 
prima facie is an avenue for jurors to clarify their understanding, however when we 
consider that their questions must be asked in writing, through the clerk of the court 
and only at an interval in the proceedings which is dictated by procedure, the moment 
for clarification may well have long passed for the juror.  Additionally, I have indicated 
that the general responses to poor understanding borne out of inadequate 
communication have tended to be focused on providing the jury with more aids to 
understanding rather than truly integrating them into the process.  I discussed this at 
length in chapter three, when highlighting the differences between critical pedagogy 
and traditional technocratic pedagogy, as well as drawing parallels with both the 
current communication, and the responses to poor understanding in the court.  I said 
also that I considered the responses to the hurdles that jurors experience to be 
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traditional and technocratic.  Indeed, I am surprised that despite the volumes of 
research in this area, the expectation is still that the jury will sit and listen passively 
and then recall the evidence in preparation of the verdict.  The various aide memoires 
available do not, in my opinion, detract from the fact that this is still a very 
technocratic system with very technocratic responses to problems and hurdles arising 
out of that system.   
In order to address this general problem, my responses, as I have demonstrated, have 
not been in line with the majority to date.  I did not isolate the jury in my research but 
rather I integrated them and viewed them as part of the bigger structure.  Indeed, in 
this respect alone my approach has been consistently different because I have always 
argued that to address the issue to find a long-term solution we must first look at all of 
the trial players, not just the jury.   
Probably the way in which my approach is most different from the majority is that I 
have chosen to offer solutions from the perspectives of critical pedagogy and 
interactive theatre arts and, whilst those solutions are confined to the written form in 
this thesis, they can be easily realised practically and, I argue, are most powerful when 
communicated in interactive, physical forms.  Indeed, in chapter five I demonstrated 
that if we communicate the trial information using Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 
in particular his problem-posing and codifications, the basic communication in the trial 
is immediately altered.  Additionally in that same chapter I developed Freire’s pedagogy 
by introducing the work of Boal and showed that through the use of his Theatre of the 
Oppressed techniques, communicative participation can be achieved.  I have stressed 
throughout my work the importance of clear, unambiguous communication in the trial 
and I chose to enable that through integrating the work of Freire and Boal.  I chose to 
address these issues through the eyes of Freire and Boal predominantly because I have 
first-hand, practical experience of their work.  Indeed, I have experienced the potent 
effects of integrating their work in life, and so I am confident that the situation in a 
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courtroom could be altered dramatically if their work were integrated in the ways that I 
have described throughout this thesis.  Indeed, I suggest that the results could be far-
reaching both in terms of our understanding of juries and juror understanding per se.  
To follow therefore I draw my conclusions on how effective the theories of Freire and 
Boal could be in the system of trial by jury. 
There can be no doubt whatsoever that there is a great deal of information - both in the 
form of research and commentary - on which to develop our understanding of the 
system of trial by jury.  I have demonstrated this to be the case and have highlighted 
that the information is mainly in the form of mock, shadow and simulated jury trials 
where the results from such studies can only be regarded as strong indications, nothing 
more and nothing less.  This research method however is limited and limiting for a 
number of reasons, with possibly the most important being that in such trials the 
attention is placed on the jury in isolation and I have argued throughout that unless we 
consider the jury as part of the bigger framework we will continue to be confused by its 
processes and its understandings.  Similarly, there is no doubt that progress has been 
made in recent years in regard to trying to provide jurors with up-to-date and relevant 
extrinsic information designed to aid their part as the decision-makers in the trial.  
Once again I have taken issue with this, not because of the types of aids offered, but 
rather at the insistence on giving things to the jury rather than integrating them into 
the process proper.  Indeed, I maintain the opinion that until such time as we make 
space for that jury and support them in their role as jurors we will never really move 
beyond what we already know.  I conclude therefore that the current research is lacking 
in vision and until that is rectified we will always lack progress in this area.  As I 
claimed at the beginning of the thesis however, my proposals do offer research insights 
into juries by speaking with jurors as the trial is in progress.   
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6.3 Conclusions relating to Freire’s pedagogy as a communication device 
In chapter three I put forward the arguments for integrating Paulo Freire’s pedagogy 
into the current system of trial by jury and in chapter five I contextualised these 
theories in a mock-up trial.  I said at the beginning of the chapter that I was drawn to 
his work because of, inter alia, his ability to empower and through empowerment 
comes a type of learning which is sustainable, something which I suggested was vital if 
reform in trial by jury is to work.  I identified the core of Freire’s education not as a 
means of getting education per se, but rather about engaging with one-another through 
dialogue to generate thought, explanations and understanding and I referred most 
specifically to his rejection of the teacher as the expert and pointed the reader to his 
insistence that education should be about exchanging ideas, which in turn leads to 
positive and productive learning.  As such, the essence of Freire’s pedagogy is about 
emphasising understanding for both the teacher and the student in equal measures.  
Thus in chapter three I adopted this principle and I placed the emphasis for 
understanding on all of the trial players, drawing away from placing the emphasis on 
the jury alone.  Essentially, Freire identifies the problem and second he responds to it 
in a way that places the student at the centre of the learning – I have done the same 
with the jury.  
 
In order to explore how Freire’s theories could theoretically develop juror 
understanding I firstly needed to assess the current trial communication and try, as 
Freire does, to identify where the problems or hurdles arise and from that point work 
on responding to them.  I therefore dissected the process of communication as it 
currently stands in the trial, highlighting what I regarded as the primary weak points at 
which communication breakdown could conceivably occur.  I made a detailed analysis in 
section 3.3 of the thesis and I stressed that, unless we can create dialogue, or at least 
clear communication between the jury and the legal professionals, there will always be 
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doubt cast over the legitimacy of the verdict.  Moreover, unless the hurdles can be 
identified and addressed as they arise, there is always potential for confusion. 
  
In response to that in chapter five I demonstrated how, by integrating Freire’s 
codifications and by using as the core communication style his problem-posing, 
communication by all of the trial players could be enhanced with the result that any 
misunderstandings are identified and responded to immediately and not at the end of 
the trial.  This marks a sea-change in response to juror understanding, because my 
suggestions involve working together during the trial rather than relying on both 
providing and using effectively aides memoire prior to and post-trial.   
 
I suggested that the main justification for integrating Freire’s work into the trial was 
that it offers a real opportunity to understand better how verdicts are formed and 
perhaps more importantly, where the challenges arise for the jury and ways in which we 
can respond immediately to those challenges.  I conclude this section by reiterating that 
if we employ Freire’s methods in the trial we will most likely see very tangible changes 
in juror understanding in future.  Indeed, I would go so far as to argue that if we 
continue to try to reform the system of trial by jury through regarding the jury as a 
separate entity we will continue to misunderstand their potential for the trial process. 
 
6.4 Conclusions relating Boal’s theories to participatory communication 
In chapter four I introduced the work of Augusto Boal, fundamentally because I felt that 
through the use of his Theatre of the Oppressed techniques we could come closer to 
improving participation in the trial.  Thus, by enhancing communication through 
participation, which is integrated into the trial process and facilitated by Boal’s Joker, I 
have developed a conceptual trial framework which, I suggest, is not only robust enough 
to enable and support trials which see and hear clear, concise and precise 
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communication between legal professionals and jurors but also to withstand criticism 
from those perhaps a little less open to the changes that I propose.  
To contextualise Boal’s work, in chapter five I put forward a number of ideas which I 
suggest could enhance participation during the trial through various participatory 
techniques but I think, on reflection, the key to much of the progress in this area is 
seen in Boal’s Joker.  I said that Boal’s Joker asks for a problem to be investigated 
through performance: he does not regard the problem as a truth which is to be 
demonstrated in the performance and so the integration of the Joker to enable the 
investigation to take place and this, I regard as one of the keys in this investigation.  
Indeed, in chapter five I highlighted the scope for the integration of the Joker as a 
means to enhancing participation: he opens the way to interaction, both physical and 
oral, for the jury and the legal professionals and so can empower the jurors to clarify 
their own understanding whilst in dialogue with legal professionals as the trial is in 
progress.  Indeed, I highlighted in chapter two that one of the justifications for 
continued use of the jury is that its participation in criminal trials brings with it 
legitimacy, democracy and fairness.  However, on these points I have stressed that 
these ideals can only really be a reality if there is true participation and the way that I 
have addressed that issue is to suggest the use of Boal’s Joker as a facilitator to enable 
such participation.  I said in chapters four and five that I thought Boal’s Joker could 
ideologically be the key to breaking new ground in jury research – I conclude that Boal’s 
Joker is a very realistic way to develop both our understanding of the jury and the 
jury’s understanding of its task.  I should say that I do not presuppose that simply by 
allowing space for the Joker all of the doubts, fears or questions in regard to the jury 
will suddenly disappear.  However, I do argue, first, that Boal’s Joker can improve 
participation and understanding of the jury in trials and, second, that it could improve 
our understanding of juries by providing a research technique which offers insights into 
juries that are currently lacking. 
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6.5 A vision for the future? 
“It seemed to me that what happened inside the picture frame had to be made as 
fascinating as possible. So, from the very start my biggest interest was on the 
design. It seemed to me that the image that you saw through the picture frame 
was the image of another world […] it had to be exciting because it was 
unexpected.”2 
 
In chapter five I discussed how the architecture of the courtroom can inspire 
expectations of theatricality or performance in a jury and I punctuated my discussion 
with reference to, inter alia, Clare Graham’s observations of the ceremony which 
attaches to the trial and her opinion that the courtroom itself is “a setting for a tense, 
tightly organized and complex drama.”3  I concluded the chapter observing that there is 
no doubt that with a criminal trial comes some sort of theatricality, whether that is 
necessarily a tightly organized and complex drama is a moot point but there is no doubt 
as to the presence of a theatricality.  This theatricality is also a dominant factor in 
peoples’ perceptions or preconceived notions of what a criminal trial is about.  Indeed I 
have also mentioned that a person’s immediate image of justice is often an exciting 
one, unravelling week after week in television dramas or hyped in the media during 
particularly horrific, but nevertheless captivating, criminal trials.  Therefore I suggest 
that we undermine at our peril the potent effect that these images have and carry to 
the jury especially as these exciting images are readily available in daily life.  At this 
stage in the thesis I am not so interested in re-assessing the theatricality as it is played 
out in the course of a trial but rather I am interested in pointing forward to how I 
believe the space, interior design, architectural layout, colours, lights and so on affect 
the jurors’ capacity to act as autonomous thinking human beings by suggesting that, as 
a result of these design techniques, coupled with our innate instinct to defer to space, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Peter Brook interview on design for his 1946 production of Love’s Labour’s Lost in Moffitt, D. 
(ed.), (1999), Between Two Silences: Talking with Peter Brook, Great Britain, Methuen, p. 76. 
3 Graham, C. (2003), Ordering Law: The Architectural and Social History of the English Law Court 
to 1914, Aldershot and Vermont, Ashgate, p.2 
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our judgement of our own abilities in our part as jurors in the trial may be subliminally 
controlled or compromised.   
 
This is something which Linda Mulcahy touches on when she implies that a person’s 
image of justice is based on what he sees at the material time, no more and no less.4  
An almost identical scenario is seen in the stereotypical theatre show, which perhaps 
explains why parallels continue to be drawn between the two. Normal stage actions will 
appear real to the audience if the portrayal is convincing and so audience members are 
inclined to accept it – maybe only temporarily – as an objective truth. The same is 
implied by Mulcahy’s perception of how the criminal trial is interpreted and through the 
image comes the truth and, from there, the ideal image of the trial. But what if that 
objective truth is misplaced? Has the initial image of justice become distorted by the 
trappings of justice, and by what means can we redress the balance to produce a more 
accurate picture of this increasingly elusive image of justice?  I have suggested ways to 
do that throughout, in respect of the participatory aspects of the trial however I now 
point out that we should also be aware of how the actual space affects those using it.  
Some argue that the jury is hampered in its ability to participate because of the 
segmentation and segregation of the courtroom – I have demonstrated how this need 
not be the case by introducing Boal’s Joker.   
 
Bertold Brecht introduced the distanciation effect in theatre and in an area of research 
that I would like to pursue in the future, I wonder how, if we were to introduce such a 
device to the trial, the participants’ image of their part may be altered.5  The 
fundamental point of the alienation device is to appeal to the audience member to work 
for himself, thus becoming more responsible for accepting what he sees. Normal stage 
action will appear real to the audience member if it is portrayed in a convincing way, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Mulcahy, L. (2011), Legal Architecture: Justice, due process and the place of law, Oxon and New 
York, Routledge, esp. chapter 2. 
5 Brecht, B. (1964), Brecht on Theatre, edited and translated by John Willett, New York, Hill and 
Wang.  
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and the same can be said of testimony in a trial.  But what if our initial perceptions 
were altered - if the immediate action were followed by Brecht’s Clown, whose job it is 
to displace the initial emotional reaction?6  This distanciation device challenges our 
initial response to the situation, thus forcing us to reconsider where our sympathies lie, 
and why they lie there, calling into question our initial assumptions about the situation.  
The use of this device could alter dramatically the way in which people view their part 
in the trial and so challenge their image not just of justice but of the part they play in 
that justice thus instilling in them the importance of their part.  Add to the Clown, the 
Joker and what emerges is a participation which transcends architectural barriers 
ultimately freeing the trial participants from deference to their allocated space and 
enhancing their part in the trial by making space for them to communicate.  Moreover, 
and perhaps more subtly, the use of the Joker or the Clown could enable the barriers, 
both physical and metaphorical, to be dissolved, so creating a trial situation where 
there is no room for segregation and segmentation, where people feel able to move 
from their allocated zones to areas which they had hitherto been unable to enter 
physically and metaphorically.  Indeed, these devices reinvent the idea of physical 
space because they allow people to move in and out of their allotted zones, to act and 
react to the action, and to take ownership of a situation which otherwise they could 
not.  I discussed this in greater detail in chapter five but I feel it worthy of a reminder 
at this stage as I draw to a conclusion by looking to the future for trial by jury.  I should 
also mention that not only do Boal or Brecht offer alternative ways to communicate 
through participation but also the Joker or the Clown have the capacity to disrupt 
people’s expectations of the norm, altering or challenging their perspective of ‘their 
space’ and how they should perform within it. 
 
Finally, as I have made clear in reference to his Theatre of the Oppressed, Boal did not 
rely on theatre buildings or stages for his work to have significant impact.  He played 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Brecht’s Clown was a device used to disrupt or alienate the passive audience members. 
Alienation is a technique to halt the process, to interrupt the action, to make us look again at a 
situation we thought we had understood. 
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with the use of space in these genres and in his Theatre of the Oppressed workshops to 
distort, to displace but ultimately to encourage the participant to understand and own 
the space, thereby gaining a sense of empowerment through their understanding of the 
impact of that space.7   
 
Similarly I do not necessarily envisage the need for the architecturally traditional 
courtrooms with their inherent segmentation and segregation for my vision of future 
trials.  Whilst in this thesis I have offered alternatives for communication within the 
traditional courtrooms I now say that a great deal more could be learned about our 
attitudes to the power of space division if we view it from a different perspective 
entirely.  Consequently, if we move the process from its traditional place then we may 
see that the inherent design barriers, often associated with self and system controls, 
are not necessarily confining and that they are able to be overcome provided there are 
valid channels for communication available to support that journey.  Thus, as a 
development of this journey I would propose to examine the implications of the work of 
theatre director Peter Brook, particularly in The Empty Space8 where he challenges a 
person’s perspective of their place in any space, be that an arena or a pit theatre or 
the work of theatre companies Grid Iron or La Fura dels Baus, as I have already 
mentioned, whose productions transcend physical barriers completely.  They are both 
site specific and site responsive companies, who develop work outside in swing-parks, 
stadiums, fields, hospital wards and public bars and their performance styles quite 
literally go beyond those which are considered to be traditionally theatrical.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7See for example Boal, A. (1992), Games for Actors and Non-Actors, translated by Adrian Jackson, 
London and New York, Routledge where he guides the user through a series of techniques to 
enable this awareness.   
8 Brook, P. (1968), The Empty Space, Middlesex, England and Victoria, Australia, Penguin. 
9 For example, in La Fura’s La divina comèdia - macro-performance in which large staging 
elements would become integrated into the whole piece.  These elements would later become a 
feature of La Fura’s work and cannot work without the integration and participation of the 
audience. www.lafura.com/web/cat/obras_ficha.php?o=79  Similarly Grid Iron’s “Decky does a 
Bronco” (2010) was set in a children’s play-park; Barflies (2009) was set in Edinburgh’s Barony 
Bar and their first full-scale site specific piece “Bloody Chamber” (1997) was set on the landside 
and airside areas of Edinburgh International Airport. 
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6.6 Conclusion to chapter six 
The idea that the continued use of the jury is justified on the basis that its participation 
brings a legitimacy to the criminal trial was one of the core building blocks of my thesis.  
This notion, as I have highlighted throughout, is premised on the fact that the jury do, 
in fact, participate in a meaningful sense, something which I have challenged in the 
course of the project, maintaining that, as it currently stands, there is no space in the 
trial framework for the jury to participate meaningfully.  Thus, the over-riding aim of 
my research was to consider the scope for transforming the institutional framework of 
trial by jury from a structure which has little or no room for jury participation to a 
structure which embraces the jury, makes space for it to be an equal part of the 
process and treats it, not as a subsidiary, but rather as an integral part of the system 
for determining guilt.  In order to achieve that conceptual aim I challenged one of the 
fundamental validating factors that has been attached to trial by jury for decades: the 
belief that jurors actually participate in the trial.  Indeed, I proposed right from the 
start that the notion of participation is just that, a notion with no substance 
whatsoever.  I have demonstrated why I regarded this to be the case and I have made 
provision to tip the balance in favour of meaningful juror participation.  Whether the 
actual participation is obviously active is a matter of personal preference of interaction 
from the individuals involved, however, I have made provision for active participation 
should that be the way that the juror chooses to be involved. 
I felt that to understand participation was to understand where not just the jury, but all 
of the trial players, are challenged by the trial process.  I have re-imagined a trial 
structure which has built bridges of dialogue and from that dialogue I have argued that 
better understanding of legal terminology - which is rooted in empowered people who 
have both wisdom and integrity - can be achieved.  In that respect alone I suggest that I 
have enabled a more nuanced, but at the same time refreshingly broad understanding 
of the system of trial by jury in the ideas put forward in this thesis. 
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I have invited the reader on a journey which reimagines the role of the jury in the 
criminal trial.  Along the way I have challenged core elements of the current system and 
I have made suggestions for reform which some may find too radical or just too 
impractical.  Regardless, I hope that the ideas advanced in my thesis demonstrate that 
it is possible for the jury to make the transition from merely being present in the 
courtroom to being meaningful participants in the trial.  I remind the reader for the 
final time that I have undertaken this whole process of investigation from both an 
ideological and a conceptual perspective.  I have a theoretical understanding of the law 
and I have practical experience both as a performance artist and a teacher.  I bring all 
of these experiences together and the thesis is thus a reflection of those ideas. 
The ideas that I have developed in this thesis have their roots in theories which were 
developed to support and enable active and positive communication in the face of 
extreme oppression.  As Paulo Freire and Augusto Boal presented their theories and 
techniques to empower, so I present their theories as ideas for a system of trial by jury 
for the future which has at its roots fundamental recognition of the ability of the person 
to undertake the task of juror, to understand the trial, and to deliver a verdict which is 
based in the knowledge that he has developed his knowledge in the process.   
I argued at the beginning of this thesis that my ideas have dual benefit: that they offer 
a way to improve understanding and participation by juries in criminal trials and that 
they might offer research insights into juries in that they may provide evidence that is 
currently lacking about where during the trial problems might arise thus potentially 
improving our understanding of how juries operate.  When I began writing I did so from 
an ideological perspective and I thought that my ideas and visions would remain only as 
ideas and visions.  As I end the project I now see how valuable and valid the ideas are 
and so I hope that they may be developed in future and may one day may be tested in 
reality and not reserved to concepts and theory alone.   
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